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DEFINITIONS
Control Station (CS) – FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 16 (FAA, 2017) defines as the structure or
system (ground, ship, or air-based) that controls the UAS and its interface to the aircraft and external
systems.
Emergency – According to the FAA Pilot/ Controller Glossary, an emergency occurs during a
distress or urgency condition FAA, 2017. Usually the result of a systems failure or environmental
effects. Distress emergencies are immediately perilous, such as engine failure. An urgent condition is
potentially catastrophic in the near future, such as low fuel condition or hazardous weather. (AIM,
Chapter 6, para. 6-1-2, FAA, 2016.) For the purposes of this research, the term "abnormal" (or "offnominal") is included under the definition of an "emergency", as only distress or urgent "abnormal"
conditions are considered. Also included is the term "contingency operations" – operations of UA
following an emergency. Coordination with ATC is expected to be conducted in the same manner as
for manned aircraft during these events. (UAS Contingency Operations Literature Review, FAA,
2016.)
Pilot-in-Command (PIC) – a pilot-in-command will always have responsibility for the
unmanned aircraft while it is operating. (UAS Roadmap, para. 1.4.3, FAA, 2013.) The PIC has
final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight. (14 CFR 1.1(1).)
Procedure – a preplanned series of actions (steps) to accomplish a specific end task. Generally,
amplified checklist procedures contained in the operator's manual identify procedures for each
aircraft.
Standards (Pilot and Crew) - the minimum degree of proficiency to which the task must be
performed.
Task – a specific operation that a crewmember is responsible to be able to successfully perform,
as exemplified by the FAA's task list in its Practical Test Standards (PTS). Tasks may be divided
into two subtypes: 1) Technical tasks – measure the crewmember's ability to plan, preflight, brief,
run-up and operate onboard systems and sensors. Flight conditions are not required as a prerequisite.
2) Performance tasks – measure the crewmember's ability to perform in-flight tasks, under specific
conditions by control manipulation or control station input.
Unmanned aircraft - an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention
from within or on the aircraft. (14 CFR 107.3). For the purposes of this research, the UA will include
those aircraft that exceed the weight of the small UA category or has the capability for beyond visual
line-or-sight or IFR operations. A small unmanned aircraft weighs less than 55 pounds on takeoff,
including everything that is on-board or otherwise attached to the aircraft. (14 CFR 107.3).
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) - An unmanned aircraft system (UAS), comprises of an
unmanned aircraft system, control equipment including the control station and data terminal, and
support equipment including launcher (if required) spares and consumables.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) conducted
research focused on minimum operational procedures used by Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) operators. ASSURE project A10: Human Factors Considerations in UAS Procedures and
Control Stations was developed to investigate pilot procedures and operating practices for the
purpose of developing recommendations.
This research addressed a need regarding the identification of tasks and procedures used in
performing larger than 55 lbs civil UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). A
literature review identified current and past practices for developing per-phase-of-flight
minimum operating procedures. The entire ASSURE A10 project examined the information
needs, environmental needs, and minimum pilot and operational procedures for control stations
based upon human factors design considerations and anticipated UAS operations. The research
further examined the operational needs control stations must support including the execution of
pilot procedures, and how those procedures differed from manned aircraft operations.
The research in this report addresses the portion of A10 related to recommendations for potential
operational requirements and pilot procedures. Two research questions supported our
investigation of these tasks. They were: 1) What are the minimum pilot procedures needed to
operate a UAS in the NAS safely? and 2) What are the potential minimum operating
requirements applicable to the operation of a UAS larger than 55 lbs. in the NAS?
The approach used in this research included an examination of existing UAS and manned
requirements, practices, and procedures. The team investigated commonalities and differences in
procedures, practices, and requirements among different UAS systems and between UAS and
manned aircraft operations. Past and current practices were used to develop initial recommended
minimum pilot and operating requirements and procedures. Validation of procedures using a
universal mission simulator with Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE) software
replicated the Vehicle Control Software (VCS) for control station functionality of unmanned
aircraft (UA) control, payload control, communications, data dissemination, and mission
planning. The validation considered three types of observations, including: 1) Normal and
abnormal procedural performance observations to validate if the recommended procedures were
comprehensive and accounted for all potential minimum requirements needed; 2) Contingency
procedural observations to validate the completeness of recommended contingency procedures;
and 3) User interface observations to validate control station controls, layout, and command and
data entry sequences supported all minimum recommended procedures.
This report presents the key results comprised of four pilot and 46 operational minimum
recommended procedures necessary for a control station to operate a civil single-engine, fixedwing, single-pilot-configured UAS flying in beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) conditions.

xiv
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1. INTRODUCTION
This research provides recommended guidance toward the development of pilot requirements,
practices, and operational procedures. Currently, there is no standard for UAS minimum
operational requirements and pilot procedures for Control Stations (CS). Based on varying levels
of UAS CS automation and design, there is a significant lack of knowledge and understanding
regarding a common set of tasks and conditions for UAS pilots performing civil UAS operations
in the NAS, and how those procedures may differ from manned aircraft pilot procedures.
Operation of UAS from control stations creates new concerns including, control station handoff
procedures; lost link control procedures; lost link troubleshooting procedures; establishing
procedural roles and responsibilities of crewmembers; duty and rest requirements; minimum
flight crew requirements; operations during data link degradation and loss; and operations during
periods of decreased sensory cues from aircraft and environment. A common set of operational
procedures must be established to safely integrate UAS into the National Airspace System with
the same level of safety assurance, which currently exists in the operation of manned aircraft
today.
This research was organized into three research tasks as depicted in Figure 1. Research task 1,
referred to as PC-1, provided a literature review. Research task 2, referred to as PC-2, served as
the development phase of the recommended pilot and operational procedures. Research task 3,
referred to as PC-3, validated the recommended operational procedures using a representative
human-factor-designed CS capable of operating a UAS applying the research assumptions. The
findings from PC-1 became initial recommendations for PC-2. PC-3 validated the procedures
from PC-2 using a control station, capable of meeting planned assumptions, in a simulated
environment.

Figure 1. Research tasks flow diagram.
Section 2 describes the assumptions considered for this research. Assumptions were developed to
establish a framework for which common recommendations could be made. Section 3
acknowledges limitations of the study to indicate risks that potentially influenced the
recommendations for minimum operational needs and pilot procedures. The research questions
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presented in Section 4, were identified from knowledge gaps about common operational
procedures necessary for the development of minimum standards for UAS control stations.
The findings for each component are communicated in this report. Section 5 provides
information about existing UAS and manned requirements, practices, and procedures collected
during the literature review. Section 6 organizes the minimum recommended pilot and
operational procedures, which used current and past practices discovered from the literature
review to develop initial recommended minimum pilot and operating requirements and
procedures. Section 7 describes the validation processes used in a simulated environment to
examine three types of observations including, 1) Normal and abnormal procedural performance
observations to validate if the recommended procedures were comprehensive and accounted for
all minimum recommendations needed, 2) Contingency procedural observations to validate the
completeness of recommended emergency operations, and 3) User interface observations to
validate that control station controls, layout, and command and data entry sequences supporting
all minimum recommended procedures.
Research
Task
PC-1
PC-2
PC-3

Topic
Literature Review of Pilot Procedures & Operational Requirements
Standard Operating Procedures Framework
Validation Process for the Operating Procedures

Section
5
6
7

Table 1. Research task breakout.
Appendices depict information according to research task. The information contained within
these appendices comprises individual PC reports previously submitted to the FAA. This
information was organized and presented to provide details within a consolidated report, rather
than referencing previously submitted reports.
The data provided in Appendix A, collected during the literature review phase of the PC-1
research task, describes commonalities and differences in procedures and practices among
different UAS systems and between UAS and manned aircraft. Tasks are organized by phase of
flight. Each task was analyzed by 1) common requirements between UAS, 2) common
requirements between unmanned and manned aircraft, and 3) unique differences between UAS
or UAS and manned aircraft.
The data presented in Appendix B was also collected during the literature review phase of the
PC-1 research task. Tasks were aligned with requirements according to the phase of flight. The
phase of flight method was selected as a logical approach based on a natural order of flight tasks,
which began prior to take-off and completed at engine shutdown after landing.
Appendix C was developed during the validation of requirements and procedures phase of the
PC-3 research task. The appendix is organized as an operational procedures matrix with the 46
operational procedures aligned to the 13 flight test cards used in the validation process.

2
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Appendix D presents each of the 13 flight test cards. Each of the flight test cards has four
observations. Observations were initially hand written during the data collection process;
however, these were transcribed into electronic format in this appendix to communicate observer
remarks in this report.
Appendix E presents the results of the validation. Not all operational requirements or procedures
were validated using the representative device in a simulated environment because they were
independent of the control station. These requirements or procedures were compared to manned
and unmanned aircraft requirements and procedures. The recommended minimum operational
requirements and procedures focus on high-level needs for UAS pilots such as roles and
responsibilities, duty and rest considerations, and minimum recommended requirements served
by the role of PIC.
Research
Task
PC-1
PC-1
PC-3
PC-3
PC-3

Topic
Comparisons by Phase of Flight
Initial Recommendations by Task
Operational Procedures Matrix
Flight Test Cards with Observed Results
Validation Results

Appendix
A
B
C
D
E

Table 2. Appendix by research task to support recommendations in section 6.
2. ASSUMPTIONS
A series of assumptions relating to a generic fixed-wing unmanned aircraft (UA) with a
maximum takeoff weight greater than 55 pounds was considered during this research for
defining proposed operational requirements and procedures that apply to a broad set of UAS
operations for full-integration into the NAS. These assumptions helped establish proposed
operational requirements and subsequent procedures that were derived.
All elements of the system and flight operations were based upon several broad assumptions as
to what makes up a UA that is capable of fully integrating into the NAS. These assumptions were
as follows:
• The UA had a maximum takeoff weight greater than 55 pounds.
• The UA was a fixed-wing aircraft.
• The UA had a single power plant.
• A crew with a single pilot was required for flight.
• The pilot using the CS controlled a single unmanned aircraft.
• Flight operations were conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR).
• Flight operations were conducted day or night, as dictated by required equipage.
• Flight operations were conducted over people.
• Flight operations took place in airspace classifications D, E, and G, including both
towered and non-towered airports.

3
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•

Flight operations may take place under varying levels of traffic conditions.

With the above assumptions, additional inferences were made such that the system met
requirements to operate in the NAS. Equipage, operating limitations, and operational scenarios
were extrapolated from the initial assumptions listed above. This context was used to derive
basic operational requirements.
3. LIMITATIONS
The focus of the operational procedures was on civil aircraft operations; however, several publicuse UAS were reviewed because of the lack of existing civil UAS operations for aircraft
weighing greater than 55 pounds. The primary limitation of the research was the availability of
documentation for UAS weighing greater than 55 pounds that were not deemed proprietary by
the manufacturer or restricted by International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or Export
Control requirements.
UAS tasks and standards were compared only to FAA Airplane Single-Engine Land Commercial
Practical Test Standards (PTS), Aircraft Certifications Standards (ACS), and relevant tasks in the
Instrument ACS. Where there were gaps in the literature that precluded a review of a specific
area or type of UAS, future research was suggested. Recommended requirements and procedures
for additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual observers (VOs), and other essential
crew were not included in this research.
Based on the assumptions for operations in class D, E, and G airspace varying levels of traffic
conditions may require additional requirements or procedures to be developed; however, the
procedures recommended in this research were considered the minimum recommendations for
varying levels of class D, F, and G airspace with consideration of the PTS and ACS reviewed.
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Consistent with the FAA’s goals for safe integration of civil UAS into the national airspace
system, the following research questions were the focus of this investigation to support
identification of tasks necessary to identify operational procedures for minimum standards for
CSs.
1. What are minimum pilot procedures that a RPIC must execute to operate in the NAS?
2. What are the minimum operating requirements applicable to the operation of a UAS
larger than 55 lbs. in the NAS?
5. PC-1 LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of PC-1 was to conduct a literature review. The literature review surveyed practices
and procedures, developed from industry and the military, to provide direction toward the
development of procedures related to unmanned operations. Details supporting the outcomes of
the literature review can be found in Appendices A through C.

4
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In reviewing existing procedures, certain characteristics for successful procedures were
considered. Research by Degani and Wiener (1997) suggested that a procedure consists of the
following: 1) Stating the end task, 2) When the task is conducted, 3) How the task is done (the
action steps), and 4) By whom it is conducted (e.g. pilot vs. sensor operator, etc.).
Standardized procedures were essential to store the collective wisdom of the organization and
should be logical and efficient. Even though preplanned procedures cannot cover the unimagined
emergency, good procedures were the most effective method of disseminating knowledge of
proper system operation. In most cases, at a minimum, the pilot must have been able to correctly
diagnose the malfunction and apply the appropriate emergency procedure. Also see AC120-71B,
Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers,
(2017).
PC-1 sampled public and civil use UAS capable of flight under IFR and beyond visual line of
sight. Procedures obtained from nine different UAS manufacturers were compared against
manned procedures contained in the FAA Airplane Single-Engine Land Commercial Practical
Test Standards (PTS), Aircraft Certifications Standards (ACS), and relevant tasks of the
Instrument ACS. Each phase of flight was reviewed. The reviewed requirements and procedures
available for each selected task were described using the following three statements for clarity:
1) Common practices among UAS, 2) Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft, and
3) Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems.
5.1 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY
The literature review was organized according to phase of flight (i.e. preflight, taxi, takeoff, enroute, landing, and after landing) for nominal procedures, and abnormal and emergency
procedures. Review of the extant literature indicated many procedures common among the
unmanned platforms surveyed as well as many notable differences. Similarities and differences
were compared between UAS-to-UAS and UAS-to-manned and it was noted that procedures
varied widely between phases of flight. A common observation from the literature review is that
unmanned aircraft pilots have adapted to manned standards and procedures as closely as possible
when technology and safety have made it possible to do so. However, under circumstances
where technology is needed to address the lack of an onboard human pilot, the procedures
deviated. Details regarding the UAS-to-UAS and UAS-to-manned procedures can be found in
Appendix A.
The research included procedures obtained from manufacturers and operators as well as
information from FAA advisory circulars, orders and manuals. Military operational procedures
were included because of the lack of existing procedures for the integration of UAS weighing
more than 55 pounds in the NAS. Where applicable, foreign sources were included. Effort was
made to maintain a civilian vernacular instead of using terms familiar to military operations.
As part of the literature review for commonalities and differences between UAS-to-UAS and
UAS-to-manned procedures, a study of other recent publications was conducted. The following
four publications were found to beneficial in information and theory:

5
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1. SAE International had published research titled, "Pilot Training Recommendations for
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations". (APR5707, 2010, reaffirmed 2016.)
Although this document concerned training and civil pilot certification, it was interesting to
note its assumption that final pilot certification standards (even for larger-than-small UAS)
did not require any manned aircraft experience. The document stated:
Unlike manned flight, the sensory cues upon which pilots relied for information about the
state of the aircraft were absent in UA Ground Control Stations (GCS) (Williams, 2008).
Seagle (1997, as cited in Thompson, Tvaryanas, & Constable) reported that the lack of
sensory feedback may contribute to launch and recovery accidents. In their discussion of
sensory feedback as a factor in UA mishaps, Thompson, Tvaryanas, &
Constable
(2005) suggested that pilots with prior flight experience were more likely to note the
absence of sensory feedback. Furthermore, in their investigation of the effects prior flight
experience on UA pilot skills, Schreiber, Lyon, Martin, and Confer (2002) stated that
their military pilot participants reported that the landing task was quite difficult. The
authors suggested that training to “unlearn” some previously acquired piloting skills may
be required for experienced pilots transitioning to unmanned aircraft.
2. A review of control station research pursuant to NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project was presented by Fern, Rorie and
Shively at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 58th Annual Meeting (2014). They
had used the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Vigilant Spirit Control Station
(VSCS) as a prototype control station display suite because it offered the necessary
sophistication and was a highly flexible and changeable test bed. Three simulations were
completed consisting of: 1) Determining a baseline performance of UAS pilots operating in
civil airspace under current instrument flight rules for manned aircraft. 2) Examining the
effect of currently employed UAS contingency procedures on Air Traffic Control (ATC)
participants. 3) Comparing three CS command and control interfaces on UAS pilot response
times in compliance with ATC clearances.
3. A recent study by Hobbs and Lyall (2015) entitled "Human Factors Guidelines for
Unmanned
Aircraft System Ground Control Stations" and conducted under NASA’s integration project
was released in September, 2015 for review and comment. The study provides preliminary
guidelines for control station design for beyond line-of-sight UAS.
The Hobbs & Lyall study relied upon the assumptions in the FAA UAS roadmap (2013)
which had been used to define the responsibilities that were assigned to the pilot of a UAS
operating in the NAS. These responsibilities were used to define the tasks that UAS pilots
must perform with the CS, and therefore dictated the minimum features a CS must contain.
The points of difference between UAS and manned aviation had been used to further focus
the guidelines.
4. Another valuable report was "A Review of Training Requirements for UAS, sUAS, and
Manned Operations" (Gildea, Williams, and Roberts, 2015). This report was in draft at the
time of this review and may change before final release by the FAA. The report was directed
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to the study of training requirements, but the methods of comparing training requirements to
the FAA Practical Test Standards was useful as tasking and training are crossover areas.
5.2 UAS-TO-UAS OBSERVATIONS
Not all UAS have the same capabilities or design purposes and therefore differences in software
complexities and cockpit designs were observed. Despite varying technologies to achieve
acceptable levels of safety, recommended minimum operational procedures and minimum
requirements were provided. These recommended minimums were considered minimal tasks the
UAS pilot needed to perform for safe integration into the national airspace. Details regarding the
UAS-to-UAS observations can be found in Appendix A.
UAS control stations varied as widely in operation and configuration as did manned cockpits of
the
early
20th
century.
As
stated
by
Hobbs
&
Lyall
(2015),
a CS contained controls and displays sourced from diverse commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
providers was likely to suffer from a lack of consistency and potential integration issues. This
may result in increased crew training requirements, reduced efficiency, and an increased
potential for operator errors.
5.3 UAS-TO-MANNED OBSERVATIONS
There were considerable differences in autonomy assumptions between manned and unmanned
aircraft. Although elevated levels of autonomy had been achieved in the "glass cockpits" of
manned aircraft, the designs were based on the pilot being able to manually fly the aircraft in the
event of electronics failure. This was not a valid assumption for some UAS, as the pilot cannot
simply turn off the autopilot and hand-fly the aircraft. There may be no "joystick" or other
method of manual control. The removal of the pilot as a backup system to the automated systems
was seen as an inherent risk associated with autonomy failure and a difference between manned
and unmanned operations. (See Beth Lyall of Research Integrations, Inc., Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society, 56th Annual Meeting, 2012.) Details regarding the UAS-to-manned aircraft
observations can be found in Appendix A.
The Preflight procedures were similar across manned and unmanned platforms. This was logical
because the difference in platforms was of no concern when it came to good airmanship.
Unmanned pilots performed planning similar to manned pilots, such as gathering all information
available prior to flight to support go/no-go decisions, complete flight planning, as well as
ensuring safety was observed. In contrast, large variations were discovered in en-route
navigation methods for unmanned aircraft. This may present a potential challenge for operating
in the NAS. Differing sources of altitude information were noted (i.e. GPS vs barometric,
electronic-map-embedded elevation data). Unless a requirement was set, it was important for
pilots to understand what internal and external awareness tools were available and these tools
varied compared to manned aircraft operations.
Designation of a single PIC was consistent between all platforms, manned and unmanned;
however, crew-changeover procedures presented the unique possibility of the incoming PIC
having not been present for, nor having participated in, all phases of flight such as preflight, taxi,
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takeoff, transfer of control, or en-route operations, while still executing the responsibilities of
PIC for the flight’s later procedures such as landing. Control Station Handoff procedures among
UAS were found to commonly include a requirement for briefings which included current
aircraft performance, navigation plan, current ATC clearance, command and control status, and
fuel remaining. Some of these hand-over procedures were unique to UAS.
While evaluating the landing phase, the commonality of automated landings appeared unique to
UAS as opposed to the literature reviewed for manned aircraft where this concept was less
utilized. Missed approaches and go-arounds were assessed to be similar between manned and
unmanned aircraft in intent and execution.
There were differences between manned and unmanned operations during failure of navigation
systems. UAS technology and platform reliance on internal navigation varied widely, to include
redundancy and back-up systems, such that no commonality could be assessed. BLOS aircraft
had few operations to bring the aircraft safely back to a landing airfield in the case of loss
navigation capability. Another unique difference was noted in that given visual meteorological
conditions (VMC), this emergency procedure concluded for manned aircraft upon successfully
reaching a landing field. Because of UAS dependence on internal navigation for landing, the
same procedures were not observed in unmanned aircraft operations.
There were minimal differences between manned and unmanned operations during taxi
operations. After-landing ground support procedures are similar except for the remote
communication element often associated with unmanned aircraft operations. After-landing taxi
procedures appeared common across manned and unmanned aircraft capable of taxi, because of
requirements to coordinate with tower and ground control during these phases. UAS procedures
relied upon ground support in many instances adding risk to any taxi operation that a manned
pilot may not incur.
5.4 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Manned and unmanned emergency procedures were similar when technology differences were
minimal. For example, manned aircraft procedures varied from unmanned procedures during
periods of intermittent or degraded downlink. In this situation, common considerations among
unmanned aircraft included the use of payload video, if available, to confirm uplink health, or in
emergency procedures, to navigate the aircraft to a better location, return to home, or navigate to
a flight termination location. Another notable difference was a lack of abnormal procedures in
unmanned operations compared to manned operations. For unmanned procedures, the procedure
was either normal or emergency.
This research highlighted characteristics of some UAS platforms during an emergency based on
autonomy design and level of technology. Though both unmanned and manned systems
standards and procedures call for the PIC to understand and operate within the performance
envelope of their aircraft for an emergency, a unique difference among unmanned aircraft
demonstrated the additional need to consider automated triggers. One reviewed UAS
automatically shut down the engine upon reaching the Initial Approach Point (IAP) when set in
an emergency condition, eliminating the ability to execute a missed approach. Another unique
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consideration among unmanned aircraft was a potential for a PIC during the en-route phase to be
non-current and/or not certified to land the aircraft if an emergency arose.
There were no flight termination procedures or standards for manned aircraft. Commonality was
found in emphasis for aircraft ditching locations and the concern about the safety of other
aircraft, resources, and people on the ground. This was observed frequently within emergency
procedures for unmanned aircraft. It was acceptable to terminate or ditch a UAS that might have
been recoverable if indications of any harm were possible to property or lives.
For the most catastrophic emergency, propulsion failure, all UAS’s reviewed had an engine
failure/engine out checklist or procedure. Most maintained electrical power for aircraft control,
navigation and communication. Unlike manned aircraft, most unmanned platforms did not
appear to have an in-flight engine restart capability.
Following the advent of federal regulation in aviation, Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM) and
Pilots Operating Handbooks (POH) had encapsulated a standard format for FAA approved crew
procedures and other information critical for the safe operation of civil aircraft in the NAS.
Unmanned operations documentation was subsequently lacking in commonality between
manned and unmanned operations as well as variance between UAS. Some UAS lacked an AFM
or POH for standardized flight procedures.
6. RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PILOT PROCEDURES (PC2)
This section proposes the recommendations for potential operational requirements and pilot
procedures. Operational requirements and procedures were derived following the conclusion of
the PC-1 literature review. Using the assumptions and information gathered from PC-1, along
with input from subject matter experts, the research team generated a series of tasks and
associated operational requirements for each phase of flight. The research team then generated
the recommended operational procedures for each requirement associated with the tasks within
each phase of flight. Procedures were organized under normal, abnormal, and emergency
procedure categories where appropriate. The research team then identified minimum
requirements and procedures for each task. These recommendations for potential operational
requirements and pilot procedures were then validated as part of PC-3. The results from the
validation are shown in Appendix F.
For this research, a minimum crew was considered for flight operations. The minimum crew
consisted of a RPIC in a single-pilot flight operation without any required support crew. These
proposed minimum operational requirements and procedures focused on tasks performed by the
RPIC throughout the various phases of flight, from takeoff through landing and final taxi.
Proposed requirements and procedures for additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual
observers (VOs), and other essential crew are outside of the scope of this research and were not
considered.
6.1 PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO UAS PILOTS
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The RPIC has the final authority in the safe operation of the UAS per 14 CFR Part 91.3.
➢ The RPIC must be able to communicate using standardized aviation phraseology and
protocol.
➢ The RPIC must perform all procedures required for the safe operation of the UA in
accordance with all applicable regulations. The RPIC must also maintain positional
awareness to ensure that right-of-way rules are followed.
➢ The RPIC must be knowledgeable of and be able to execute emergency procedures.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢

Exercise final authority in the safe operation of the UAS.
Use standardized phraseology and protocol when communicating.
Comply with applicable regulations.
Execute emergency procedures when required.

6.2 DUTY REQUIREMENTS
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Flight time limitations must be in accordance with the following portions of 14 CFR Part
91.1059:
- A normal pilot duty period must not exceed 14 hours within a 24 hour period.
- Flight time for one pilot must not exceed 12 hours within a 24 hour period.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Adhere to established duty and rest requirements.
➢ Do not exceed a 14 hour duty period within 24 hours.
➢ Do not exceed 12 hours of flight time within a 24 hour period.
6.3 REST REQUIREMENTS
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Rest requirements must be in accordance with the following portions of 14 CFR Part
91.1059:
➢ Rest period is defined per 14 CFR Part 91.1057:
“Rest period means a period of time required pursuant to this subpart that is free of all
responsibility for work or duty prior to the commencement of, or following completion
of, a duty period, and during which the flight crewmember or flight attendant cannot be
required to receive contact from the program manager. A rest period does not include
any time during which the program manager imposes on a flight crewmember or flight
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attendant any duty or restraint, including any actual work or present responsibility for
work should the occasion arise.”
➢ A minimum of 10 hours of rest is required preceding a normal duty period.
➢ A minimum of 10 hours of rest is required following a normal duty period.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Observe rest requirements in accordance with 14 CFR §91.059.
➢ Rest period is defined in 14 CFR §91.1057.
➢ Comply with the requirement to get, at minimum, 10 hours of rest prior to the start of a
normal duty period.
➢ Comply with the requirement to get, at minimum, 10 hours of rest following the end of a
normal duty period.
6.4 MINIMUM FLIGHT CREW
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The RPIC shall possess the following qualifications:
- The RPIC must possess a current UAS airman certification or the equivalent FAA
approved airmen certification is required to act as PIC.
- The RPIC must possess ratings appropriate to the UAS being flown, with a
minimum of an instrument rating or an equivalent certification.
- The RPIC must maintain currency in the same category of UAS being operated
and be proficient in the planned phase of flight as well as landing.
- The RPIC must have instrument currency per 14 CFR Part 61.57(c) and/or
61.57(d).
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ The RPIC must meet all operational requirements outlined above.
Minimum operational requirements and procedures related to flight operations were presented,
organized by phase of flight. Since they were minimum recommendations in nature, they form
the basis for addressing operational scenarios, from normal flight operations to emergency and
abnormal scenarios. Tasks were organized according to phase of flight (i.e. preflight, taxi,
takeoff, en-route, landing, and after landing). Each task identified the minimum requirement and
minimum procedure.
6.5 PREFLIGHT
6.5.1 Before Entering the Control Station
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be familiar with all available information concerning each flight,
including but not limited to, weather, alternate landing sites, ditching locations, flight
termination points, NOTAMs, required communication and clearances, and alternate
airport fuel requirements.
➢ During the flight planning process, the pilot is required to take terrain masking into
account to prevent loss of the primary command and control link. Lost-link procedures
must take terrain into account.
➢ The pilot must verify that the control station has the required power and reserve that is
appropriate for the flight.
➢ Prior to flight, the pilot should ensure that all control station environmental controls are
functioning properly.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Consult all relevant weather sources, including but not limited to those in the
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) 7.1. Consider a preflight weather briefing.
➢ Determine alternate landing sites.
➢ Determine acceptable ditching locations that do not pose a risk to persons and/or
property.
➢ Determine flight termination points along the route of flight.
➢ Determine fuel/power supply requirements for the route of flight, accounting for the
required reserve.
➢ List alternate airfields along the route.
➢ Ensure the aircraft mission plan matches the mission plan filed with ATC. Thoroughly
review all elements of the aircraft flight plan, including fail-safe contingency mission
plans.
➢ Ensure adequate fuel/power supply for the planned mission, including requirements for
weather alternates as required.
➢ Review entire route of flight for appropriate divert, alternate, and emergency airfields and
ditch points.
➢ Consider terrain masking as part of flight planning. This includes lost-link contingencies.
➢ Ensure sufficient CS power is available for entire duration of operations.
➢ Ensure functionality of all equipment as required.
➢ Inspect environmental control systems.
6.5.2 Presets
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must inspect the control station for damage and ensure required equipment is
functional prior to initiating startup procedures.
➢ Require the pilot to have all documentation required for flight present and accessible
within the control station.
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➢ Any additional ground control equipment required for flight must be powered on and has
sufficient reserve power as required prior to the start of preset verification.
➢ The pilot will verify that the system powered up correctly.
➢ Maps and navigation data required for flight must be loaded and verified.
➢ The pilot must finalize the flight plan as part of the preset check and control station
configuration.
➢ The flight plan and any emergency flight plans or contingencies must be verified.
➢ The pilot must ensure that all command and control equipment is correctly configured for
communication with the aircraft.
➢ The pilot must set voice communication radios to the appropriate frequencies.
➢ Instrument approach plates, en-route charts, and any required supplements must be in the
control station and accessible to the pilot while the UA is in flight.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢

➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

Review CS maintenance logs.
Resolve open discrepancies, as required.
Inspect the control station.
Conduct an inventory of all appropriate publications to include but not limited to:
- Pilot operating handbook (POH),
- Checklists,
- Regulations,
- Standard operating procedures (SOPs),
- Aircraft weight and balance,
- Current FAA chart publications, and
- Full FAA chart coverage for the route.
Apply power to all required ground control equipment.
Verify that the control station and aircraft powered up correctly in accordance with the
applicable POH.
Ensure sufficient CS power is available for entire duration of operations.
Ensure functionality of all equipment, as required.
Load and verify all maps and navigation data that are required for flight.
Create, upload, and set mission plans.
Ensure that all command and control link equipment, both in the control station and
onboard the aircraft is correctly configured for flight.
Tune all voice communication radios to the appropriate frequencies.
Verify that all required approach plates, en-route charts, and any required supplements
are in the control stations and accessible.

6.5.3 Preflight Checks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be proficient in checklist usage and have the ability to properly identify
aircraft discrepancies. The pilot must also be knowledgeable with procedures for
deferring inoperative equipment and proper fuel and aircraft servicing.
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➢ The successful completion of any built-in test (BIT) must be verified by the pilot.
➢ The correct function of the throttle must be verified as part of preflight procedures.
➢ The pilot must set and verify the altimeter to the correct setting as part of preflight
procedures.
➢ Inertial Measurement Unit(s) (IMU) function checks must be conducted as part of
preflight procedures.
➢ The correct function of any flight-critical sensors must be verified.
➢ The command link, including any redundancies, must be verified to function at the
required signal strength(s) required for safe operation.
➢ Two-way communication radios must be checked for correct function.
➢ Flight controls must be checked for free and correct operation.
➢ The pilot must verify any inoperative equipment items in the MEL are functional prior to
flight.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

Verify successful completion of any built-in test (BIT).
Verify the correct function of the throttle control(s) as applicable.
Set/verify the altimeter.
Perform IMU function checks.
If applicable, perform payload function checks.
Perform a function check on all redundant command link systems. Ensure that all systems
function and are able to do so at the levels required for flight.
➢ Verify correct function of two-way communication radios by performing a radio check
with a controlling agency, crew, or visual observer as required.
➢ Verify flight controls and flight control surfaces are free and correct.
➢ Verify any inoperative items found on MEL during preflight have been cleared and
signed off.
6.5.4 Engine Start
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Prior to engine start, the pilot must verify that the proper safety equipment, such as a fire
bottle, is present and that the area is clear of hazards and/or non-essential personnel.
➢ Engine starting procedures must be communicated and coordinated between the pilot,
applicable ground control element, and any required ground crew.
➢ The pilot or other required crewmember must be able to properly perform the engine start
procedures.
➢ Engine health indications must be monitored by the pilot during and after the completion
of the engine start procedure.
➢ Prior to takeoff, the pilot must verify proper operation of the engine and engine indication
instrumentation/displays.
➢ The pilot must be knowledgeable on how to perform abnormal engine start procedures.
➢ The pilot and ground crew must have a means to command the immediate shutdown of
the UA engine in the event of an emergency.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Coordinate with crew/applicable personnel to ensure that required safety equipment is
present and that the area is clear of hazards and non-essential personnel.
➢ If applicable, establish communication with appropriate ground control element and
ground crew to coordinate engine start procedure.
➢ Ensure that the system is properly configured for engine start and begin engine start
procedures.
➢ Monitor engine health throughout the engine start procedure.
➢ Verify proper operation of the engine and all engine instrumentation.
➢ If applicable, perform abnormal engine start procedures.
➢ In the event of an emergency during engine start, perform an emergency engine
shutdown.
6.5.5 Pre-Taxi
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ If applicable, the pilot must coordinate with ground crews to ensure the airframe is free of
frost and/or ice prior to taxi.
➢ At airports with an operating control tower or ground control element, or where
separation from ground traffic cannot be ensured by the pilot, a crewmember must
communicate with ATC to receive taxi instructions.
➢ At airports without an operating control tower, the pilot must communicate with other
aircraft and/or utilize observers (as required) to ensure adequate traffic separation during
taxi.
➢ Prior to the start of taxi, all flight-critical avionics must be correctly set and configured.
➢ All essential crewmembers must be aware of the following:
- Taxi route,
- Known hazards along the route, and
- Contingencies.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Verify that the UA is free of frost and/or ice.
➢ If applicable, contact ATC and request taxi clearance/instructions. If at a non-towered
airport, communicate with other traffic on common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF)
and/or utilize visual observers or other available means to ensure separation from traffic
during taxi.
➢ Check all critical instrumentation for correct settings including but not limited to the
altimeter, navigation equipment, radios, etc.
➢ Ensure all flight displays are correctly set and configured for flight.
➢ Brief any participating crewmembers on the following:
- Taxi route,
- Known hazards along the route, and
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-

Contingencies to address any abnormal or emergency situations.

6.6 TAXI
6.6.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must verify that command and control data links are functioning within
operational limits for taxi.
➢ If brakes are installed, the pilot must perform a brake check to verify proper function of
aircraft brakes and brake indications.
➢ If the UA is capable of being taxied, a loss of data link during taxi operations shall result
in the autonomous stopping of taxi operations until the link can be regained.
➢ If the UA is so equipped, the pilot must be able to taxi with the assistance of visual aids
or markers to indicate the correct route.
➢ If a marshaller is used, the pilot must maintain two-way communications with the
marshaller, and if possible, maintain visual contact.
➢ If a marshaller is used, taxi operations must be conducted at a pace to be set by the
marshaller.
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and react to hazards on the taxiway, such as other
traffic and personnel with the help of a visual observer.
➢ If the pilot uses full motion video to taxi and no visual observer is utilized to assist, the
pilot must bring the UA to a stop if visual contact with the taxiway centerline is lost and
cannot be regained in a reasonable amount of time.
➢ The UA must be taxied at a speed that will allow the pilot to stop the aircraft within a
safe distance of traffic and obstacles.
➢ The pilot must maintain communication with ground control (when applicable) and any
applicable ground crew to be able to bring the UA to a stop at any time with a command.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Verify that command and control data links have the required signal strength and
reliability required for taxi.
➢ If brakes are installed, perform a check of brake function to ensure the UA may be
stopped at any point during taxi. If applicable, utilize ground crew to verify brake
function.
➢ If applicable, contact the ground control element if link is lost during taxi.
➢ Utilize visual aids and markers to assist with taxi operations to the maximum extent
possible.
➢ If possible, maintain two-way communication with a marshaller, if one is used.
➢ Conduct taxi operations at the pace of the marshaller or visual observer.
➢ When using full-motion video, stop UA if runway centerline is lost and contact cannot be
regained in a reasonable amount of time.
➢ Set taxi speed such that the UA is able to be brought to a stop within a safe distance of
obstacles and other traffic.
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➢ Maintain communication with ground control and/or applicable ground crew throughout
taxi.
6.6.2 Communications
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ All communications must be accomplished using standard aviation phraseology.
➢ Upon starting taxi operations, the pilot must maintain a sterile cockpit, restricting
communication to that which is directly related to the operation of the UA.
➢ The pilot should have an alternative means of communication available to them within
the control station (cellular phone, backup radio system, etc.).
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Communicate using standard aviation phraseology.
➢ Maintain sterile cockpit while taxiing.
➢ Use backup communications during primary communications failure.
6.6.3 Pre-Takeoff Checks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Checklists required for takeoff must be completed by both the pilot and any required
supporting crew prior to takeoff.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Complete any remaining pre-takeoff checks prior to taking position on the runway.
6.7 TAKEOFF
6.7.1 Communications
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ All communication with ATC or controlling agencies must utilize standard aviation
phraseology and adhere to standard ATC "read-back" requirements. The pilot must also
demonstrate understanding of takeoff, line up and wait, and hold clearances.
➢ Communication and coordination with ATC is required prior to takeoff. Standard
instrument flight communication protocols apply as appropriate.
➢ Contingencies for the loss of communication and the command link must be in place and
able to be executed autonomously or by the pilot prior to initiating a takeoff procedure.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Obtain ATC clearance in accordance with procedures in AIM Section 4.
➢ Record clearances in accordance with AIM 4-4-7a.
➢ Use backup communications during primary communications failure.
6.7.2 Takeoff Run/Launch
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Prior to takeoff, the pilot must perform a final check of all flight critical systems such as
the control surfaces, communication system(s), data link(s), engine instrumentation, and
other essential systems to ensure proper configuration for takeoff.
➢ A takeoff must not be performed unless it can be verified that the flightpath is clear of
traffic.
➢ Pilots must acknowledge takeoff clearances using standardized ATC communication
protocols.
➢ The following must be monitored during the UA takeoff run:
- The UA maintains the runway heading.
- The UA power plant is operating at takeoff power and within normal operating
parameters.
- There are no failures with the navigation system, communications, command and
control link, or any other flight-critical systems.
➢ A refused takeoff should be considered in the event of a flight-critical system failure.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Perform flight checks of any critical systems. Verify proper setting and strength of
required command link(s).
➢ Verify traffic is clear.
➢ Acknowledge receipt of clearance using standard phraseology and read-back practices.
➢ Maintain runway centerline and runway heading at rotation.
➢ Maintain takeoff power and monitor critical power plant operating parameters.
➢ Monitor flight-critical systems, including by not limited to:
- Navigation system,
- Two-way communications,
- Detect, sense and avoid equipment, as applicable
- Command and control link, and
- Any other flight-critical systems/equipment.
➢ Consider takeoff abort if an emergency situation develops.
6.7.3 Initial Climb Out
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be knowledgeable of UA takeoff and climb speeds as they apply to the
performance of the UA. Climbs must be performed as appropriate for obstacle clearance.
➢ When applicable, takeoff climbs must conform to ATC clearance.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Rotate at rotation speed (VR or VROT).
➢ Maintain the appropriate V-speed during climb out.
➢ Maintain ATC-instructed departure altitudes and headings, as applicable.
6.7.4 Aborted Takeoff
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and properly react to safety-critical failures during
takeoff and initial climb.
➢ The pilot must not fly below the minimum required airspeed at which the UA may be
controlled.
➢ Obstacles and hazards in and surrounding the airport environment must be known to the
pilot, which must include at a minimum, the available runway and obstacles within 30° of
the runway heading.
➢ Aborted takeoffs must be communicated to ATC as soon as practical.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Maintain an airspeed that allows positive control of the UA.
➢ Maintain a heading that is clear of obstacles.
➢ Communicate the aborted takeoff to ATC as soon as practical.
6.8 CLIMB TO ALTITUDE
6.8.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢

The pilot must operate two-way radio equipment as required.
The pilot must verify the aircraft is configured properly for climb.
The pilot must maintain assigned heading.
The pilot must level off at the assigned altitude.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)

➢ Maintain contact with ATC and perform frequency changes as requested.
➢ Ensure that the aircraft is configured for climb.
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➢ Maintain heading assigned by ATC unless cleared to deviate or climb/maneuver at pilot's
discretion.
➢ Level off at the assigned altitude.
6.9 EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS
6.9.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

The pilot must use proper communication procedures when utilizing radar services.
The pilot must comply with ATC clearance and advise if unable to do so.
The pilot must respond to ATC clearances using standard readback procedures.
The pilot must obtain an ATC clearance, as required.
The pilot must communicate using standard aviation phraseology.
The pilot must set navigation systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC
clearance.
➢ The pilot must establish two-way communication with the proper controlling agency.
➢ The pilot must identify, assess, and mitigate risks encompassing icing conditions.
➢ The pilot must perform operations checks as required. These checks will include fuel
level, oil temperature, engine operation (or propeller pitch operation), electrical, datalink,
and other engine parameters.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

Use proper communication procedures when using radar services (as applicable).
Obtain ATC clearance.
Respond to ATC clearance.
Comply with ATC clearance.
Use standard aviation phraseology when communicating with ATC.
Set navigation systems, and transponder codes to ensure compliance with ATC
clearances.
➢ Conduct any required communication frequency changes.
➢ Use available systems (if equipped) to detect icing conditions.
➢ Monitor aircraft electrical, propulsion, and datalink performance.
6.9.2 Navigation (Including GPS Availability)
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must maintain awareness of the airplane’s position using the available and
appropriate navigation system(s).
➢ The pilot must intercept and track a given course, radial, bearing, or navigational
reference as equipped.
➢ The pilot must recognize navigation signal loss and take appropriate action.
➢ The pilot must maintain the assigned altitude(s) and heading(s).
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➢ The pilot should follow the preplanned course by reference to steerpoints/waypoints or
other available navigational references as appropriate.
➢ The pilot should identify landmarks by relating surface features to chart symbols, if
equipped.
➢ The pilot should navigate by means of precomputed headings, groundspeeds, and elapsed
time, as applicable.
➢ The pilot should account for the effect of wind on maintaining desired route of flight and
its effect on performance.
➢ The pilot should verify the aircraft's position with respect to the planned flight route.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Monitor aircraft's position throughout the flight and maintain course in accordance with
ATC instructions/clearance.
➢ Intercept and track a given course, radial (if equipped), or bearing, as appropriate.
➢ Determine loss of GPS or primary navigation if it occurs.
➢ Maintain the appropriate altitude and headings.
➢ Maintain course by reference to established waypoints/steerpoints or other navigational
references, as applicable.
➢ If equipped, be able to identify surface features to chart symbols.
➢ If applicable, navigate by means of precomputed headings, groundspeeds, and elapsed
time.
➢ Correct for wind to maintain desired route and performance.
➢ Remain within planned route described in the flight plan.
6.9.3 En-route Climb
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ UA climb performance information must be known to the pilot, must be published in the
UAS POH, and available in the control station. This information must include:
- Absolute ceiling,
- Service ceiling,
- Climb performance based upon pressure altitude and temperature, and
- Time, fuel, and distance to climb
➢ ATC must be notified if unable to climb at a specified rate/gradient or to an assigned
altitude.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Conduct en-route climbs according to ATC clearance.
➢ Conduct climbs with respect to UA performance limitations, including but not limited to:
- Absolute ceiling,
- Service ceiling,
- Altitude and temperature, and
- Time, fuel, and distance to climb.
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➢ Notify ATC if the UA is unable to climb at a specified rate or gradient in accordance with
AIM 4-4-10(d).
6.9.4 En-route Course Change
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢

Course changes must conform to ATC clearance, as required.
The pilot must command the UA to fly the assigned heading to achieve a desired course.
The pilot must verify the UA is flying the correct heading to achieve the desired course.
The pilot must make corrections to maintain a desired course, as required.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)

➢
➢
➢
➢

Obtain and/or acknowledge clearance to change course from ATC.
Command the UA to fly the desired heading or course.
Verify the UA is flying the commanded heading and/or course using available flight data.
Make corrections to maintain heading and/or course as required.

6.9.5 En-route Descents
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ UA descent performance limitations must be known to the pilot. This information must
be published in the UAS POH and available to the pilot in the control station.
➢ UA performance and operating limitations must be known to the pilot. This information
must be published in the POH and available to the pilot in the CS.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Conduct descents in accordance with ATC clearance.
➢ Conduct descents with regard to UA limitations.
➢ Do not exceed UA performance limitations in descents.
6.9.6 Cruise Power Settings
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Aircraft fuel levels must be monitored while in flight, and power at cruise must be set to
achieve the desired performance for the planned flight.
➢ Computations for propulsion power settings at cruise must take the required fuel/battery
reserve into account.
➢ Cruise performance and fuel levels must be re-computed should airspeed, altitude, and
other variables be changed en-route.
➢ The pilot must be able to determine new performance capabilities/limitations if a flight
plan is altered due to change in purpose of flight or emergency.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Monitor UA fuel/battery status while in flight.
➢ Adjust power settings as required to maintain desired performance.
➢ Perform fuel burn/battery life calculations such that the destination is reached with the
required fuel/battery reserve remaining.
➢ Re-evaluate performance data as required to reach the destination at the required time
with the required fuel/battery reserves.
➢ Determine any new performance capabilities or limitations that may result from
alterations in the flight plan or an in-flight emergency.
6.9.7 Weather Monitoring
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be aware of weather conditions along the route of flight.
➢ The pilot must be aware of meteorological conditions that allow for the formation of
airframe icing and utilize anti/de-icing systems as required.
➢ Hazardous weather along the route of flight must be avoided whenever possible. The
pilot must coordinate to avoid potentially hazardous weather wherever possible.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Monitor weather conditions along the route of flight, establishing communications with
in-flight weather services as required.
➢ Determine if icing conditions exist and utilize anti/de-icing equipment as appropriate.
➢ When necessary, alter the flight plan to avoid weather that poses a hazard to the safety of
flight.
➢ Notify ATC if a flight plan must be altered to avoid hazardous weather.
6.10 DESCENT FROM CRUISE
6.10.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must conduct descents in a manner that does not impede or decrease the safety
of other air traffic
➢ The pilot must coordinate with ATC if using non-standard approach procedures.
➢ If applicable, the pilot must adhere to ATC clearances during descent.
➢ The pilot must ensure that the UA is configured for descent.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Descend to pattern altitude or an approach fix/initial approach waypoint in a manner that
does not impede or decrease the safety of other air traffic.
➢ If unable to perform a published instrument approach, coordinate approach procedures
with ATC prior to arrival at the initial approach fix.
➢ If applicable, comply with ATC clearance to descend.
➢ Ensure that the UA is configured for descent.
6.11 APPROACH
6.11.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Airspeed, altitude, heading, and system health parameters must be monitored while on
approach.
➢ Instrument approaches must be performed per the published approach procedures unless
a standardized alternative is available.
➢ If a visual observer is the sole means of verifying and clearing the landing path, ensure
that two-way communication is established prior to initiating the approach.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Monitor the airspeed, altitude, heading, and system health parameters while on approach.
➢ Perform approaches per the published approach plates unless a standardized approach
exists for specific unmanned system being flown.
➢ Ensure that the final approach path is clear of aircraft and obstacles.
➢ If a visual observer (VO) is the sole means of clearing the airspace for an approach,
ensure that two-way communication with the observer is maintained throughout the
approach.
6.12 LANDING
6.12.1 Communications
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Two-way communication must be established prior to arrival at the destination or when
passing through controlled airspace. Communications with the controlling agency must
be maintained while the UA is in controlled airspace.
➢ Communication during landing procedures must conform to standardized aviation
phraseology and be appropriate to the airspace in which the UA is operating.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Establish communication with local ATC when arriving at the destination or entering
controlled airspace, as applicable.
➢ Maintain communication with ATC when operating in controlled airspace. Acknowledge
and read back clearances per the AIM 4-4-7(b).
➢ Use standard phraseology to obtain ATC clearance for landing.
6.12.2 Approach and Landing (Human-in-the-Loop)
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be trained in all applicable landing procedures.
➢ The pilot must obtain clearance from ATC to land.
➢ The pilot must ensure that the UA is configured for landing.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Choose landing procedure appropriate to the type of approach and prevailing weather
conditions.
➢ Contact ATC and request clearance to land; acknowledge landing clearance when
received.
➢ Ensure that the UA is configured for landing prior to touchdown.
6.12.3 Go-Around
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ When considering executing a go-around, the pilot must assess the risk posed by
continuing to land when compared to the risk associated with the aborted landing.
➢ Intent to perform a go-around must be communicated to ATC as soon as it is practical to
do so.
➢ Go-around maneuvers must be executed at appropriate engine power settings to achieve a
climb gradient that allows the UA to remain clear of obstacles.
➢ Upon initiating a go-around, the UA must climb to a predetermined altitude that allows
for obstacle clearance.
➢ In the event of a go-around, the pilot must follow published missed approach procedures
and/or ATC clearance to re-attempt the approach.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

Communicate the go-around to ATC as soon as practical.
Abort landing prior to commitment point.
Maintain positive rate of climb.
Maintain runway centerline.
Climb to a predetermined altitude that ensures obstacle clearance.
Follow applicable missed approach procedures.
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➢ Coordinate with ATC as required to re-attempt the approach.
Recommended Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Assess the risk of performing a go-around.
6.12.4 Ground Support
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ If required for landing, ground support personnel must adhere to standardized procedures
to ensure operational safety and be properly briefed on required procedures.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ If required for landing, coordinate with any ground support personnel and brief them on
landing procedures.
6.12.5 Approach and Landing (Automated)
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Automated landings must be monitored by the pilot to ensure that the aircraft adheres to
performance limitations and approach parameters throughout the maneuver.
➢ The pilot must be able to interrupt an automated approach and landing in the event of an
emergency or to input corrections as needed to ensure a safe landing.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Monitor the aircraft on approach and ensure that it conforms to known performance
limitations on approach and landing.
➢ If required and the UA is so equipped, make manual control inputs to assist in guiding the
UA while on approach.
➢ If applicable, assume manual control of the UA in the event of an emergency.
6.13 POST-LANDING
6.13.1 Communications
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Communication must be maintained with ATC or the required controlling agency upon
landing. The pilot must be prepared to follow instructions relating to taxi, route of taxi,
and holding short for traffic.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Maintain communication with the applicable ATC element upon landing.
➢ Follow ATC instructions for taxi.
6.13.2 Taxi
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Communication and coordination with ATC and any required ground crew must be
maintained when taxiing clear of the runway.
➢ When taxiing clear of the runway, the pilot must have the ability ensure that the UA
remains clear of obstacles, vehicles, and other aircraft.
➢ The pilot is required to observe and comply with all signage and warning lights, if
equipped. If not equipped to visually identify signage and warning lights, the pilot must
follow instructions from ground crew or ground control element to the maximum extent
they are able.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Taxi on cleared route.
➢ If capable of taxi, maintain a taxi speed at the marshaller's pace, or as appropriate to
maintain separation from other traffic.
➢ Remain a safe distance from other aircraft.
➢ Avoid hazards on taxiway surface.
➢ Taxi according to applicable signage and warning lights.
6.13.3 Ground Support
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ When applicable, the pilot must coordinate with ground support personnel to park the
UA.
➢ Engine shutdown must be completed in accordance with applicable procedures. A postflight inspection must be conducted following engine shutdown.
➢ If applicable, engine shutdown must be confirmed with crew.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

Verify UA is parked in designated location.
Shut down the engine.
If applicable, confirm engine shutdown with ground crew.
Perform a post-flight inspection of CS and associated systems.
If applicable, coordinate with ground crews to perform a post-flight inspection of the UA.
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6.14 CONTROL STATION HANDOFF
6.14.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ If a control station handoff is intended as part of the flight plan, the correct function of
the receiving control station(s) must be verified prior to initiating handoff procedures.
➢ Prior to initiating control station handoff procedures, the pilot must establish two-way
communications with the receiving control station.
➢ Control station handoffs must be performed procedurally. Positive transfer of control
must be confirmed between pilots every time a control station handoff occurs.
➢ Control station handoff briefings must include, at minimum:
- UA health,
- Fuel state,
- Altitude,
- Airspeed,
- Heading,
- ATC clearances,
- Any abnormal occurrences,
- Any information deemed safety critical by the pilot that is handing over control,
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability), and
- Lost-link profile(s)/routing.
➢ Control station changeover briefings must include, at minimum:
- UA health,
- Fuel state,
- Altitude,
- Airspeed,
- Heading,
- ATC clearances,
- Any abnormal occurrences,
- Any information deemed safety critical by the pilot that is handing over control,
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability), and
- Lost-link profile(s)/routing.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Receiving Pilot - Perform preflight on receiving CS and verify correct function of
essential systems.
➢ Establish two-way communication with the receiving control station prior to initiating a
control station handoff.
➢ Receiving CS: Establish voice communications with transferring CS.
➢ Receiving CS: Coordinate with transferring CS to establish C2 link with UA, if/as
applicable per the pilot’s operating handbook (POH).
➢ Transferring CS: Provide handover briefing to Receiving CS:
- Verify autopilot mode,
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➢
➢
➢
➢

➢

- If applicable, verify matched commands,
- If applicable, verify data terminal settings,
- Verify altimeter setting,
- Verify current clearance, and
- Verify any other flight-critical systems.
Transferring CS: Initiate positive transfer of UA control to Receiving CS.
Receiving CS: Verify UA control.
Keep the transferring CS on link as a backup, if/as applicable.
For transfer of UA control from one CS to another – Perform a control station handoff
briefing for the receiving pilot, to include at a minimum:
- UA overall health,
- Fuel state,
- Altitude,
- Altimeter setting,
- Airspeed,
- Heading,
- ATC clearances,
- Any abnormal occurrences,
- Contingency/emergency plan(s),
- Safety critical information that the receiving pilot will need to ensure safe flight,
and
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability).
For an internal crew changeover within a CS– Perform a crew changeover briefing for the
receiving pilot, to include at a minimum:
- UA overall health,
- Fuel state,
- Altitude,
- Altimeter setting,
- Airspeed,
- Heading,
- ATC clearances,
- Any abnormal occurrences,
- Contingency/emergency plan(s),
- Safety critical information that the receiving pilot will need to ensure safe flight,
and
- Confirmation of command link integrity (strength/reliability).

6.15 LOST-LINK CONTROL PROCEDURES
6.15.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ UA lost-link behavior must consist of one or more predetermined flight plans that are
activated automatically upon the loss of the command link. The pilot must understand
how the UA will behave in the event lost-link flight plans are activated. Lost-link
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behavior must also trigger an appropriate transponder squawk code to alert ATC of the
UA's lost-link status.
➢ If able, the pilot must communicate with ATC to verify the appropriate transponder
squawk code upon encountering a lost-link scenario.
➢ Upon encountering a lost-link scenario, the pilot must communicate the UA’s last known
altitude, heading, destination, location, and expected lost-link behavior/routing to ATC.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Ensure that lost-link fail-safes are set up as appropriate for the flight (including any
automated transponder triggering to squawk 7400) and active throughout all phases of
flight.
➢ Communicate lost-link behavior to ATC and verify appropriate transponder squawk
code, if able.
➢ At a minimum, relay the following information to ATC:
- Last known altitude,
- Heading,
- Destination,
- Location when the link was lost (Latitude/Longitude), and
- Expected lost-link behavior/routing.
6.16 LOST-LINK TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES
6.16.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot should communicate the outcome of lost-link troubleshooting procedures to
ATC upon completion of the lost-link troubleshooting checklist.
➢ Lost-link troubleshooting procedures must be published in the UAS POH and accessible
by the pilot in the control station.
➢ Lost-link troubleshooting procedures must clearly define instances when the flight may
be continued or must be terminated.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Refer to published troubleshooting procedures when troubleshooting a lost command
link.
➢ Continue or terminate the flight based upon the outcome of link troubleshooting
procedures.
➢ Communicate the outcome of troubleshooting to ATC.
6.17 OPERATIONS DURING COMMAND AND CONTROL LINK DEGRADATION AND
LOSS
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6.17.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Command link integrity must be monitored while in flight, and should degraded
performance be encountered, the pilot must take steps troubleshoot command link
performance if it is deemed necessary to do so.
➢ Operations during command and control degradation and loss must be included in the
POH. Procedures must address:
- Troubleshooting measures that must be undertaken by the pilot to restore control,
- Communication protocols, including communications/coordination with ATC,
- Actions to be taken if the command link is re-established or restored to full
functionality, and
- Contingencies for degraded operation.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ While operating a UA, monitor the command and control link integrity. Should degraded
link performance be encountered, execute appropriate procedures to address the situation.
➢ During command and control degradation or loss of signal, execute appropriate
checklists, troubleshooting, communication protocols, and contingencies for reestablishing the command link.
6.18 OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF DECREASED SENSORY CUES FROM
AIRCRAFT AND ENVIRONMENT
6.18.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ If equipped, the pilot may utilize aircraft sensors, such as electro-optical cameras,
infrared sensors, or any other available means to regain or maintain orientation and
spatial awareness.
➢ If required for safe operation, the pilot must be able to manage multiple telemetry
datalinks independently.
➢ The pilot must be able to interpret information from multiple instruments and displays to
determine the UA's status.
➢ The pilot must be able to prioritize emergency procedures in the event that multiple
emergency scenarios occur when in a state of degraded sensory cues.
➢ To facilitate navigation in situations where cues from the UA are intermittent or
degraded, the pilot must be able to use recorded position, heading, and airspeed to
calculate the proper heading and time to a designated recovery point.
➢ If equipped with a directional ground data terminal (GDT), the pilot must be able to use
GDT azimuth and dead reckoning icons to aid in navigation and maintain UA position.
➢ The pilot is required to understand when conditions of partial or full loss of sensory cues
exist.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Determine if full or partial loss of sensory cues exist.
➢ If applicable, use UA sensors to regain or maintain orientation and spatial awareness of
the UA.
➢ If applicable, manage multiple telemetry datalinks independently.
➢ Maintain positional and spatial awareness of the UA by scanning displays and
instrumentation.
➢ Monitor UA caution/alert status.
➢ If multiple emergences exist, manage them using aeronautical decision making
techniques.
➢ When applicable, calculate position, headings, and airspeed to determine proper heading
and time to designated location.
➢ If equipped, be familiar with ground data terminal azimuth and dead reckoning to
maintain UA position.
Recommended Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Determine if full or partial loss of sensory cues exist.
6.19 IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
6.19.1 Propulsion Failure
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Propulsion failure notifications must be available to the pilot and must convey any
associated system failures that aid the pilot in diagnosing the failure.
➢ The pilot must maintain aircraft control and properly configure the aircraft to achieve an
optimum glide.
➢ Emergency landing areas must be selected such that risk to personnel and property on the
ground and in the air is minimized.
➢ Emergency approaches and landings that transect high-volume airspace should be
avoided whenever possible.
➢ If no suitable landing airfield is available, the pilot must determine the best area to ditch
or terminate aircraft.
➢ Terrain and weather conditions must be evaluated when choosing a suitable emergency
landing or ditching location.
➢ Utilize applicable emergency procedures to address an engine failure.
➢ The pilot must set the transponder to squawk 7700 in the event of an engine failure, if
able.
➢ When the situation warrants, the pilot must communicate engine failures to ATC.
➢ The pilot must coordinate with ground support personnel as necessary to meet the needs
of an emergency.
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Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Identify and address engine failure notifications with the appropriate emergency
procedures, as applicable.
➢ Maintain aircraft control and configure the aircraft to achieve optimum glide, as required.
➢ While performing an emergency landing, select landing areas that pose minimal risk to
personnel and property on the ground.
➢ During an emergency landing, take high-volume transects and approaches into
consideration and maneuver to avoid them whenever possible.
➢ If a suitable landing site is unavailable, determine the best area to terminate the flight to
minimize risk to personnel and property on the ground.
➢ Determine effects of weather on landing/ditching location.
➢ Address all applicable emergency procedures as practical.
➢ Set transponder to 7700 if/when able to do so.
➢ Communicate an engine failure to ATC as soon as practical.
➢ When applicable, notify ground crew.
6.19.2 Two-way Communications Failure
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ When feasible, the pilot should ensure UA transponder squawk code is set to 7600.
➢ When available, the pilot should use an alternative means of communication, such as a
cellular phone, backup radio system, or some other means to communicate with ATC in
the event of a communication failure.
➢ When the UA is so equipped, the pilot must prioritize routing as follows:
- Assigned route,
- Vectors,
- Expected (if given further clearance), and
- Filed flight plan.
➢ When applicable, the pilot must prioritize altitude as follows:
- Assigned altitude,
- Expected altitude (if given further clearance), and
- Minimum en-route altitude (MEA).
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢
➢
➢
➢

Set transponder to 7600.
When available, utilize alternative means of communication to communicate with ATC.
Prioritize routing as required for IFR communications failures.
Prioritize altitudes as required for IFR communications failures.

6.19.3 Navigation Failure – GPS or Other System
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must diagnose navigation failures and take timely action to troubleshoot them.
➢ In the event of a failure within the navigation system, the pilot must address the failure(s)
in accordance with established procedures.
➢ In the event of a navigation failure, the pilot must maintain radio contact with ATC. If the
UA is not capable of safely continuing the flight or landing safely, the pilot must contact
ATC and advise of intent.
➢ If applicable, the pilot should utilize dead reckoning navigation.
➢ Standard procedures for off-site landings must be published, known to the pilot, and
accessible to the pilot within the control station.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Address navigation system failures as soon as practical.
➢ Address a navigation failure in accordance with established procedures for the given
system.
➢ If applicable, perform dead reckoning navigation.
➢ Notify ATC of intentions.
➢ Refer to off-site landing (ditching) or termination procedures, as required, if flight cannot
be continued with a failed navigation system.
6.19.4 Detect and Avoid (Traffic, Terrain, and Obstacles)
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot is required to give way to both manned and unmanned aircraft per 14 CFR
§91.113. The pilot should use their discretion when acting upon alerts from collision
avoidance instruments including but not limited to TCAS, ADS-B, and TIS.
➢ If an automated detect and avoid system is used, it must give way to other air traffic in a
manner that is consistent with 14 CFR §91.113.
➢ Potential collision threats must be displayed to the pilot.
➢ The pilot must be able to execute evasive maneuvers when required.
➢ If autonomous detect and avoid systems are used, the pilot must be able to monitor the
execution of collision avoidance maneuvers.
➢ The pilot must be able to override autonomous collision avoidance maneuvers.
➢ When able, the pilot must communicate with ATC upon deviating from a clearance to
execute a collision avoidance maneuver.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Abide by applicable right-of-way rules.
➢ When applicable, use available collision avoidance instruments and understand their
associated procedures.
➢ If an automated detect and avoid system is used, it must give way to other air traffic in a
manner that is consistent with 14 CFR §91.113.
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➢ Monitor DAA system to maintain safe distance from other aircraft.
➢ Execute evasive maneuvers when required.
➢ When applicable, the pilot must monitor the execution of automated collision avoidance
maneuvers.
➢ If required, override autonomous DAA system.
➢ Notify ATC of intentions when able.
6.19.5 Uncontrolled Flight
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must be able to identify and react to equipment failures that can lead to or
hinder the recovery from uncontrolled flight.
➢ Equipment failures must be addressed in accordance with established procedures.
➢ The unmanned system must make the pilot aware of conditions that may result in
uncontrolled flight.
➢ The pilot must be aware of aircraft configurations and flight regimes in which the UA is
susceptible to a loss of control.
➢ The pilot must be able to recognize and recover from unusual attitudes that would
otherwise lead to the UA entering into a state of uncontrolled flight, when UA
capabilities allow such control.
➢ The pilot must be able to execute appropriate spin recovery strategies for multiple types
of stalls/spins, when UA capabilities allow such control.
➢ An emergency must be declared with ATC if control of a UA is lost.
➢ Standard procedures for loss of control must be published in the POH, known to the pilot,
and accessible to the pilot within the control station.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Address equipment failures that can lead to or hinder the recovery from uncontrolled
flight.
➢ Address equipment failures in accordance with established procedures.
➢ Interpret and react to system cues that warn of the possibility of entering into a state of
uncontrolled flight.
➢ Avoid configurations and flight regimes in which the UA is susceptible to a loss of
control.
➢ Recognize and recover from unusual attitudes, when UA capabilities allow such control.
➢ Execute appropriate stall/spin recovery strategies for multiple types of stalls/spins, when
UA capabilities allow such control.
➢ Notify ATC of a loss of control as soon as practical.
➢ Know and execute any published procedures to address any loss of UA control.
6.19.6 Emergency Descent
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Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must demonstrate the ability to execute proper division of attention in an
emergency descent scenario.
➢ Emergency descents must be executed such that the aircraft's performance limitations are
not exceeded.
➢ Emergency descent maneuvers must be performed with consideration given to the
aircraft's configuration.
➢ If an emergency descent is executed, the pilot must inform ATC as soon as practical.
➢ The pilot will execute all descent procedures as time allows while maintaining aircraft
control.
➢ If applicable, the pilot will brief and perform hand-off procedures to the landing pilot.
➢ The pilot must be able to determine whether a viable landing or termination point is
within the descent path.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Execute proper division of attention in an emergency descent scenario.
➢ When performing an emergency decent, ensure that any performance limitations are not
exceeded.
➢ Perform emergency descents as applicable to the aircraft's configuration (flaps, landing
gear, and engine power setting) as applicable.
➢ Notify ATC as soon as practical when executing an emergency decent.
➢ Execute all descent procedures as time allows while maintaining aircraft control.
➢ If applicable, brief and perform hand-off procedures to the landing pilot.
➢ Determine if landing or flight termination is suitable.
6.20 EMERGENCY LANDING
6.20.1 Communication
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Emergency landing flight plans and/or routes must be communicated with ATC as soon
as practical.
➢ ATC must be notified as soon as possible when deviating from a clearance.
➢ The pilot must maintain a sterile cockpit during emergency maneuvers.
➢ When the situation warrants, the pilot must provide ATC with information regarding the
nature of the emergency and intentions.
➢ During the transition portions and prior to landing, the pilot must maintain
communication with ATC and any required ground crew.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Communicate emergency landing flight plans/or routes with ATC as soon as practical.
➢ Notify ATC as soon as practical when deviating from a clearance.
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➢ Maintain a sterile cockpit during emergency maneuvers.
➢ When the situation warrants, provide ATC with information regarding the nature of the
emergency and intentions.
➢ During the transition portions and prior to landing, maintain communication with ATC
and any required ground crew.
6.20.2 Approach
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ The pilot must perform emergency approaches in accordance with procedures.
➢ The pilot must continue to monitor airspeed, altitude, and performance parameters while
on approach.
➢ Emergency landing locations must be chosen to minimize risk to personnel and property.
➢ If possible, the pilot must confirm that weather minimums for landing are met.
➢ The pilot must ensure obstacle clearance to the best of their ability when executing an
emergency landing.
➢ Standard procedures for emergency landings must be published in the POH, known to the
pilot, and accessible to the pilot within the control station.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Perform emergency approaches in accordance with procedures for the given system.
➢ Monitor airspeed, altitude, and other flight performance parameters while on approach.
➢ Choose an emergency landing location that minimizes risk to persons or property on the
ground.
➢ Determine effects of weather on emergency landing conditions.
➢ Ensure obstacle clearance to the best extent possible when executing an emergency
landing.
➢ Adhere to any published emergency approach and landing procedures that may exist for
the system.
6.20.3 Touchdown
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Upon touchdown, the pilot must perform any additional emergency procedures that may
be required to fully address the emergency.
➢ When able, the pilot must maintain communication with ATC throughout an emergency
landing scenario to maintain traffic separation and clear a landing area.
➢ Upon touchdown, communication with any required visual observer(s) or other necessary
ground support personnel must be maintained to ensure that the approach path remains
clear.
➢ The pilot must be aware of missed approach and/or ATC requirements throughout the
approach. If missed approach requirements are not established, the pilot must notify
ATC.
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➢ Standard procedures for emergency landings must be published in the POH, known to the
pilot, and accessible to the pilot within the control station.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Complete any additional procedures that may be required after touching down.
➢ Maintain communications with ATC.
➢ Upon touchdown, communicate with any required visual observer(s) or other necessary
ground support personnel to ensure that the approach path remains clear.
➢ Determine missed approach requirements.
➢ Complete emergency landings in accordance with any published emergency procedures
for the given system.
6.20.4 Ditching (Off-site Landing) Site Selection
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ Aircraft ditching must be included as part of a standardized emergency checklist.
➢ Ditching locations must be selected based upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel
and property on the ground.
➢ Ditching locations and pilot intentions must be communicated to ATC prior to ditching
the aircraft if able.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Execute ditching maneuvers in accordance with published procedures for the given
system.
➢ Select ditching locations based upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel and
property on the ground.
➢ When practical, communicate ditching locations and pilot intentions to ATC.
6.20.5 Flight Termination
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ If the UA has the capability to flight terminate (manually or through preprogrammed
control inputs), the procedures will be included as part of a standardized emergency
checklist.
➢ At a minimum, flight termination states and parameters for execution must be known to
the pilot, and the pilot must monitor the execution of flight termination, if asserted,
whenever the command downlink is active.
➢ Flight termination locations must be selected based upon the ability to minimize risk to
personnel and property on the ground.
➢ The pilot must communicate his/her intention to terminate the flight to ATC and provide
the flight termination point.
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➢ The flight termination procedure should engage a fuel cutoff upon activation and if able,
provide an indication to the pilot when the fuel cutoff is engaged.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ If required, perform flight termination.
➢ Execute flight termination according to established flight termination procedures for the
given system.
➢ When executing flight termination, monitor the execution of the maneuver.
➢ Select flight termination locations bases upon the ability to minimize risk to personnel
and property on the ground.
➢ Notify ATC of intent to terminate and provide the flight termination position.
➢ If applicable, engage the fuel cutoff upon activating flight termination.
6.21 ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES
6.21.1 General Tasks
Proposed Minimum Operational Requirement(s)
➢ All abnormal operational states and procedures must be included in a standardized
abnormal operations checklist.
➢ ATC must be informed when a UA enters into a state of abnormal operation, such as
abnormal gear extension/retraction, unintentional CG shift, data/communication timeouts,
or non-standard performance parameters. Pilots must report any failures of
instrumentation, reversion to backup or standby systems, or any other failure/abnormal
operation that may impact the safety of flight.
Proposed Minimum Operational Procedure(s)
➢ Perform any abnormal operations procedures as they are published for the given system.
➢ Report any failures of instrumentation, reversion to backup or standby systems, or any
other failure/abnormal operation that may impact safety of flight to ATC.
7

PC-3 VALIDATION PROCEDURE

The US Army’s Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS) (Defense Industry Daily, 2013) was
considered a representative device of sufficient maturity and human factors design
considerations to verify operational procedures. Use of the UGCS served to validate the
proposed minimum operational procedures and identified potential gaps with recommendations
to the FAA. This validation procedure was not intended to evaluate the Army’s UGCS for
BVLOS operations in the NAS, but to validate if the recommended operational requirements and
procedures were of a robust and comprehensive nature using a representative device. Details
regarding the validation process results in Appendix E.

39

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.
The validation of minimum operational procedures was performed on June 6, 2017 through June
8, 2017 with two Army UGCSs in Huntsville, AL using 13 flight test cards in a simulated
environment. All 46-proposed minimum operational procedures were represented within the 13
flight test cards. Each of the two UGCSs were used in a simulated environment to replicate the
MQ-1C Gray Eagle and RQ-7Bv2 Shadow 200 UAS respectively. Researchers noted differences
between vehicle-specific modules (VSMs), using NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG)
4586 (Platts, Cummings, and Kerr, 2007), and procedures between them, based on the
capabilities of these UAS. These differences demonstrated the flexibility of a common
architecture for hardware and software, which benefited this validation procedure. For example,
the MQ-1C Gray Eagle operated on the airport surface area similar to manned aircraft, including
taxi and ATC communications procedures; however, the RQ-7Bv2 was launched from a
pneumatic launcher and did not taxi but still required ATC communications procedures.
Although these differences were limitations, the variability increased researcher confidence in
determining pass/fail criteria while validating these procedures.
7.1 VALIDATION APPROACH
A chronological sequence of phases of flight organized the proposed procedures into logical
areas and associated to a flight test card (Appendices E and F). Validation was determined
through the following types of observations:
1. Normal and abnormal procedural performance observations to validate if the proposed
procedures were comprehensive and accounted for all minimum requirements needed,
regardless of specific control stations used.
2. Contingency procedural observations to validate the completeness of the proposed
contingency operations. In addition, to validate repeatability of proposed procedures
varying contingency conditions were considered.
3. User interface observations to validate that control station controls, layout, and command
and data entry sequences supported all proposed minimum procedures.
7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PROCEDURES TO VALIDATE
Flight test cards (Appendix D) were used to document and standardize the verification
observations. Multiple flight test cards were used to capture all 46 proposed procedures.
A pilot validation procedure was conducted to validate procedural accuracy in each of
observation areas in controlled settings. The verification procedure was altered to improve the
reliability of the data collection to ensure a more complete evaluation of proposed procedures.
7.3 FAULT REPORTING AND DATA RECORDING
Data collectors administered each flight card with a UAS operator on a UGCS control station.
The data collector communicated each step in each flight card and observed the operator’s ability
to perform steps using the UGCS. Results were recorded directly on each flight test card,
including any specific information for a procedure’s inability to be performed or if a proposed
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procedure failed to adequately define the operational steps required for the safe operation of a
UAS in the NAS.
Because the data collector was able to physically see the UAS Operator to know their identity,
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) considered this research confidential. Each UAS Operator
was assigned a UAS Operator ID number. No names or other personally identifiable information
were collected. Once the test flight card data had been input into an electronic database, the
original test flight cards were destroyed.
7.4 PERSONNEL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Four data collectors and three UAS operators were used during the data collection. During the
preliminary experiment in March 2017, requests were made to increase the quantity of UGCSs
from one to two and additional UAS operators from one to three to increase the confidence of
each procedure’s validation using multiple iterations and collected data for each flight test
performed. The data collector and UAS operator were familiar with each flight test card’s
procedures prior to beginning the validation of proposed procedures within each attempt. No
other additional or special personnel were used or required.
UAS Operators were volunteers and had UAS system qualification and availability from the
Army’s UAS Project Office. According to US Army UAS Regulation 95-23 (US Army, 2006),
to be considered qualified, each UAS Operator had completed either the MQ-1C Gray Eagle or
RQ-7B Shadow Individual Qualification Course at the Army’s UAS training institution.
7.5 EQUIPMENT RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
The US Army uses the UGCS emulator and Universal Mission Simulator (UMS) as a Training
Aids, Devices, Simulator and Simulations (TADSS) system. The device can simulate the MQ-5B
Hunter, RQ7Bv2 Shadow, and MQ-1C Gray Eagle Army Unmanned Aircraft types. All of these
UAS fit into the assumptions for this research. These devices provide a training capability to
UAS operators for qualification training and follow-on continuation training to maintain
proficiency and currency in all required operator tasks. The devices also use Multiple Unified
Simulation Environment (MUSE) software to stimulate the Vehicle Control Software (VCS) for
UA control, payload control, weapons control, communications, data dissemination, and mission
planning.
The Army’s TADSS system supports their objectives strategic vision to employ a family of UAS
via common hardware and software. The Army’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap
(Army, 2011) identified simulation devices as a core competency for its science and technology
(S&T), research, development, test, and evaluation (RTD&E) capabilities in UAS operations.
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Figure 2. Universal Mission Simulator (UMS). (U.S. Army, 2015).
One UGCS emulator (Long, 2017) and one UGCS Universal Mission Simulator (UMS) (Ficken,
2017) were used during the validation procedure. The emulator and UMS are the same device
except, the UGCS emulator reflected the same hardware and software to operate a MQ-1C Gray
Eagle UAS; the UGCS UMS reflected the same hardware and software to operate the RQ-7BV2
Shadow 200 UAS (Long, 2017). The UMS replicated radio communications equipment with
photographs of the equipment in their respective locations within the UGCS. System-specific
Operator’s Manuals and Checklists were provided and used during the data collection for each
test flight card. Two fully-software-functional UGCS running simulated telemetry data provided
fidelity to accurately replicate each proposed operational procedure. The use of simulation to
validate operational procedures significantly mitigated the risk of loss of aircraft, equipment, or
personnel while performing the flight test cards for abnormal and emergency operational
procedures. No other special equipment was used or required.
7.6 VALIDATION ENVIRONMENT
Personnel and equipment had dedicated facilities that were free of distractions and capable of
independence between UGCSs. Both UGCSs were located in Huntsville, AL at two contractor
facilities approximately one mile apart. Neither UGCS had connectivity to the other. Multiple
validation observations were collected by completing 13 test flight cards to observe all 46
operational procedures. A matrix for the breakdown of flight test card and operational procedure
can be found in Appendix B.
7.7 PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES
Four data collectors were required to record observations as they occurred within each test flight
card. Each data collector also compared the expected results to the observed results for each
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operational procedure to determine an initial pass/fail status. UAS operators were responsible for
performing each proposed operational procedure to the best of their ability within the constraints
of any operational limitation or publication such as checklist or Operator’s Manual. During the
course of simulating each flight test card, the UAS Operators would manipulate the Instructor
Operator Console (IOC) to induce faults or conditions necessary for the UGCS to display
conditional indicators, such as warnings, cautions, alerts, or specific telemetry feedback for the
UAS operator/ data collector to perform each procedure.
7.8 VALIDATION PROCEDURES
1. Each UAS Operator was presented an Informed Consent form. Each UAS operator read
and signed the form.
2. Each UAS Operator sat at the UA operator workstation within the UGCS.
3. Each UAS Operator vocalized all procedures, process steps, and CS observations to ensure
the data collector accurately recorded observations.
4. The data collector stood or sat either behind the UAS operator or in the sensor operator
workstation, provided it is not required to perform the operational procedures outlined in
each flight test card.
5. The UAS operator also performed duties as the Instructor Operator Console (IOC)
administrator, interacting with the IOC to replicate each operational procedure and/or
process step, as required.
6. The data collector described the operational procedure and any specific process steps
required for each procedure to the UAS Operator.
7. The UAS Operator performed each operational procedure or process step by manipulating
the correct subsystem controls. The UAS operator used a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
and data input devices to perform the tasks. The UAS Operator also observed system
responses before proceeding to the next process step or operational procedure.
8. The data collector recorded observations as the UAS Operator’s performed each
operational procedure or process step. Additionally, the data collection observed and
recorded any operational procedure or process step that was not able to be performed.
9. Both the data collector and UAS operator proceeded through all operational procedures and
process steps until each test flight card was completed.
A minimum of four observations of each of the 13 test flight cards were performed.
7.9 VALIDATION ASSESSMENT
After the completion of four observations of each of the 13 flight test cards, the research team
collectively assessed pass/fail conditions for each operational by using judgement after
comparing the expected-to-actual results observations recorded. The results were shown in
Appendix E.
The research team recorded the collective pass/fail results from the four validation observations
from each flight test card. The operational procedures within each flight test card was reviewed
for agreement between all four observations. Any unanimous attempts (either a pass or fail) was
accepted by the research team. Non-unanimous attempts were reviewed for any accompanying
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notes. With a majority rule, the data collector team determined the overall pass/fail condition
from data collector comments. A majority rule of pass/fail determined the recommended
operational procedure’s acceptance. There were no tie-breaker validation attempts required,
resulting in a majority rule decision for all 46 recommended operational procedures.
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
An urgent need exists to incorporate standardized organization for UAS operating documentation
to capture and present procedures and performance information regarding their UAS. Some
foreign states, such as Australia (2017) and Sweden (2009), began to address this issue through
requirement of approved flight manuals or inclusion of flight and control station procedures in
the aircraft’s operation manual as a condition for access to certain airspace.
Several gaps exist among the unmanned procedures surveyed. Specific areas for future
investigation and study include unmanned pre-taxi procedures, ground support operations, and
rejected takeoffs. In the En-route and Landing phases of flight, gaps were found in the climb,
transition, and manual (i.e. human in the loop) landing procedures. For the After Landing phase
of flight, procedural gaps were noted again for ground support, parking, ground support
handling, and shutdown. Among Abnormal and Emergency phases, procedures related to
operations during degraded uplink, lost link (uplink), and lost link troubleshooting also appear
deficient.
It is additionally recommended for research in the following areas:
1. Validate recommended procedures during an actual flight environment.
2. Validation of procedures using a HF-optimized prototype CS.
3. Development of a PTS/ACS – performance based standards – with the minimum procedures
for CS recommended from this research.
4. Research high and low traffic conditions relating to minimum tasks required.
5. Research runway independence vs runway dependence between UAS platforms and
differences in requirements – for example – a runway-independent UAS may have different
weather infrastructure requirements. Also, how are procedures different – having to taxi on a
runway versus no taxi necessary.
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APPENDIX A—COMPARISONS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT
Appendix A provides information about the similarities and differences in requirements,
practices, and procedures between UAS and unmanned to manned aircraft were divided by
phases of flight that was determined in research task PC-1. The phases of flight are presented in
the temporal order of flight progression from prior to take-off through engine shutdown upon
landing. Some phases of flight were further broken down into categories given specific
requirements or importance those sub-categories play during that particular phase. Additionally,
researchers included abnormal or emergency procedures after the normal phases of flight,
addressing not every possible emergency, but those which standards or checklists are most often
included across all aircraft due to the significant nature and potential outcome.
A. PREFLIGHT
1. Before Entering GCS – [Preflight]
a. Common practices among UAS
Common practices between UAS included the need to obtain weather observations and
forecasts, crew health analysis or CRM check, NOTAMS, or a review of instrument
procedures. Many systems required obtaining information necessary for navigation
performance infrastructure along the planned route, the availability of an instrument
approach at the destination; alternate landing sites, fuel requirements and alternate airport
fuel requirements. Other commonalities included a confirmation of the quality and
availability of C2 links and filing a flight plan when required.
Fuel planning was consistent across UAS to ensure the aircraft is carrying enough usable
fuel on each flight, although there was a variation of the amount of reserve fuel based on
a percentage of planned flight time or a minimum reserve time in minutes. Same
considerations on endurance and flight duration is also made with regard to electric
powered aircraft with consideration to battery life.
b. Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft
Require the pilot to become familiar with all available information concerning each
flight. Additionally, required proficiency areas include checklist usage, ability to properly
identify aircraft discrepancies, procedures for deferring inoperative equipment, proper
fuel and oil servicing.
For instrument flight, planning was required for the identification of forecast weather,
alternate airports, and fuel requirements. The length and configuration of the runway (i.e.
grade, crown, and slope) were also planning considerations.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
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Variation between UAS existed. Some requirements of manned aircraft relating to the
crew manifest, people on board the aircraft, oxygen, etc. were not required for UAS.
Some UAS and manned aircraft systems required the physical inspection of the aircraft,
ground control, and ground support equipment prior to entering the control station. Some
UAS required a physical inspection of the ground control and support equipment prior to
entering the control station. Variances were noted in the requirement to complete the
physical inspection of the aircraft. Some were after the preflight inspection was complete,
but before the engine start procedures, others were a part of or before the preflight.
Note: UAS reviewed included systems that performed horizontal takeoff using traditional
runway environments. Some UAS used catapult launcher devices and were runway
independent for takeoff.
2. Before Engine Start – [Preflight]
a. Common practices among UAS
Common practices verify the functionality of the aircraft and control station through a
methodological process. The methods used by each system are unique to that system.
Minimally, the functionality of the avionics, sensors, actuators, lighting, flight control
surfaces, servo actuators, data links, fuel and oil levels are checked. Levels of autonomy
for the UAS are verified from creating, saving, and uploading mission and emergency
mission plans, loading the plans to the aircraft, and verifying the plan was received. Some
systems require the activation of the mission plan during the preflight to observe control
station indicators reported from the aircraft and physical changes to the aircraft such as
deflection/ orientation of deflection of flight control surfaces or throttle position prior to
engine start.
Many UAS platforms rely on communication between the ground station and the crew
out at the aircraft as well as the hand-off ground station when applicable. There were
procedures noted where extensive radio checks were made, to include phone checks,
prior to engine start.
b. Common practices among UAS and manned aircraft
Manned aircraft procedures also required an aircraft inspection to detect possible defects
within the aircraft including documentation such as airworthiness, registration, currency
of electronic data, identification of minimum equipment required for flight, avionics;
engine controls, lighting, electrical fuses, circuit breakers, and annunciators, flight control
surfaces, landing gear wheels and tires.
UAS aircraft mimicked manned aircraft by requesting engine start, as a requirement
when at a controlled airfield, and putting clearance on request when applicable.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
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There were some limitations to the data collected for this task because many procedures
require the use of a system-specific checklists to perform this portion of the preflight.
Many checklists contained either proprietary information or were ITAR controlled,
limiting their use in this research.
Many of the manned aircraft requirements were not applicable to UAS. For example,
seatbelts were required to be inspection and passengers were required to be instructed in
their use. Additionally, fire extinguishing equipment and life support equipment were
required to be inspected during a preflight inspection. Currently, these requirements are
not applicable to UAS because there are no people on board the aircraft; however, if UAS
begin to perform people transport operations, then requirements such as these may be
required.
A preflight inspection for a UAS may require other crewmembers to perform checklist
such as a crew chief or sensor operator. Establishing and maintaining communications
with other crewmembers during the preflight inspection varied between UAS as well as
manned systems.
Manned aircraft before-engine-start procedures had requirements, not clearly identified in
most commercial UAS platforms such as procedures and required documentation, flying
with inoperative equipment, limitations of flying with inoperative equipment,
requirements for having a current aviation database, equipment required for IFR flight,
IFR airworthiness to include aircraft inspection requirements. It was only noted in
military UAS platforms were the above listed requirements were present.
There were additional ground stations requirements present in UAS that were not similar
to manned aircraft. The large amount of computer equipment in a ground station
produces a lot of heat. There were steps to verify the ground station was under a certain
temperature to ensure the computers would not overheat. There were also steps to
confirm the ground station was configured in flight mode as some of these stations also
have the capability to duplicate as simulators.
3. Engine Start – [Preflight]
a. Common practices between UAS
Common practices for performing the engine start task use UAS-specific checklist
procedures. Most UAS required the proper positioning of aircraft, including mooring the
aircraft to prevent movement. The engine start procedure for many UAS required other
crewmembers to perform such as a crew chief or maintainer.
Establishing and maintaining communications with other crewmembers during the engine
start procedure varied between UAS. All UAS required the pilot to monitor enginerelated information, such as RPM, fuel flow, oil pressure, and bus voltage output to
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determine if the engine was operating within normal operational parameters. Some UAS
platforms required the pilot to verify throttle position prior to engine start and change the
throttle position during an engine run while verifying normal operating parameters at
other-than-idle RPM.
Additionally, the majority of the surveyed UAS platforms had a procedure during
emergencies, to quickly shut the engine off.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Commonalities between UAS and manned systems included the proper positioning of the
aircraft to ensure propeller safety. Engine starting procedures also required the ability to
monitor the electrical system and RPM during the starting procedure. Adherence to
checklist procedures were also required.
It was noted on a few UAS platforms considerations for cold and hot weather procedures
that were similar to manned aircraft.
Requirement for a fire bottle was also duplicated for larger-than-small UAS on a
controlled airfield during engine start.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Some UAS’s had the capability to start the engine without the need for support
equipment. Some UAS required support equipment such as an air start cart or a computer
plug-in to monitor indications until a link could be established.
Researchers were unable to determine the specific engine start procedures from the
UAS-specific documentation provided. Manned aircraft engine starting procedures
included details for failures or emergency procedures during or after engine starting
procedures. The manned aircraft procedures included propeller safety information for
passengers, which currently is not required for UAS because it is assumed that no
passengers would be on board the UAS.
The manned aircraft engine starting procedures also provided details for abnormal
starting procedures, hand propping to start the engine, high altitude operations, and hot or
cold weather environments. The manned aircraft engine starting procedures also included
emergency starting information that wasn’t as well documented or existing in other UAS
platforms.
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4. Pre-Taxi – [Preflight]
a. Common practices between UAS
A visual observer to clear taxi path and follow through taxi was a requirement for some
of the UAS platforms in our research. A confirmation that all personnel and equipment
were cleared prior to requesting clearance was a procedure noted.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Pilots, both manned and UAS, showed requirements to get current ATIS, altimeter setting
and finish all pre-taxi checklists prior to asking for taxi.
Information from UAS and manned aircraft operations focused on knowledge and
awareness prior to beginning the taxi operation. Knowledge included procedures for
appropriate cockpit activities during taxiing including taxi route planning,
communications with ATC, understanding procedures for steering, maneuvering,
maintaining taxiway, runway position, and maintaining awareness, understanding
relevance/importance of hold lines, and understanding taxi operation planning
procedures.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Considerations for icing (such as anti-icing or de-icing) prior to taxi was observed within
the manned aircraft pre-taxi operations; however only some UAS researched had de-icing
capabilities.
Understanding taxi operations for procedures unique to night operations, non-towered
airports, and aircraft lighting; understanding the hazards of low visibility taxi operations
was not identified in UAS operations as it is in manned.
Manned aircraft documentation also provided information about the proper settings of the
different avionics systems and flight instruments.
A brief between the safety observer and the UAS operator is made prior to taxi to ensure
proper verbiage is used and any other pertinent information to be past.
B. TAXI
1. Communication and Pre-Takeoff Checks
a. Common practices between UAS
Common practices included the ability to communicate and comply with ATC
instructions. All UAS reviewed used runway markings during taxi operations. UAS were
required to taxi at safe speeds; only one system provided maximum taxi speeds.
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b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Common elements for taxi operations between UAS and manned aircraft include the
compulsory requirements to comply with ATC instructions and procedures (e-CFR,
2017).
Brake checks were required an all aircraft that taxied from a parking location to the
runway.
Taxi speeds and safe taxi distances were also a requirement on most aircraft researched.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Some UAS require no taxi whatsoever. These UAS are catapult launched instead of
taxied from a storage location such as a hangar to the launch and recovery site on the
airport may occur prior to preflight. These aircraft are towed by another vehicle, which
should use ATC instructions to the driver of the vehicle to comply with ATC instructions
as if the aircraft was taxing under its own power.
Some UAS required the use of an External Operator and marshalling personnel or the
vehicle operator to visually clear the aircraft while taxing on the airport surface. The
external Operator maintained a visual contact with the aircraft and radio communications
with the marshalling team and tower during taxi operations.
Manned aircraft taxi procedures included the sustainment of a sterile cockpit and
monitoring of flight instruments during taxi operations.
C. TAKEOFF
1. Communications – [Takeoff]
a. Common practices between UAS
Commonalities in takeoff communication procedures fell along the lines of highlighting
the necessity to communicate with ATC prior to takeoff. These procedures, while
highlighted at a fairly high level, pointed to the need to ensure clear communication with
ATC using standard aviation terminology and phraseology.
Procedures also emphasized the need for clear communication amongst the crew, both in
the ground station or through use of a radio for dual shelters and/or visual observer
operations.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Commonalities were rooted in the requirements to clearly communicate with ATC, and
communicate with essential crew. In the context of takeoff, communications with ground
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crew, such as those responsible for marshaling the aircraft, and ATC are expected to
adhere to existing standards, using typical aviation phraseology and terminology.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
With all common communication procedures being very similar, the biggest difference
that was noted was the requirement to acknowledge ATC light signals. There is an
obvious limitation of a UAS to not be able to acknowledge light gun signals due a
potential inability of the UAS pilot to visually acquire light gun signals.
Note: It should be noted that documentation for some small unmanned aircraft system
(sUAS) were reviewed. While these systems were generally considered to be out of scope
for this research project, it was included for the sake of comparison. It highlights key
operational differences and presents a case for differentiating procedures that are
intended for small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) and larger, more complex systems.
Especially in the communications and takeoff phase for comparisons.
2. Takeoff – [Takeoff]
a. Common practices between UAS
Similar requirements for a takeoff run revolve around establishing the aircraft is ready for
takeoff (verifying completion of pre-takeoff checks), performing the takeoff itself, and
monitoring aircraft status and function after takeoff. These procedures primarily
consisted of ensuring that the aircraft was aligned and positioned on the correct runway,
applying power/commanding a takeoff, ensuring rotation at the correct airspeed, and
establishing a steady climb.
An emphasis on monitoring of aircraft systems and functions was also common,
requiring the pilot to check flap settings prior to takeoff, rotation at the desired airspeed,
status of the navigation system, and the correction function of the aircraft throughout
takeoff.
Monitoring of systems continues through takeoff and into climb out, with the pilot
continuously monitoring system status and verifying that such things as flap retraction,
navigation, and any required automation are functioning correctly. Should any anomalies
occur that necessitate a rejected takeoff, it is initiated per the required procedures.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Common procedures between manned and unmanned aircraft at takeoff included many of
the same fundamental requirements for fixed-wing takeoff. The UAS, like a manned
aircraft, required the aircraft to be positioned on the correct runway relative to wind
direction, verification of ATC clearance, and that the takeoff run be initiated with the
aircraft when all required variables such as traffic and aircraft system status are
accounted for and known to the pilot.
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c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
One of the more obvious differences between manned and unmanned takeoff procedures
is that not all unmanned aircraft are capable of performing a conventional takeoff. While
other platforms were capable of performing either a conventional takeoff or a catapult
launch, depending upon the mission requirements. The ability to utilize less conventional
takeoff methods, such as a catapult creates drastically different procedures and
requirements for takeoff than those for conventional manned aircraft. This is especially
true given that aircraft that have a simple “push button” launch system that initiates a
takeoff with a high degree of autonomy, requiring little (if any) pilot intervention upon
launch.
Some UAS platforms had an autonomous abort built into the system. Others had red
warning lights and/or accompanying aural tones to indicate an abnormal indication to
help a pilot facilitate a timely abort if needed.
Research only discovered standards and procedures in military UAS’s that referenced
bird conditions and requirements associated with those conditions in relation to take-off
and landing. Bird hazards and conditions were addressed throughout manned aviation.
3. Ground Support – [Takeoff]
a. Common practices between UAS
A Requirement for ground support at takeoff varied by systems and was not fully
captured in available documentation. While there are requirements to utilize supporting
ground crew and/or equipment for several unmanned aircraft systems addressed by the
literature, few specific procedures matched when compared between systems.
Additionally, there were some platforms that relied on maintenance or communication
troops to facilitate or participate in checklists. Those documents were not made available
to researchers.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
No common ground support requirements were identified between manned and
unmanned aircraft except the need to have a fire bottle during engine start. The need for
dedicated ground personnel to marshal a manned aircraft and provide a means to clear a
runway of traffic is diminished for a manned aircraft due to the presence of a pilot
onboard the manned aircraft.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
For manned aircraft, the requirement for support equipment and ground support
personnel often ends upon the start of taxi. This being the case, there was very little
commonality between manned and unmanned aircraft in terms of ground support for
takeoff. For unmanned aircraft, the requirement for ground personnel extends up to the
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completion of takeoff. Taxiing and visually clearing taxiways, runways, and parking
locations is automatic for a manned aircraft due to the presence of a pilot in the cockpit.
With unmanned aircraft,
these simple tasks become more complex when the pilot is removed from the aircraft and
high levels of autonomy are exercised. The addition of ground personnel to perform these
visual checks becomes a necessity unless a different means to visually clear the taxiways,
runways, verify configuration, and externally monitor the climb are available to the pilot.
These functions are not dissimilar to the role of visual observers in the context of many
sUAS operations—a dedicated person on the ground to provide deconfliction of the UA
from objects…in this case, on the ground.
4. Aborted/Rejected – [Takeoff]
a. Common practices between UAS
Little information was available for the comparison of rejected takeoff procedures. A few
of the platforms had abort procedures related to aircraft being outside limitations while
on takeoff roll or due to malfunction of critical equipment.
Upon examining the rejected (aborted) takeoff procedures there are some basic elements
that are immediately noticeable, and are applicable to all manners of UAS. When the
procedure is broken down to the fundamental level, it requires the pilot to perform
several basic tasks to ensure a safe abort. The basic tasks/requirements for an aborted
takeoff are:
a. The pilot must first recognize the need to reject the takeoff,
b. Control of the UAS must be maintained by the pilot at all times,
c. The pilot must bring the aircraft to a stop as quickly and safely as possible,
and
d. If the aircraft departed the runway, the pilot must shutdown the engine
immediately.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Very little information was available to make this comparison. Limitations in the types of
documentation available prevented a full comparison here. A commonality shared was to
notify ATC of the abort as soon as aircraft control could be maintained.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Little information on abort procedures was available to the research team. This is due to
the differing sources of information and the proprietary/restricted nature of many of the
systems that were considered for this research. The lack of listed procedures here points
to limitations on the kinds of information that the research team was able to obtain and/or
release.
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One difference identified, which may be unique to unmanned aircraft, pertained to some
of the autonomous behaviors of some systems. Some aircraft, under certain criteria like a
lost link would abort automatically. Also, some aircraft would reject the abort input after
certain airspeed, such as V1 was reached. In such cases, the aircraft would continue to
takeoff.
D. CLIMB-OUT
1. Climb-Out - [Climb-Out]
a. Common practices between UAS
Climb out procedures and requirements varied between different unmanned aircraft, and
were often embedded within takeoff procedures. However, commonalities observed
between unmanned aircraft revolved around system monitoring and ensuring the aircraft
and associated systems perform within their desired constraints.
At the most basic level, common elements of UAS climb performance related to the
necessity of the pilot to understand climb characteristics of the UAS and how they may
be affected by pilot inputs. At the deeper level, these procedures consist of ensuring that
such things as rotation at the desired airspeed, the raising of landing gear and flaps, the
proper climb attitude and airspeed is achieved, engine function is normal for the climb
power setting, ATC communications are maintained, directional control is maintained,
and systems are monitored for any abnormal operation.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Common areas between manned and unmanned climb out procedures were largely
focused on the tasks performed during climb out. These tasks primarily consisted of such
things as ensuring that the aircraft was rotated at the correct speed to initiate a climb, the
gear were raised and flaps retracted, critical systems were monitored, and the correct
pitch and airspeed required for the climb were maintained until reaching the desired
altitude.
Communications on climb-out were mirrored. Tower switching over to departure and
requirement to check-in with departure, was duplicated with the same verbiage and
intent.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Despite their similarities, there are some distinct differences between manned and
unmanned aircraft when addressing aircraft climb procedures. Levels of automation
within unmanned aircraft can vary, ranging from nearly full automation to manual pilot
control. While the tasks that were performed between both manned and UAS were
largely the same, the manner in which they were performed differed. Systems with high
levels of automation perform many of the critical post-takeoff climb functions such as

A-10

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.
raising the gear and flaps with a high degree of autonomy. Some platforms are capable of
initiating an automated takeoff and subsequent climb with a button press. This places the
pilot in the role of monitoring system function, rather than actively piloting the aircraft.
Additionally, the automation of some UAS platforms regulate the rate of climb so the
pilot is unable to shallow or increase feet per minute of the climb. The rate at which it
climbs and descends will remain constant and can only be changed through level off.
Manned aircraft climb out procedures provided a greater emphasis on obstacle avoidance.
While it is certain that this is an important factor in unmanned aircraft climb out
procedures as well, it was not a prevalent in the sources that were compiled. This likely a
result of the limitations of documentation available for this research.
E. EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS
1. Communications – [En-route]
a. Common practices between UAS
UAS systems that have the capability for launch and recovery in one geographical
location, and the ability to execute command and control for the en-route portion of the
flight from a separate geographical location have unique communication requirements.
This type of operation is often referred to as “remote split operations” and is common for
UAS that fly beyond line of sight (BLOS). The communication between the Launch and
Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission Control Element (MCE) is essential for
smooth transition of aircraft control and to keep updated on any changes in expected
times for the scheduled or non-scheduled transition to occur.
For UAS that do not fly BLOS operator and observer should remain co-located and
communicate verbally.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
UAS and manned aircraft both require an operator to exhibits the knowledge, and skills
to communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for clearances and procedures within the
National Airspace System (NAS). The skill to use and understand the proper phraseology
and to correctly copy, read back, interpret, and comply with an ATC clearance is
common between platforms.
Knowledge and skills are required to correctly set up communication frequencies,
navigation systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance along
with monitoring proper frequencies, including emergency frequencies.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
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Manned aviation systems do not have a condition similar to the unmanned aircraft
systems remote split operations. This set of required skill and knowledge is new for those
operators transitioning from manned to UAS
UAS aircraft that operate BLOS rely heavily on a control structure of satellites and other
communication links. The monitoring of these control links is crucial and the ability to
switch between them, if the capability allows so, when one becomes degraded or no
longer useful is unique to UAS.
2. Navigation (including GPS availability) – [En-route]
a. Common en-route navigation requirements between UAS
Due to the large variation of UAS, the common en-route navigation requirements are also
dramatically different between different UAS. However, based on the purpose of
navigation there were a few commonalities found. Pilot is expected to navigate the
unmanned aircraft in reference to latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, and time and
demonstrate the ability to use all installed navigation systems (if any navigation systems
are installed). There was a strong reliance on visual navigation and/or GPS navigation
across the platforms. Pilot skills also included being able to locate the unmanned
aircraft’s position using visual contact and/or the navigation system, exhibit satisfactory
knowledge to keep the unmanned aircraft inside its authorized airspace (latitude,
longitude, altitude, speed, and time), and consistently monitor present position with lost
link failure route to ensure route will not violate airspace or be unable to maintain
obstacle clearance. All pilots of UAS platforms were expected to exhibit satisfactory
knowledge of airspace restricted from UAS use.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Due to the large variation of UAS and manned aircraft, the common en-route navigation
requirements are also dramatically different between UAS and manned aircraft. The need
for a complex navigation system increases as an aircraft integrates into controlled
airspace. The redundancy or back-up navigation systems vary from platform to platform.
A common characteristic with manned and unmanned aircraft is the use of automation to
ensure adherence to navigation requirements. Small aircraft, flying in uncontrolled
airspace typically utilize the pilot to navigate their aircraft. As the unmanned and manned
aircraft become more complex, the use of automation will guarantee proper navigation.
Common navigation requirements between manned and unmanned aircraft included
utilizing the same GPS constellation for navigation, navigate in reference to latitude,
longitude, altitude, speed, and time, and locate the airplane’s position using the
navigation system. Additional skills expected were intercept and track a given course,
radial, or bearing, as appropriate, verify route does not violate airspace and avoids
obstacles, and recognize navigation signal loss and take appropriate action. When using
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the GPS for navigation, pilots also should possess knowledge of Global Positioning
System (GPS) or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (equipment, regulations,
databases authorized use, Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM).
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
It is not surprising to find large variations between UASs and manned systems
concerning en-route navigation requirements. Some UAS platforms utilize a high degree
of automation, some have no automation, and some utilize a hybrid between the two
levels of automation. The use of automation affects how the aircraft navigates, and who is
responsible for safely navigating the aircraft. Additionally, some UASs are fully
autonomous, some are not autonomous, and some UASs utilize a hybrid of nonautonomous and fully autonomous operations. If a UAS has no automation, the pilot will
navigate the aircraft. As a system becomes more automated, the pilot will manage the
automation. The following two examples of automated and manual conditions point out
the different roles of the pilot in order to execute the UAS mission.
1. AUTOMATED - CONDITIONS: 1). Set proper flight mode for cruise flight. 2).
Verify the aircraft enters the selected flight mode. 3). Verify cruise airspeed,
heading, and altitude are set to programmed settings.
2. MANUAL CONDITIONS: 1). Change heading commands to meet mission
waypoints. 2). Adjust for winds. 3). Adjust airspeed commands to meet time on
target (TOT) requirements while staying within the operating parameters. 4).
Adjust altitude commands to meet waypoint requirements or air traffic control
(ATC) directions. 5). Ensure aircraft maintains airspeed and altitude within
assigned parameters of the aircraft operating limits.
The size of the aircraft will also affect its navigation capabilities. Some large
transport aircraft carry multiple GPS units and other navigation aids. A prudent pilot
will always use all available navigation sources during en-route navigation. The
number of available navigation sources is widely varied from aircraft to aircraft.
Unique navigation requirement differences between UAS to manned systems were
small UASs often use GPS to determine altitude, but most manned aircraft utilize
pitot static instruments, UASs monitor present position with lost link failure route to
ensure route will not violate airspace or be unable to maintain obstacle clearance and
if a manned aircraft loses ground communication, it typically continues on its
preplanned route of flight. Also, small UASs have the ability to immediately
terminate flight when navigation capabilities are lost, where a manned aircraft needs
to reestablish its location and navigate to a landing area.
Another difference is most manned aircraft use vertical navigation to avoid other
aircraft, however many UASs are too low to the ground to use altitude confliction
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methods. Additionally, a manned aircraft pilot often uses see and avoid in order to
avoid a midair collision. A UAS pilot often uses sense and avoid in order to avoid a
midair collision.
3. Climb – [En-route]
a. Common practices between UAS
Information regarding requirements for UAS for this task in the en-route phase of flight
was scarce. The majority of unmanned platforms reviewed do not appear to have
formalized procedures or standards for accomplishing an en-route climb. Of the
unmanned platforms, a group II fixed wing platform described the need for the PIC to
“understand the climb characteristics of the aircraft” as well as the “climb rate controlled
by the autopilot” and how this is adjusted manually and by the aircraft’s automation
during waypoint navigation.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned
Both unmanned and manned systems seemed to lack formalized procedures for this task.
While the reason for this absence is unclear, the PIC of either platform must understand
the climb characteristics of the aircraft and how this performance can be adjusted.
For instrument flight, both unmanned and manned aircraft will be required to perform at
least to the minimum climb performance used in determining Minimum Crossing
Altitudes (MCA) for en-route instrument flight (i.e. 150 Feet Per Nautical Mile below
5,000’, 120 ft/NM below 10,000’, and 100 ft/NM above 10,000’ MSL) (FAA Order
8260.3B).
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Although few UAS provided standards or procedures for performing an en-route climb,
variation between navigation systems and level of automation are likely to be
differentiators both among unmanned platforms as well as between unmanned and
manned aircraft.
The level of automation is some UAS’s did not allow the pilot to increase or decrease
climb rate as the computer determined best rate of climb and used that information to
regulate airspeed, angle of attack and other flight controls to optimize the climb.
4. Descent – [En-route]
a. Common practices between UAS
Requirements reviewed for UAS indicated a focus on the ability of the PIC to anticipate
the airspeed, altitude, and heading of future waypoints and to plan their descent
accordingly while monitoring system health (e.g. pitch indications, proper airspeed and
altitude responses, vertical speed and engine indicators).
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Regardless the level of autonomy assisting in the descent, a second theme was found in a
need for the PIC to again understand the performance envelope of their aircraft and to
plan their descents accordingly.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Both unmanned and manned systems standards and procedures call for the PIC to
understand and operate within the performance envelope of their aircraft. The need to
plan descents with future waypoints or procedures in mind while monitoring system
health is also universal.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
A notable distinction between unmanned and manned systems was presented in this task
within descent planning with regards to the waypoint navigation system utilized by some
UAS. Specifically, the procedures for a group II fixed wing UA describes a need to
“Establish waypoints … to integrate [the] approach with manned aircraft procedures.”
Although waypoint navigation appears common among UAS, these navigation systems
lack standardization and do not appear innately compatible with existing NAS
procedures.
5. Cruise Power Settings – [En-route]
a. Common practices between UAS
UAS systems reflect highly automated systems, based on terminology in literature. The
terminology is predominately managing airspeed and altitude, statements such as “do not
exceed system limitations”, “monitor fuel level”, “set flight mode” are used, but little
guidance in regard to actually setting cruise power settings is stated. One widely used
platform requires, “an in-flight fuel consumption check 30 to 60 minutes after level-off or
entry into cruise flight. Initiate alternate course of action if actual fuel consumption varies
from the planning value, and the flight cannot be completed with the required reserve.
Monitor fuel quantity and consumption rate during the flight.” This also refers to
performance automation that is monitored by the operator. Another platform states, “The
Operator shall continuously monitor battery voltage”.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Both UAS and manned require an applicant to exhibits satisfactory knowledge, risk
management, and skills associated with ensuring the aircraft is performing as specified.
Altitude and airspeed, whether controlled by automation or power settings on a manned
aircraft, require input by the operator and continued monitoring to ensure the expected
results are maintained. Most manned and unmanned aircraft have multifunction display to
monitor fuel burn rate, current fuel levels, system parameters are met as well as warnings
and cautions should the system not operate properly. Manned aircraft verbiage is much
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more manual than the automation terminology used within the UAS, but both require
regular monitoring of the system.
c. Unique requirements differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Manned aircraft verbiage is much more manual than the automation terminology used
within the UAS. Procedures are more mature but involve more manual input of power
settings and fuel control, such as mixture to obtain optimal performance. UAS systems
are more automated, in which performance in maximized through automation instead of
operator input. It becomes a monitor the indications verse provide input to get desired
indications.
Fixed wing aircraft generally refer in terms of fuel burn and use of traditional power
source such as AvGas. While larger-than-small unmanned aircraft are not as likely to be
electrically powered – they may be powered by means other than traditional fuel, for
example the Altavian states, “The Operator shall continuously monitor battery voltage”.
When considering cruise power settings, this may be significant to an unmanned aircraft
but would not be a significant consideration for manned aircraft.

F. LANDING
1. Communications – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
In general, there were no common practices across all platforms besides the requirement
to coordinate descent and landing with ATC. Two platforms referred to communication
with operating control towers in preparation for landing.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
For the UAS platforms that discussed landing communication they aligned with the
manned standards in 14 CFR 91.129(i) “Takeoff, landing, taxi clearance. No person may,
at any airport with an operating control tower, operate an aircraft on a runway or taxiway,
or take off or land an aircraft, unless an appropriate clearance is received from ATC.”
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The unique difference between systems is that some systems did not address the topic or
those that did only stated that crews should maintain communication and seek clearance
prior to landing procedures. This is stated clearly in manned aircraft due to the
requirements of 14 CFR.
Due to the previous requirements to be a rated pilot for operation of UAS, coupled with
the restrictions of operating in controlled airspace, the procedure to communicate with
Air Traffic control may be sparse because they are the standard operating procedures
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trained for manned operations and may be assumed. Additionally, for hand and catapult
launched systems they do not operate in manned airspace and therefore there is normally
no requirement to contact prior to take-off and landing operations.
2. Transition – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
There were no Common practices between UAS. On the unique platforms which had split
operations, the time to do hand-off between shelters varied. Once the aircraft was within
Line of Sight (LOS) links, usually was the time the shelters would switch from mission
control to launch/landing control.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Due to the lack of procedures for transition in both manned and unmanned no
commonalities and dissimilar actions can be highlighted.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Due to the lack of procedures for transition in both manned and unmanned no
commonalities and dissimilar actions can be highlighted with the exception of split
operations hand-off mentioned previously.
3. Approach – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
For systems that included Approach procedures the requirements were in general
common between all platforms. Each procedure in some wording included verify fuel /
flight time in case of a go-around, approaches and go-around options via chart or mission
planning tools, and review and establish descent rates, weather, obstacles, etc. prior to
commencing the approach.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Common between UAS and manned is the UAS uses the spirit of the manned procedures
for approach to include checklists, communication with ATC and required briefings with
crew.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The unmanned procedures in some cases reference mission planning tools whereas
manned procedures do not use a mission planner or GCS.
Additionally, some UAS platforms required the visual observer to be present for the
landing to verify configuration, correct landing runway and expedite taxi off. It would be
during the approach phase the pilot would verify observer has two-way communication
with the pilot and is in position for the landing.
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4. Landing (Non-Automated) Approach and Landing – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
There were no specific procedures for non-automated landings within the scope of this
research.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The landing phase was considered a critical phase of flight and therefore the only
commonality that could be drawn was for there to be a sterile cockpit during this phase.
Confirming landing gear was down and clearance was given to land was a commonality
shared between manned and unmanned platforms.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
For manned aircraft, 14 CFR has very detailed guidance on both VFR and IFR landings.
For UAS the information was not abundant enough to draw any conclusions from.
5. Landing (Automated) Approach and Landing – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
For aircraft that included landing procedures, the procedures were similar in that the
aircraft and operator were configured for the landing phase, reviewed the pilot checklist,
communicated and verified that the ground crews were ready, and then initiated the
landing.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The information for this phase of flight was not abundant enough to draw any
conclusions from.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The main difference is that manned aircraft traditionally do not land using automated
systems. For those that do the procedures were similar in that the aircraft were
configured, checklist complete, and landing initiated.
For UAS aircraft that relied on a visual observer, a final confirmation of aircraft
configuration, alignment to runway, and runway approach path, runway was clear of all
aircraft and equipment was procedural.
6. Go Around – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
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There were numerous Common practices between UAS systems in regards to missed
approaches and go-arounds. Each procedure that was included followed similar
procedures of determining risk and initiate a missed approach procedure. Pilots were to
communicate intent, apply power, climb to a safe altitude (various procedures stated
different altitudes), and reposition to begin approach or transition to alternate landing
area.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The missed approach procedures for manned and UAS were common between them both
in stating intentions to ATC and executing the go around with a smooth climb at runway
heading to a safe altitude.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The noticeable differences were the platform specific details. Depending on the platform
the level of detail was different on climb out, attitude, etc.
The technology built into some UAS platforms sends the aircraft into a go-around
autonomously if it breaks from one of its landing parameters. Also, the pilot can select
the go-around manually, but on these same platforms the aircraft performs the go-around
autonomously once selected.
Some UAS platforms have a minimum altitude in which a go-around can be selected due
to the lag time between entering a command and the aircraft receiving the command.
Once the aircraft is below the minimum altitude established, the aircraft will ignore the
pilots command and continue to land.
7. Ground Support – [Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
There was little written about ground support for UAS. Those platforms that included the
information referenced communicating with the ground crew to ensure that they are ready
for recovery and support.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
There were no commonalities discovered during this research.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The unique differences are in manned operations there is limited discussion of ground
support after landing. Even though there are few UAS platforms that discuss ground
support, the ones that do require it, provide ample guidance.
G. POST LANDING
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1. Communications – [Post Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
In general, there were two requirements noted in the procedures that included post
landing communication; communicate with ground crew and communicate with ATC.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The commonalities are that in both manned and UAS that communication between the
pilot, crew, and ATC are critical.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The unique differences are that the manned procedures provide more detail about when
and what to communicate. 14 CFR 91.129(i) states; “Takeoff, landing, taxi clearance. No
person may, at any airport with an operating control tower, operate an aircraft on a
runway or taxiway, or take off or land an aircraft, unless an appropriate clearance is
received from ATC.”
2. Ground Support – [Post Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
Across each aircraft that listed procedures there were Common practices that include
verifying the aircraft is in a safe location, securing the aircraft, and conducting shutdown
checklists and post flight. Finally, the ground crew was to communicate the shutdown
had been completed to the pilot.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
In manned flight, there are ground support and shutdown procedures conducted by the
pilot and crew. The procedures between and manned and UAS were similar in nature.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The unique difference is the pilot is not in the vicinity of the aircraft and ground crew.
Therefore, the communication is done remotely which imposes additional communication
requirements and procedures.
3. Taxi – [Post Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
The common requirement shared is if an aircraft has the ability to taxi, then clearances
must be approved prior to moving the aircraft.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The taxi procedures between manned and UAS are very similar in that they both follow
the 14 CFR and require clearance for taxi operations.
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c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The main difference is in the UAS the pilot does not have as much information of
obstacles on the ground as a manned pilot. The UAS pilot is remote and relies upon the
ground support in many instances to direct and observe for the pilot therefore this adds a
risk to any taxi operation a manned pilot does not incur.
4. Parking – [Post Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There were no detailed procedures for parking found in this research.
5. Engine Shutdown – [Post Landing]
a. Common practices between UAS
There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There were no detailed procedures for engine shutdown.
H. PROCEDURAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO PILOTS
a. Common practices between UAS
All systems required a minimum of one pilot to act as the RPIC.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
All manned aircraft require at least one pilot to act as PIC. Some aircraft require a flight
crew of more than one person; however, only one may act at the PIC.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Although a UAS requires one PIC to operate the system, the PIC can change. With a
UAS, the incoming PIC may not have participated in other phases of flight such as
preflight, taxi, takeoff, transfer of control, or en-route operations, but may become the
PIC later in a flight, such as a landing procedure. A crew-changeover briefing may take
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place as the transfer of control between crewmembers within the same control station or
different control station occurs.
In a manned aircraft, all of the crewmember must be on the aircraft during all preceding
phases of flight. Crewmembers may participate in an initial crew briefing, but may also
participate in a crew changeover briefing within the same cockpit.
Some systems require the use of an Aircraft Commander and/or Mission Commander in
addition to a PIC.

I. CONTROL
OPERATIONS

STATION

HANDOFF

AND

PILOT

CHANGEOVER

DURING

a. Common practices between UAS
Initially during this element of research task, consideration was only the control
station handoff, which pertains to transferring control from one control station to
another. This is typically completed in operations in which the aircraft is in a beyond
line of sight (BLOS) environment. The nature of long-endurance UAS is such that
crews may be scheduled in shifts. The transition of control from one pilot to another
within the same ground station is referred to as a changeover. It was decided to
expand this task to include crew changeover as well.
Regarding ground station handoff, since commercial regulations do not broadly
encapsulate BLOS operations, little information is available outside of DoD assets.
Within the DoD systems, little information regarding the transfer of control between
remote ground control stations was available within the documents that were
compiled for the literature review, with literature focusing primarily on crew
changeover procedures within a control station.
Of the available information relating to control station handoffs between remote
locations, the most detailed information was found in military UAS Operations
Manuals. Handoff procedures included briefings and radio communication
requirements. Similarities between control station handoff procedures were the most
pronounced between the Air Force assets, referring to the aircraft operator’s
requirement to complete required steps and follow the aircraft manuals and checklist.
Literature that focused on crew changeovers within the control station was primarily
oriented towards a briefing for the incoming pilot that covers both normal and
abnormal system behavior, identifying responsibilities during the transfer, and
ensuring that control is not interrupted. These procedures ensure a smooth transition
of control between pilots and the aircrafts status is known while preventing an
interruption in aircraft control.
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A common theme between all UAS handoff procedures is the importance of
communication and the reliance on a checklist to guide the procedure. The emphasis
on these elements of UAS operation highlight the importance of coordination and
defined procedures when exchanging the information necessary to hand over control
of a UAS to a pilot that will take over control from a remote location.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The chosen literature showed few similarities between manned and unmanned
procedures relating to the transfer of controls between control stations. The closest
comparison that can be made between manned and unmanned aircraft in terms of the
transfer of controls in a UAS crew changeover procedures. However, these
similarities are primarily superficial in that they involve the physical transfer of the
control station from one pilot to another and require the aircraft’s status and
instrumentation to be monitored throughout the process. They do not address the
handoff of controls to a control stations in a remote location, and do not allow for a
direct comparison between the required procedures.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There are obvious differences between manned and unmanned control transfer in that
the unmanned aircraft has the capability to pass control of the system to a different
physical location. This is entirely unique to unmanned aircraft and is due to the
fundamental difference in how the two types of aircraft (manned and unmanned) are
piloted.
The majority of the literature for unmanned aircraft systems highlights procedures
and processes that relate to crew changeovers within a control station, with a smaller
emphasis on transfer of control from one control station to another. Despite the
limited information relating to control handoff between control stations, what is
available highlights the importance of procedures for both events; a change of crew
and a handoff to a different control station.
J. OPERATIONS DURING COMMAND AND CONTROL DEGRADATION AND LOSS
a. Common practices between UAS
Little information relating to procedures with degraded command and control
performance was found in the literature. The most significant information relating
to operations with degraded system performance came from Air Force doctrine and
referenced the ability of the UAS to land with a degraded navigation solution, provided
that the runway is suitable.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The literature showed no commonalities between manned and unmanned aircraft with
respect to the operation of the aircraft with degraded or a loss of command and control.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
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The literature was extremely limited in terms of describing procedures for degraded
operation. This is especially true with respect to degraded command and control. The loss
of primary command and control functions on the part of the pilot due to a lost-link
scenario was better covered, but degraded performance and control loss due to other
factors was not. This is not necessarily due to these procedures not existing, but instead
points to a gap in the literature that may be addressed with greater access to system
documentation and operations manuals.
K. OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF DECREASED DATA FROM AIRCRAFT
ATTITUDE, PERFORMANCE OR ENVIRONMENT
a. Common practices between UAS
Degraded sensory cues may occur under two conditions. Partial or full downlink failure
modes.
Partial or intermittent downlink failure modes occurred when the downlink stream was
not consistent. The downlink reports from the unmanned aircraft (UA) may occur as
interrupted messages from the UA to the Control Station (CS). The conditions may occur
from multiple causes including failures with onboard datalink equipment; masking of the
datalink stream between air data terminal and the ground data terminal; failures with the
ground data terminal to the CS; downlink telemetry signal jamming. The pilot may be
able to maintain awareness, although may experience periods of increased workload
while performing emergency procedures to increase the downlink quality, or to move the
UA to an area to eliminate masking. Additionally, the pilot may become disoriented as
the CS is displaying intermittent data, such as inconsistent or erroneous UA status such as
RPM or UA’s position on scrolling map confusing the pilot.
Full downlink failure modes occur when the AV downlink is consistently disrupted. The
downlink reports from the unmanned aircraft (UA) will occur as no report(s) from the
UA to the Control Station (CS). The conditions may occur from multiple causes
including failures with onboard datalink equipment; masking of the datalink stream
between air data terminal and the ground data terminal; failures with the ground data
terminal to the CS; downlink telemetry signal jamming, or an UA mishap (such as
propulsion failure causing flight into terrain). The pilot is not able to maintain awareness
because no telemetry is being reported (or received) into the CS. The pilot may
experience periods of increased workload while performing emergency procedures to
reestablish a downlink signal.
Common considerations for between UAS included the use of payload video, if available,
to assist the pilot in understanding if uplink is still being received by the UA. In some
UAS the payload video, if available, was used during emergency procedures to navigate
the aircraft to a better location, return to home, or navigate to a flight termination
location.
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b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The manned aircraft has a back-up if the performance engines fail. The pilot can use 5
senses to track location, approximate speed, attitude and altitude. Many UAS also have a
built-in, redundant back-up in lieu of not having the ability to rely on senses.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
UAS with operational payload video may be able to use the video to assist the pilot with
understanding the status such as pitch, roll, and location of the UA; however, not all UAS
have an independent full-motion video datalink. Some UAS have no full-motion video at
all. Some UAS have a single downlink datalink which includes both telemetry and video.
Some UAS have redundant telemetry datalinks. Should a primary datalink fail, then a
secondary datalink may enable the pilot to understand what the UA is doing during
normal or emergency operations. For example, the primary datalink range may be limited
to shorter distances, but uses a higher data bandwidth for launch and recovery operations.
During en-route operations, the UAS may be operating on a secondary datalink under
normal operations. Other UAS may operate under primary datalinks and the use of
secondary datalinks may be considered emergency operations.
The pilot of a manned aircraft would be able to use other cues such as aural, vibration,
and other instruments to continue flight with the loss of attitude or airspeed indications.
The manned aircraft pilot has the ability to disengage an autopilot, if operational at the
time of partial instrument failure, to manually control the aircraft using input from other
information. A UAS pilot relies on the data to fly the aircraft and has no other outside
cues to use as back-up if performance instruments degrade or fail.
L. LOST-LINK TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES
a. Common practices between UAS
More research is desired on this topic; few sources contained information relating to lostlink troubleshooting procedures. Procedures within some documentation were rooted in
over-arching doctrine, and were not specific to any particular platform as the example
below:
“During this emergency, the UAS crew will attempt to reestablish communications with
the unmanned aircraft. If contact is reestablished, the aircrew will decide whether to
terminate the mission and return to base to preserve the asset or, based on the tactical
situation, continue the mission as planned. At the return home side, the unmanned aircraft
will perform the programmed flight recovery maneuver unless communications have
been restored and the Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) commands otherwise.”
This straightforward approach to lost-link troubleshooting paints a broad picture of how
such procedures are frames. It is also likely that it relies on specific system
documentation to further define what specific lost-link troubleshooting actions are.
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While this general standard is geared towards operation in a tactical scenario, it is
relevant in that it points to a baseline for how lost-link troubleshooting may be handled
with any UAS, regardless of the operating environment. This general approach
specifies that attempts should be made to regain control, and based upon the outcome of
those attempts; the pilot should make a decision whether to continue the flight, land, or
terminate the flight based upon the nature of the failure. If the link cannot be reestablished, the UAS will fly its predetermined lost-link flight plan.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Manned aircraft are not subject to the same constraints associated with direct control
through a data link and therefore does not have an equivalent lost-link procedure.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
UAS’s are unique in a loss of the command and control (C2) link can render the pilot
unable to directly influence the flight path of the aircraft. In the event of this kind of
failure, the options available to a UAS pilot are often limited, and the UAS typically
reverts to a predetermined state. This state is often to return to a suitable landing location.
Information relating to lost-link troubleshooting procedures for specific UAS was limited
within the given literature. Further access to system documentation may help to fill these
gaps. Checklists and manuals for specific UAS are expected to include any
troubleshooting procedures and any additional information that the pilot needs to address
a lost-link scenario, but given the nature of the systems that were evaluated for this
literature review, this information is difficult to share due to the proprietary and/or
confidential nature of the systems.
M. LOST-LINK PROCEDURES (following confirmation of lost link)
a. Common practices between UAS
Commonalities reflecting responses to lost-link conditions are highlighted in the higherlevel doctrine that was reviewed. Best Practices share two common practices for
addressing lost-link scenarios.
The first is in the event of a lost link, the pilot of the UAS should be in contact with ATC
and ensure that their lost-link plan, whatever that may be, complies with any ATC
clearance requirements.
The second is UAS behaves in a predictable manner after the link is lost, often following
a pre-planned route.
In addition, FAA ATO Policy addressing lost-link scenarios further specify that specific
transponder squawk codes should be used to broadcast a lost-link scenario to ATC
independently of pilot radio calls.
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Commonalities between UAS with respect to lost-link control, while not as clear in the
literature, do exist. They all state the requirement of the UAS to follow some kind of
“predicted flight path”. However, lost-link procedures for specific UAS may differ based
upon operating environment and conditions. The pilot will need to ensure the lost-link
flight plan account for terrain, weather, and any restricted airspace along the route of
flight.
b.

Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Given the significant differences in how manned and unmanned aircraft are controlled,
there are no commonalities between manned and unmanned aircraft in this respect.
Policies propose that transponder codes be used to indicate lost-communication status of
UAS using squawk codes. For UAS applications, this is a natural extension of common,
accepted aviation practice that addresses the need to communicate a lost-link status
quickly and allow ATC to adapt to the change.

c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
While it is known that all UAS considered within the literature have some form of lostlink control procedures, not all were present in the literature. This gap is largely due to
the nature of the systems and their documentation. The procedures that were available
varied in what the aircraft was programmed to do in the event it went lost-link. Some
immediately climbed and headed back to landing airfield while others went into a holding
pattern for a period of time before returning to an airfield. Other aircraft would start a
descent to landing, while other aircraft had not logic pre-build in.
N. IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
An in-flight emergency can be generalized when other-than-normal circumstances in
performance occur that could lead to degraded ability to aviate, navigate or communicate with
potential for loss of aircraft or life. Based on the severity of the situation the goal is to minimize
the impact of the emergency to prevent loss of life and resources. Due to this common goal, it is
not surprising the standards and procedures used in manned aviation have been closely adapted
to current UAS operations. Any significant changes noted in research were driven by technology
constraints and not due to a change in philosophy. The greatest deviation noted in the handling of
an in-flight emergency between manned and unmanned aircraft was in UAS procedures it was
noted several times where the PIC was trained to make the decision to terminate or ditch the
aircraft verse doing a forced landing which could not ensure the safety of other manned aircraft,
resources and infrastructure on the ground, or civilian lives. Having the absence of a soul on
board made ditching and flight termination a greater outcome potential for an in-flight
emergency on a UAS verse a manned aircraft where ditching would be an extreme last resort
option.
1. Propulsion failure – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between unmanned system
Most UAS aircraft have been designed to get airborne and stay aloft with minimal power,
therefore, they often have more of a glider design. The Altavian NOVA 7200 has a 12:1 glide
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ratio and the RQ-4 Global Hawk boasts a 131-foot wingspan as examples. The nature of most
UAS designs allow the aircraft to be able to glide at a controlled rate for relatively long
distances over time and therefore one of the first common steps during engine failure was to
asses’ ability to make it back to approved airfields or locate proper ditching locations.
Though there is a sense of urgency in any emergency, a commonality between UAS
platforms was having longer time prior to being on the ground in an engine out situation,
allowing greater options for landing areas.
All UAS’s under the scope of this research addressed had an engine failure/engine out
checklist or procedure. Most still maintain electrical power to be able to maintain aircraft
control for purposes of navigating and communicating. The other common standards and
procedures were also shared with manned aircraft and are included in part b below.

b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft - In-Flight Emergencies
This is one of the most critical emergencies that could happen during flight so it was no
surprise that many UAS’s share similar procedures. There are many common shared
practices.
As with manned aircraft, airmanship is the number one priority. Maintain aircraft control,
continue to navigate, and communicate when safely able to do so remains a common core
of airmanship between manned and UAS aircraft.
UAS rely heavily on detection and identification from the pilot as automation increases,
verse flying the aircraft. Common areas included identifying a failure in a timely manner
using indications displayed on flight instruments in the cockpit for a manned aircraft or
ground station screen in an UAS. Identify any other systems or load shedding affected by
losing engine propulsion. Additionally, identifying a landing sight the aircraft can safely
glide to.
Other common skills addressed under this area were pilots’ ability to reduce drag if
applicable, communicate with ATC of the emergency to gain priority and traffic
deconfliction while maintaining aircraft control, and squawk 7700 (this happens
automatically on most UAS’s like the RQs).
Also, the pilot of most UAS platforms researched were provided and required to
complete engine failure/out checklists. Pilots were directed to continue to monitor
instruments like airspeed, altitude and temperatures and with this emergency land as soon
as possible at a suitable airfield.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There was no research discovered on engine restarting procedures for UAS. Though this
research didn’t exhaust every design and UAS on the market, it can be confidently said most
UAS’s did not have restart capability after the engine failed. This is different than many
manned aircraft that have the ability to try to restart a failed engine.
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One of the main themes shared in an engine out checklist for UAS was to ensure route and
waypoints to the landing or termination were safely away from people or property. In a
manned aircraft, though safety of civilians were noted scarcely upon picking a suitable
runway, there were no noted implications/restrictions of picking a flight path to that location
over areas of population. This is logical as the difference is the consideration of getting souls
on board safely to landing verse no consideration of souls on board in a UAS and therefore
less risk should be taken to secure a landing for a UAS.
The S in UAS is for systems, which speaks to the architecture of unmanned flight. There is
Mission Control elements and ground support built into the architect. A pilot on a manned
aircraft only needs to relay the emergency to ATC prior to landing. The UAS operator will
also inform mission commanders, SOF (supervisor of flight), ground support crews and time
permitting may even call a response center. Some larger contractors make response centers
available which has on call experts to help troubleshoot information. In some UAS
infrastructures there are different landing/takeoff control elements (LRE) and/or pilots that
would need to be coordinated with quickly to “catch’ the aircraft on final. Often there are
more resources and members involved in a UAS emergency then the single pilot flying in a
manned aircraft would have access to.
On manned aircraft, there will be a quick check of seat backs in the most upright position and
secure seat belts/harnesses. These steps would not be required on an unmanned aircraft.
There was no research discovered on fuel jettison procedures for the UAS’s under the scope
of this research. Though for engine-on emergencies, included in the checklist were burndown fuel procedures as the unmanned platform would be able to maintain altitude to afford
the opportunity to lessen weight on the landing, it was not noted in any of the procedures for
engine-out. This was a listed for consideration in manned aircraft engine-out procedures
2. Emergency Descent – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
UAS architecture allows for other members to help decrease task saturation during an
emergency. The ground station affords access of resources outside of the virtual cockpit.
Most platforms had other personnel readily available during operations to include a sensor
operator, mission commander, and shelter maintenance personnel. These crewmembers can
be delegated to execute tasks such as obtaining weather, communicating with ATC and other
outside agencies, pulling up airfield diagrams, reading checklists, etc., to allow the pilot to
remain focused on maintaining positive aircraft control, monitoring other aircraft systems
and navigating to a landing area. Some UAS platforms additionally have extra pilots already
on site to provide physiological breaks during the course of the sortie.
As with normal en-route descents, requirements reviewed for UAS indicated a focus on the
ability of the PIC to anticipate the airspeed, altitude, and heading of future waypoints and to
plan their descent accordingly while monitoring system health (e.g. pitch indications, proper
airspeed and altitude responses, vertical speed and engine indicators). A noted difference
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found was based on the level of autonomy assisting in the descent. In an emergency situation
a pilot must be aware of built in actions points along the mission route that may trigger
additional actions based on the state or contingency the aircraft is in. Noted on one UAS
platform, when put into a C-3 condition (emergency condition), the aircraft automatically
shuts down the engine upon reaching the Initial Approach Point (IAP), which eliminates the
ability for the aircraft to execute a missed approach. It is crucial the pilot is aware of these
action points and has the knowledge to override them when absolutely necessary.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
Both unmanned and manned systems standards and procedures call for the PIC to understand
and operate within the performance envelope of their aircraft. The need to plan descents with
future waypoints or procedures in mind while monitoring system health is also universal.
This remains true in an emergency with the caveat of working with ATC to gain traffic
priority in the descent to ensure aircraft can maneuver to quickly get on the ground,
especially in cases where the longer airborne the more exasperated the emergency becomes
such as a fuel or other fluid leak.

c.

Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
As earlier mentioned on some UAS platforms, the mission control ground station pilot is not
the same as the take-off/landing control ground station pilot, as earlier referred to as split
operations. Though these systems are capable of having the mission control pilot land the
aircraft, it can come at a degradation of capability and/or skill. The take-off and landing
ground station (LRE) is the only ground station with line of sight links such as UHF LOS.
This allows more immediate control from the pilot’s command to the aircraft maneuvering.
The mission control ground station (MCE) uses beyond line-of-sight links, which have a
delay between pilot’s command and aircraft maneuver. In a critical environment where LOS
links are available, it is desirable to have the LRE station and pilot fly the aircraft for descent
and landing to have the most immediate response to pilot’s input. Therefore, unlike manned
aviation, in regular procedures and emergency the LRE pilot and ground station would be
brought on line and “catch” the aircraft, time permitting, which would require the extra step
of doing a “hand-over” brief from one pilot and station to the other.
Other UAS platforms, there are often different currencies and/or certifications, which vary
from platform to platform. There is the potential the pilot in control during the cruise/mission
phase when an emergency arises that requires the aircraft to be landed as soon as possible is
non-current and/or not certified to land the aircraft. In this case a hand-off to a certified or
current pilot would be the normal practice, time permitting. In a manned aircraft, the pilot
would have all required certifications and currencies and the only equivalent practice would
be to have the most experienced/skilled pilot fly the aircraft, if more than one is available.
Some UAS platforms have a ground observer as part of their architecture. In lieu of a fullmotion video capability (FMV) these platforms rely on a spotter to verify the aircraft is lined
up on the correct landing runway, in the correct configuration and glide pattern, and the
runway/taxi area is cleared of people and other obstacles. In a landing emergency, it will be
important to get the visual observer back out on the airfield to perform these duties. If the
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visual observer is unavailable, at locations where there is a control tower, coordination can be
made with the tower to be the visual observer.
As mentioned earlier under in-flight emergencies, the emergency descent of a UAS as a
glider designed aircraft often would have more time in the descent to run full checklists and
seek the assistance of the Mission Commander and other resources to help with checklist
execution and communications with ATC. There could be multiple airmen helping to resolve
the problem to safely get the aircraft recovered verse a manned aircraft where the pilot may
be the only person available responsible for obtaining weather, ATIS, communicate with
ATC, study approach and landing, etc. and therefore have the potential to become more
greatly task saturated under emergency situations.
A manned aircraft takes an exponential amount of attention verse a UAS to maintain positive
aircraft control. Parameters such as radius of turns ¼ to 1/3 mile from reference points, bank
angles to not exceed 60 degrees, establish 68 KIAS on descent, maintain step altitudes on
descent +/-100 feet, airspeed +0/-10 knots, are all criteria which require tentativeness and
skill that can be compromised when dealing with other emergency situations that also require
extra procedures, steps, or monitoring. The automation built into some UAS platforms and
preprogrammed mission points allows the aircraft to automatically maintain the correct
airspeed, altitude and performance parameters allowing the pilot to monitor verse control
which decreases task saturation.
Manned aircraft requirements also have considerations that would generate an emergency
descent not necessary for UAS. Depressurization and cockpit smoke are examples,
additionally during the descent the requirement to maintain positive load factors was
addressed only in manned operations.
3. Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Communication – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
In general, there were no common practices identified on communications during an
emergency across platforms. The expectations remained the same as normal operations and
aligned with 14 CFR 91.129 (i).
The communication between the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission
Control Element (MCE) remain essential in an emergency ensuring smooth transition of
aircraft control and to keep updated on any changes in expected times for the scheduled, or
non-scheduled transition to occur.
Few platforms required establishing notification procedures and communication connectivity
between the operation center and emergency airfields as well as making contact with those
able to ensure the landing runway was clear of personnel/aircraft/and equipment.
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For UAS that do not fly BLOS, the need for the operator and observer landing to remain colocated and communicate verbally remain in an emergency.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
In general, there were no additional common guidance and requirements identified on
communications during emergency but the expectation to continue 14 FR 91.129 (i)
requirements listed below.
UAS and manned aircraft both require an operator to exhibits the knowledge, and skills to
communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for clearances and procedures within the
National Airspace System (NAS). The skill to use and understand the proper phraseology and
to correctly copy, read back, interpret, and comply with an ATC clearance is common
between platforms.
Knowledge and skills are required to correctly set up communication frequencies, navigation
systems and transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance along with monitoring
proper frequencies, including emergency frequencies.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Manned aviation systems do not have unmanned aircraft systems remote split operations.
This adds an additional layer of communication during emergency landing between the
landing crew and mission crew with UAS’s of this capability.
UAS’s, which have sensor operators or other crewmembers that provide additional back up
during landings, become even more critical during an emergency. Some platforms the sensor
operator is to notify the pilot of air traffic conflict or deviations in altitude. Additionally, each
aircrew member will monitor the crew intercom and aircraft radio to maximum extent
possible.
The ground stations have the ability to use a telephone. It is procedure for the MQ-1/9 and
other platforms to minimize uses during critical phases of flight.
The sensor operator or additional crewmembers afforded to a UAS pilot during an
emergency also will inform the pilot of any additional caution and warning messages.
In the case of some UAS platforms, such as the RQ-4, an emergency mission plan with
predetermined routes and altitudes are programmed into the aircraft logic. A pilot must be
able to determine what contingency the aircraft is in and accurately predict what actions the
aircraft will take, to include direction of turn, altitude it will climb or descend to during
phases of flight, and the emergency flight route.
Approach – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
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There were no common practices between UAS for emergency procedures during an
approach. The research concludes in an emergency; the common approach requirements
remain the same as normal operations listed below time permitting:
1. Verify fuel/flight time in case of go-around
2. Review approaches and go-around options via chart or mission planning tools
3. Review and establish descent rates, weather, obstacles, etc. prior to commencing
approach.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
During this phase of flight, approach to landing, the UAS and manned aircraft share the
common goal of transitioning safely to landing and therefore the procedures are aligned in
regard to executing checklist, receive proper ATC clearance to continue on approach and be
aware of all go-around/missed approach procedures.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There are several unique procedures between manned and unmanned aircraft. The unmanned
procedures in some cases reference mission planning tools whereas manned procedures do
not use a mission planner or GCS.
In a UAS, the pilot can identify and seek waiver authority in the case of an emergency for
landing below minimum weather or other stated requirements.
The UAS pilot will ensure if unable to comply with the missed approach routing or climb
requirements, coordination for alternate climb out instructions are made which ensures
obstacle clearance.
For an engine out emergency, a UAS pilot will identify safest ditching/termination point if a
safe landing can’t be made while on the approach, or when directed to abort landing/goaround by ATC due to safety of life or resources.
For UAS’s that do not include approach procedures, a standard approach procedure should be
developed with standard and emergency approach methods included.
Touchdown – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
There were no specific procedures or standards noted in landing with an emergency besides
the execution of all emergency and landing checklist prior to landing. There continued to be
verbiage about UAS not landing in areas where potential life or resources could be put in
danger.
b. Common between UAS and manned aircraft
For aircraft that included procedures for landing, the procedures were similar between UAS
and manned. Both required the aircraft be configured for the landing phase, review and
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completion of landing checklists, communicate and verify ground crews were ready, confirm
clearance with ATC was given, and then initiated the landing.
When conditions permitted, completion of both emergency and normal landing checklists
were expected.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
Due to the lack of procedures for landing in both manned and unmanned, no unique
differences can be highlighted.
Ditching Site Selection – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
Ditching an aircraft, for the purposes of this research, is an aircraft that is still able to
maintain some level of positive control while landing, but unable to safely make a designated
or approved
aircraft-landing surface. Ditching, verse flight termination, also assumes
an attempt is being made to minimize damage to the aircraft and/or safety of the crew on
board. Only common standard and requirement noted in the very few UAS’s that had
standards or procedures for ditching were to ensure the primary site selected would not
endanger personnel or property on the ground.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
There were very specific ditching procedures for manned aircraft based on type of aircraft
and ability to carry passengers and/or cargo. However, no commonalities were found
between UAS and manned operations, mostly due to the lack of procedures and standards for
UAS ditching.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The requirement to not ditch in a place where any risk property or safety of life could be
jeopardized was not a stated standard or procedure for manned aircraft.
Manned aircraft ditching procedures also included securing cargo and briefing passengers, to
include proper impact positions and emergency exit procedures upon landing. Water ditching
had additional requirements on releasing and using safety rafts for manned aircraft. These
would not be procedures necessary to be adopted by current larger-than-small UAS
platforms.
Flight Termination – Emergency Landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
Flight termination for this research is when an aircraft is purposefully put into a spin or other
unrecoverable flight parameter to ensure the aircraft impacts the desired area. Unlike
ditching, the aircraft is expected to be a complete loss. The choice to terminate is most often
due to the aircraft not being controllable for landing, or a suitable airfield cannot be made
safely given the remaining battery supply and/or altitude. Technology for UAS to flight
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terminate was different from platform to platform. The commonality was the emphasis to
find a location that ensured safety of other aircraft, resources, and life.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
There were no flight termination procedures or standards available for manned aircraft. The
closest procedure a manned aircraft would have is to put the aircraft into an intentional spin
to minimize distance it would fly prior to impacting the ground, thus providing more
assurance of it crashing where desired. However, with a person in the aircraft it would be
assumed a ditching option would be selected over a flight termination, as this would also
translate into a life termination procedure as well.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
None were noted as there were no termination standards or procedures for manned aircraft
discovered in this research to compare to.
4. Uncontrolled flight (where real time human pilot input, either manual or through
automated systems, has no effect on the aircraft attitude or flight path.) – [In-Flight
Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
UAS platforms rely on a control links such as UHF, SATCOM, KU and/or Inmarsat to be
able to relay commands. A common procedure when a pilot has no ability to change aircraft
attitude or flight path is to switch over to another control link if available to help troubleshoot
the lack of response.
There are various degrees of automation in UAS platforms and uncontrolled flight can be
causal due to control link failure, mechanical failure, or pilot error. In all cases it is up to the
UAS operator to troubleshoot the cause and try to put the aircraft back into the controlled
flight envelope.
There were no commonalities between procedures across UAS in regards to recovering an
aircraft from uncontrolled flight. Data that was found for uncontrolled flight situations was
very limited. There were checklists in several UAS and others that addressed troubleshooting
to regain command control. Spin and stall recovery checklist were present in a few
publications. In one highly autonomous UAS the pilot doesn’t have the ability to recover the
aircraft outside of controlled flight and only had checklist for mechanical and control link
failures. The automation levels were too divergent across platforms to draw common
practices. Some platforms autonomously control all of its flight parameters such as rate of
climb, turn, and level-off, while others are flown with a stick and rudder.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
The inability to control aircraft attitude or flight path for manned aircraft is due to either a
mechanical failure of a control surface or the aircraft was flown outside its parameters to
maintain controlled flight (stall or a spin). The only common procedures found between UAS
and manned were in regards to uncontrolled flight caused by the aircraft being flown outside
its parameters to maintain controlled flight.
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Unusual flight attitudes that can lead to uncontrolled flight can result from stress, high
workload, task saturation, and distractions. These contributors are experienced by both UAS
and manned pilots.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
The automation levels of some UAS aircraft were designed to keep it in its flight envelope.
More developed UAS platforms have constant feedback from numerous sources to eliminate
the pilot from being able to stall or put the aircraft in a spin. It will override commands from
the pilot to increase/decrease power, increase/decrease climb/descent, or increase rate of turn.
It uses optimal performance data while flying and pilots can only direct final altitude, final
heading. The level of automation eliminated a pilot from being able to command the aircraft
into an uncontrolled flight parameter unless flight termination was selected.
Manned aircraft have the benefit of the pilot in the aircraft using all senses while flying. A
pilot can feel when the aircraft it climbing, descending and/or turning. This is not a benefit a
pilot sitting in a ground station has. It can be concluded it is easier for a pilot in a manned
aircraft to sense he/she is approaching an uncontrolled flight situation, or is in an
uncontrolled flight situation, verse a person staring at a screen who may be distracted at
looking at weather, chat windows, moving map, or other external factors.
There are physiological situations that can lead a manned aircraft into an unusual attitude
and/or uncontrolled flight such as spatial disorientation or the leans. These are not generally
concerns for a UAS pilot operating out of a ground station.
5. Navigation (GPS or other navigation system) failure – [In-Flight Emergencies]
a. Common practices between UAS
UAS technology and platform reliance on internal navigation varied so widely, to include
redundancy and back-up systems that no commonality could be assessed. There was a varied
degree of possible safe recovery of aircraft based on navigation failure.
b. Common practices between UAS and manned aircraft
UAS and manned aircraft have procedures to use external references and ATC radar to assist
in location of the aircraft and use pilotage to get to landing area. The use of ground data
azimuth and dead reckoning is similar with platforms. Computing time, distance, and
heading for each leg of flight route, and using assistance of ATC radar or visual observer was
shared between platforms.
c. Unique differences between UAS or UAS to manned systems
There were a few systems that had built in contingencies for loss of navigation. One UAS
researched will enter into a 20-degree roll, orbiting clockwise, maintaining current altitude.
The aircraft would descend as it maintained a 20-degree roll until it reaches the surface if it
doesn’t regain GPS inputs. Another UAS researched will also enter an orbit if it loses all
internal navigation inputs. This is a design to allow time to troubleshoot the navigation
problem.
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A unique difference between most UAS and manned aircraft is once a manned aircraft has
successfully reached a landing field after a loss of internal navigation, the emergency is averted
as the landing process in VFR conditions remains the same as standard operations. Most UAS
platforms rely heavily on internal navigation for landing, especially those designed to land
autonomously. To override automation and have to manually land the aircraft is still an
emergency situation for the more autonomous platforms.
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APPENDIX B—INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY TASK
To accommodate the reader’s varied interest in the literature review during the PC-1 task of this
research, this appendix was organized by each task concentrating on ‘Initial Recommendations”.
Initial recommendations were not the proposed recommendations, but current research regarding
available standards and procedures.
A. PREFLIGHT
1. Before Entering GCS – [Preflight]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to become familiar with all available information concerning each
flight, including weather, NOTAMS, flight plan, told data, alternate landing sites, and
alternate airport fuel requirements.
b. Require pilot proficiency areas in checklist usage; ability to properly identify aircraft
discrepancies; procedures for deferring inoperative equipment; proper fuel and oil
servicing.
c. Require the pilot to perform fuel planning to ensure the aircraft is carrying enough usable
fuel on each flight. Plan a reserve fuel based on a percentage of at least 10% of the
planned flight time or a minimum reserve time of 30 minutes.
d. Require each pilot and crew, to include visual observer, hand-over crew, launch/recovery
specialist, and maintenance personnel to do a crew resource management check and/or
brief to determine human factors risk for flight.
2. Before Engine Start – [Preflight]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to verify the functionality of the aircraft, control station, and support
equipment through a methodological process.
b. Require the pilot to evaluate the functionality of avionics, sensors, actuators, lighting,
flight control surfaces, servo actuators, datalinks, fuel, and oil levels.
c. Require the pilot to detect possible defects for aircraft, control station, and support
equipment.
d. Require the pilot to verify the functionality of the emergency/contingency mission plan.
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e. Require the pilot to verify the UAS meets the minimum equipment list for flight.
f. For UAS with multiple crewmembers, verify the functionality of communication
systems.
g. Require the pilot to document any defects noted, limitations as a result of missing or nonfunctional equipment on a standardized form.
h. Require the pilot to document the completion of the preflight inspection.
i. Require the pilot be able to use radios and demonstrate use of correct verbiage when
getting current ATIS information and requesting engine start/clearance on request with
airport ground control.
j. Require the pilot be familiar with any existing cold or hot weather starting procedures
and/or standards for the aircraft and exercise correct action when operating inside one of
those conditions.
3. Engine Start – [Preflight]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to establish two-way communication with ground support
crewmembers.
b. Require the pilot to perform engine starting procedures through a methodological
process.
c. Require the pilot to verify throttle position prior to engine start, if capability exists.
d. Require engine health information to be monitored during engine start. In circumstances
when a pilot is unable to establish a link connection to the aircraft to monitor engine
health, a ground crew member is required to monitor engine health information until pilot
establishes a link to take over these duties.
e. Require the pilot to change the throttle position during an engine run to verify normal
operating parameters at other-than-idle RPMs, if capability exists.
f. Require the pilot to be able to demonstrate the ability to perform abnormal starting
procedures.
g. Require the pilot to be able to demonstrate the ability to detect unsafe engine parameters.
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h. Require the pilot to be able to immediately shut off the engine, if required.
4. Pre-Taxi – [Preflight]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to determine if ice exists or if de-icing procedures are required prior to
taxi operations.
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC to receive taxi instructions.
c. Require the pilot to set the UAS avionics systems correctly and in a methodological
manner.
d. Require the pilot to correctly set the flight instruments.
e. Require the pilot to perform a pre-taxi briefing to all crewmembers.
B. TAXI
1. Communication and Pre-takeoff checks
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of
flight.
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC using proper and accepted terminology.
c. Require the pilot to taxi in accordance with ATC instructions.
d. Require the pilot to perform a brake check as soon as safely can be executed based on
aircraft technical data.
e. Require the pilot to be able to perform a full stop at any given time, whether self-initiated
or directed to do so by ATC or visual observer.
f. Require the pilot to maintain a reliable datalink with the aircraft. Pilot shall be able to
perform a switch link procedure to use the most reliable datalink when capabilities exist.
g. Require the pilot to use visual aids to taxi or be in two-way communication with visual
observer.
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h. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to have two-way communication with the
marshaller.
i. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to taxi at a normal walking speed. If a safety
observer is in a follow-vehicle, pilot shall taxi at a safe speed for conditions.
j. Require the pilot or visual observer to recognize hazards on the taxiway surface.
k. If the pilot is using Full Motion Video for taxi and loses sight of the taxiway centerline,
the pilot must be able to stop the aircraft until visual contact with the centerline is
reacquired.
l. Require the pilot to taxi at safe speeds for conditions present.
m. Require the pilot to taxi at a safe distance from other aircraft.
n. Require the pilot have knowledge of limitations for taxi for their airframe to include
wind, temperature and RVR.
C. TAKEOFF
1. Communications – [Takeoff]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require, prior to taking the runway, that the pilot clears the approach path and runway
through visual observer or other means.
b. Require the pilot to communicate using standard aviation/ATC phraseology, and adhere
to standard ATC “read-back” requirements.
c. Require communication with a controlling agency prior to takeoff; following instrument
departure communication procedures as appropriate
d. Ensure that a contingency is in place for a radio communications failure and that the pilot
is proficient in its implementation.
2. Takeoff – [Takeoff]
Initial Recommendations
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a. Require the pilot to make a final check of aircraft systems and configuration prior to
requesting permission from ATC for takeoff (aircraft flaps, communications and
datalinks, engine, and other required equipment).
b. Require the pilot or visual observer perform a final check of runway and airspace prior to
initiating the takeoff run to ensure the runway and flightpath is clear of traffic.
c. Require the pilot to check solid command and control links prior to initiating takeoff.
d. Require pilot to acknowledge takeoff clearance in communications with ATC once
takeoff approval has been received.
e. Require pilot to monitor the aircraft performance indications during the takeoff roll.
f. Require the pilot maintains runway heading.
g. Require the pilot to have knowledge of performance indications and verify engine is at
full power and operating within established parameters.
h. Require pilot to monitor primary navigation or critical aircraft systems. Pilot must be able
to recognize and perform proper procedures if aircraft falls outside of performance
envelope.
i. Require the pilot to demonstrate proper ability to perform and abort the takeoff shall a
safety critical failure occur during the takeoff roll.
3. Ground support – [Takeoff]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the use of ground personnel to assist in takeoff if the UAS is not equipped with
sensors that allow for the pilot to visually ensure that taxiways, runways, and parking
locations are clear of traffic prior to takeoff.
4. Aborted/rejected takeoff – [Takeoff]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to recognize when an aborted takeoff is required per technical guidance.
b. The pilot must know the minimum required airspeeds at which the UAS may be
controlled while still on the ground or when out of ground effect and flying.
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c. Require the pilot to maintain control of the UAS upon initiating an abort. This includes
maintaining glide speeds and executing appropriate maneuvers in the event of an airborne
abort.
d. The pilot must know the airport environment, including the available runway distance
and obstacles within 30° of the runway heading.
e. Require the pilot to communicate an aborted takeoff to ATC when safety permits.
f. Require the pilot to confirm with visual observer if it is safe to taxi clear of the runway
(hot brakes, smoke from engine, or other indications the aircraft needs to be shutdown
immediately).
g. Pilot must be familiar with airport protocol when declaring an emergency for shutdown
on runway and request assistance as necessary from fire department.
h. Pilot will contact maintenance or tow crew to expedite removing aircraft from runway
when it is unable to be taxied after an abort or landing.
D. CLIMB-OUT
1. Climb-Out – [Climb-Out]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to be familiar with the climb performance of the UAS being flown,
including all relevant V-speeds (V1, VROT, VX, and VY).
b. The pilot must know the climb limitations of the UAS for the purpose of obstacle
avoidance.
c. Require the pilot to be proficient in instrument flight rules, in this case, departure
procedures (SIDs and Obstacle Departures).
d. Require the pilot to possess relevant instrument departure plates and necessary charts
within the control station.
e. Require the pilot be able to execute climb-out checklist instructions such as raise the gear
and flaps as required.
f. Require the pilot to be capable of complying with ATC guidance to include, switching
the radio to departure, and/or turn/climb/level-off to directed heading/altitude.
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E. EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS
1. Communications – [En-route]
Initial Recommendations
a. During all phases of flight, the operator must be aware of, and be able to monitor
communication frequencies for ATC and comply with ATC clearance.
b. During the transition portions of the en-route phase the operator must have the
knowledge and skills to communicate with the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) or
the Mission Control Element (MCE), which ever one is applicable.
c. Pilot must be able to execute proper hand-over procedures between PIC and/or
LRE/MCE shelters.
2. Navigation (including GPS availability) – [En-route]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot shall demonstrate the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of installed
electronic navigation system(s), elements related to navigation systems and radar
services, and elements related to pilotage and dead reckoning.
b. Pilot shall demonstrate knowledge of responsibilities associated with accepting an ATC
clearance to include proper use of aviation phraseology, methods used to obtain an ATC
clearance, knowledge of ATC airspace requirements, and read back ATC clearance.
c. Pilot shall demonstrate knowledge of RNAV, RNP, and TCAS procedures along with
knowledge of transponder (Mode(s) A, C, and S) and navigation publications and
databases.
d. Pilot shall demonstrate proper knowledge of lost communication procedures, and terrain
clearance requirements associated with en-route navigation procedures.
e. Pilot shall demonstrate appropriate knowledge and use of the airborne electronic
navigation system, and be able to locate the airplane’s position using available and
appropriate navigation system(s).
f. Pilot shall demonstrate skill to navigate by means of precomputed headings,
groundspeeds, and elapsed time. Additional navigations skills include being able to
recognize and describe the indication of station, or waypoint passage, and verify
airplane’s position within prescribed nautical miles of flight planned route.
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g. Pilot shall be able to recognize navigation signal loss and be able to take appropriate
action.
h. Pilot must correctly set up communication frequencies, navigation systems and
transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance.
i. Pilot must establish two-way communication with the proper controlling agency, in a
timely manner, and use standard phraseology.
j. Pilot shall have the ability to identify, assess and mitigate risks, encompassing
automation management for task management, degraded awareness, limitations of
navigation systems, and avoidance of automation distractions.
3. En-route climb – [En-route]
Initial Recommendations
a. PIC must understand climb performance of the aircraft and how to adjust it when able.
b. PIC must be able to notify ATC if aircraft climb performance does not meet minimum
standards for instrument flight.
4. En-route descents – [En-route]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must understand descent performance of the aircraft and how to adjust it.
b. Pilot must understand and be able to operate within aircraft operating limitations.
c. Pilot must be able to execute all descent checklists, to include hand-off checklists with
LRE.
d. Pilot must have the knowledge and ability to communicate with ATC with request to
conduct en-route descent.
5. Cruise power settings – [En-route]
Initial Recommendations
a. During all phases of flight, the operator must be aware of and able to monitor aircraft
performance such as range and endurance.
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b. Pilot must exhibit satisfactory knowledge, risk management, and skills associated with
IFR departure, en-route, and arrival operations.
c. Pilot must understand and be able to utilize alternate power sources and related
limitations associated with their uses.
d. Operator must understand various conditions that may affect range and endurance of an
aircraft and be able to stay within aircraft and regulatory limitations.
e. Operator must be able to determine the effect of cruise performance on the aircraft shall
airspeed, altitude, or other variables change en-route.
f. Operator must be able to determine new performance capabilities/limitations if a flight
plan is altered due to change in purpose of flight, directed by ATC, or an emergency
arises.
F. LANDING
1. Initial Descent
Initial Recommendations
a. The pilot must establish two-way radio communications with the ATC facility providing
air traffic services prior to entering that airspace and thereafter maintain those
communications while within that airspace.
b. Due to the current nature of UAS operations it may be necessary to create more detailed
procedures with guidance for controlled and uncontrolled airspace and operations with
specific step by step guidance on contact and clearance procedures.
c. The pilot conducts descent checklist.
2. Transition
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot shall be aware of aircraft performance and the environment requirements of which
they are transitioning through.
b. If a visual observer is required for landing to confirm configuration, proper runway
alignment, and visually clear the approach path and landing runway, pilot must establish
contact and be able to give an arrival time to ensure member is in place.
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c. Pilot will contact maintenance and inform them of estimated land time in order to tow
aircraft when required or assist in parking/shutdown as needed.
3. Approach
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must be able to execute all appropriate checklist associated with descent and before
landing.
b. Pilot must be able to access proper weather sources for updates to landing airfield, to
include current altimeter setting and winds.
c. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology to request desired
approach, state intentions (landing, touch-and-go), and receive approval to commence
and continue approach.
d. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of
flight.
4. Landing (Non-Automated – Human in the loop) - – [Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must be able to execute all applicable landing checklists.
b. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing weather minimum criteria and be able to identify
alternate airfields if outside the required minimums.
c. Pilot must be able to brief and execute missed approach or go-around procedures when
applicable.
d. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing fuel requirements and know when to declare
minimum and emergency fuel to landing controller.
e. Pilot must be able to recognize when aircraft is outside of landing parameters and be able
to execute a successful missed approach procedure.
f. Pilot must be knowledgeable of the proper landing configuration and verify aircraft is
configured to land.
g. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology and read back to
receive permission to land aircraft.
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h. Pilot must be able to communicate with ground support crew to ensure landing
configuration and proper alignment when applicable.
i. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of
flight.
5. Landing (Automated Approach and Landing) - [Landing]
a. Pilot must be able to execute all applicable landing checklists.
b. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing weather minimum criteria and be able to identify
alternate airfields if outside the required minimums.
c. Pilot must be able to recognize criteria for an autonomous go-around and communicate
those procedures with ATC when the aircraft executes a go-around.
d. Pilot must be knowledgeable of landing fuel requirements and know when to declare
minimum and emergency fuel to landing controller.
e. Pilot must be able to take over manually from an autonomous landing when directed to
by ATC or safety dictates.
f. Pilot must be knowledgeable of system limitations and know when a command to goaround will be denied by the aircraft based on too low of an altitude.
g. Pilot must be knowledgeable of the proper landing configuration and verify aircraft is
configured to land.
h. Pilot must be able to communicate with ATC using proper terminology and read back to
receive permission to land aircraft.
i. Pilot must be able to communicate with ground support crew to ensure landing
configuration and proper alignment when applicable.
j. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all critical phases of
flight.
Initial Recommendations
a. Standard checklist for UAS landing procedures is developed for each variant of landing,
size, and category that may be used as a standard for customization.
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6. Go around
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must be able to determine risk and initiate a missed approach procedure when
required.
b. Pilot must be able to communicate intent with ATC during a go-around and comply with
ATC guidance when safely able.
c. Pilot must be able to apply proper, smooth power and correct climb attitude during a goaround.
d. Pilot must be able to climb to a safe altitude
e. Pilot must be able to reposition the aircraft to begin approach, transition to alternate
landing area or request holding airspace to troubleshoot a malfunction.
f. Pilot must be able to execute proper checklist associated with a go-around procedure.
7. Ground support – [Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must establish two-way communication with ground support crew.
b. Pilot must be able to brief ground support crew on standards for landing and post-landing
procedures.
G. POST LANDING
1. Communications – [Post Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilots must be able to use correct terminology and request permission to taxi clear of
runway, and continue taxi to parking.
2. Ground support – [Post Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot shall verify with ground crew the location of parking and ensure the safety of that
location from damage or conflict of other aircraft.
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b. Pilot shall communicate with ground crew to secure the aircraft.
c. Pilot shall be able to conduct shutdown checklists and post flight operations.
d. Pilot shall communicate the shutdown has been completed with ground crew and set a
time for debrief as applicable.
e. Pilot shall accurately pass along any information they require to fill out all post-flight
documentation.
3. Taxi – [Post Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Require the pilot to maintain a sterile cockpit environment during all aircraft movement.
b. Require the pilot to communicate with ATC using proper and accepted terminology.
c. Require the pilot to taxi in accordance with ATC instructions.
d. Require the pilot to be able to perform a full stop at any given time, whether self-assed or
directed to do so by ATC or visual observer.
e. Require the pilot to maintain a reliable datalink with the aircraft. Pilot shall be able to
perform a switch link procedure to use the most reliable datalink when capabilities exist.
f. Require the pilot to use visual aids to taxi or be in two-way communication with visual
observer.
g. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to have two-way communication with the
marshaller.
h. If a marshaller is used, require the pilot to taxi at a normal walking speed. If a safety
observer is in a follow-vehicle, pilot shall taxi at a safe speed for conditions.
i. Require the pilot or visual observer to recognize hazards on the taxiway surface.
j. If the pilot is using FMV for taxi and loses sight of the taxiway centerline, the pilot must
be able to stop the aircraft until visual contact with the centerline is reacquired.
k. Require the pilot to taxi at safe speeds for conditions present.
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l. Require the pilot to taxi at a safe distance from other aircraft.
m. Require the pilot have knowledge of limitations for taxi for their airframe to include
wind, temperature and RVR.
4. Parking – [Post Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. No recommendations at this time.
5. Engine shutdown – [Post Landing]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must be able to execute all engine shutdown checklists.
b. Pilot must be able to communicate properly with ground support crew during engine
shutdown procedures.
c. Pilot must be able to expeditiously shutdown the engine in case of an emergency during
the engine shutdown process.
H. Procedural Roles and Responsibilities Related to Pilot
Initial Recommendations
a. Require a pilot to be designated as the PIC at all times.
b. Require the pilot to communicate to ensure safe operations.
c. Require the pilot to perform all procedures in accordance with applicable publications.
d. Require the pilot to perform all emergency procedures with accuracy and proficiency.
e. If equipped with a sensor operator workstation for any UAS, require at least one sensor
operator in addition to one PIC.
f. Require the outgoing PIC to brief an incoming PIC prior to a transfer of control from
within the same control station.
g. Require the outgoing PIC to brief an incoming PIC prior to a transfer of control between
different CSs.

B-14

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.
I. Control Station Handoff and Pilot Changeover during Operations
Initial Recommendations
a. Control station handoffs must be governed by the use of a checklist. As with manned
platforms, positive transfer of control must be confirmed before the control station
handoff is complete.
b. Pilot assuming control of the UAS has a complete understanding of all facets of the
situation, including ATC clearance, any anomalies with the system, and other missionrelevant items deemed appropriate by the operating entity.
c. Control station handoff procedures will exercise concise communication protocols,
conducted in a sterile environment, consistent with a critical phase of flight.
d. For crew changeovers, operating entities establish a standard changeover brief, to include
at a minimum, UAS health and status, ATC clearances, any changes in mission
requirements, and changes in normal aircraft configurations and standards (C-1 timer) or
other areas deemed appropriate by the RPIC or operating entity.
J. Operations during Command and Control Degradation and Loss
Initial Recommendations
a. Additional information is required to make recommendations.
K. Operations during Periods of Limited Data from Aircraft relating to Attitude,
Performance, or Environment
Initial Recommendations
a. If equipped, Pilot is able to use FMV during sensor degradation.
b. If equipped, the pilot must independently manage multiple telemetry datalinks.
c. Pilot must be able to plan for terrain masking that may inhibit the control station from
receiving downlink telemetry.
d. Pilot must be capable of using multiple instruments to understand the aircraft’s status.
e. Pilot must be able to prioritize most-to-least critical emergency procedures, shall multiple
emergencies exist when operations during degraded sensory cues exists.
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f. Pilot must be able to record the last known UA position, heading, airspeed, and calculate
the proper heading and time required to navigate to a recovery point.
g. Pilot is required to consider winds at altitude to set a proper heading to return to normal
operations.
h. If equipped with a directional ground data terminal (GDT), pilot is required to use GDT
azimuth and dead reckoning icons to aid in navigation and maintain aircraft position.
i. Pilot must understand when conditions of partial or full loss of sensory cues exist.
L. Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot will be able to communicate with ATC upon encountering a lost-link; clearly
communicate the outcome of troubleshooting and the actions taken as a result.
b. Pilot is required to be able to troubleshoot procedures to first address the possibility of reestablishing the command link.
c. Pilot is able to accurately predict the aircraft’s initial preprogrammed action to going lostlink.
d. Pilot is able to accurately assess, when applicable, the time the aircraft shall arrive to a
landing airfield, to include the flight path and altitude aircraft will transverse to
destination and communicate to ATC those actions in order for traffic clearance.
e. Pilot once establishing link will be able to properly asses when the flight may be
continued, or when the flight must be aborted.
M. Lost-Link Procedures (following confirmation of lost link)
Initial Recommendations
a. Require that the pilot be able to communicate lost link procedures to ATC.
b. Require the pilot to communicate last known UAS status to ATC (Altitude, heading,
destination, lost-link flight plan, location, etc.) and expected response to lost link (i.e.,
rout of flight, orbit location, landing location, etc.).
c. Pilot is able to use troubleshooting method(s) available outside the control station (i.e.
contacting off-site personnel) for the purpose of attempting to re-establish a lost link.
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d. Pilot is able to accurately assess, when applicable, the time the aircraft shall arrive to a
landing airfield, to include the flight path and altitude aircraft will transverse to
destination and communicate to ATC those actions in order for traffic clearance.
N. In-Flight Emergencies
1. Propulsion failure – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations:
a. Pilot shall quickly and accurately diagnose an engine/propulsion failure.
b. Pilot shall continue to maintain aircraft control and properly configure the aircraft for
best glide ratio.
c. Pilot shall quickly determine glide distance.
d. Pilot shall select a suitable landing area, accurately assessing using risk management if
landing to a runway or primary site can be completed without endangering personnel or
property on the ground and in air.
e. Pilots shall assess possible air traffic at suitable landing area.
f. Pilot shall determine if no suitable landing airfield is available, the best area to make an
off-field landing, ditch or terminate aircraft.
g. Pilot shall evaluate terrain and weather conditions en-route and at suitable landing area.
h. Pilot shall execute all applicable emergency checklists items per flight manual.
i. Pilot shall perform crew coordination actions.
j. Pilot shall ensure aircraft is squawking 7700.
k. Pilot shall communicate emergency to ATC while maintaining aircraft control.
l. When time permits, pilot will coordinate and communicate emergency with command
center, ground support, and any other elements integrated into the make-up the unmanned
system design.
2. Emergency descent – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot demonstrates the ability to assess priorities and execute proper division of attention.
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b. Pilot shall utilize crew resource management and delegate when appropriate to other
crewmembers to decrease task saturation.
c. Pilot must understand performance of the aircraft and how to correct when needed, to
include any action points that may be triggered due to the state the aircraft is in.
d. Pilot will ensure aircraft is configured properly for emergency descent procedures.
e. Pilot will communicate with ATC to ensure all aviation traffic is cleared through the path
of emergency descent.
f. Pilot will obtain current weather and ATIS information, to include obtaining and ensuring
proper altimeter setting at landing area.
g. Pilot will execute all descent checklists and/or emergency descent checklists as time
allows while maintaining aircraft control.
h. Pilot will brief and perform hand-off procedures to landing pilot and or shelter as
applicable.
i. When time permits and aircraft control can be maintained, pilot will evaluate all options
for alternate landing/termination points along descent and approach route in the event
aircraft control cannot be maintained, runway or landing area can no longer be used due
to safety of resources or lives or in the case of having to go missed approach.
3. Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Communication – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot must be aware of and accurately communicate to ATC the emergency mission plan
route and altitude aircraft is programmed to execute.
b. Pilot shall notify ATC as soon as possible when deviating from an ATC clearance, for
safety of flight during an emergency landing.
c. Pilot shall limit communications to flight-critical information and emergency actions
required during critical phases of flight.
d. Pilot must be prepared to provide ATC nature of emergency, fuel/time available, souls on
board and intentions to include explanation of being a UAS and level of
control/autonomy available to comply with ATC guidance.
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e. During the transition portions and prior to landing, the pilot must have the knowledge and
skills to communicate with the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) if applicable.
f. Due to the current nature of UAS operations it may be necessary to create more detailed
procedures with guidance for controlled and uncontrolled airspace and operations with
specific step-by-step guidance on contact and clearance procedures for communication of
UAS during an emergency.
Approach – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot is able to determine and execute proper emergency, before landing, and approach
checklist.
b. Pilot is able to monitor workstation and confirm proper airspeed, altitude, temperatures
and performance parameters for approach.
c. Pilot is able to determine and verify proper landing location that will protect people and
possible property from harm.
d. Pilot is able to identify minimum weather landing requirements for operations and
confirms requirements are met.
e. Pilot can identify and seek waiver authority in the case of an emergency for landing
below minimum weather or other stated requirements.
f. Pilot will ensure if unable to comply with the missed approach routing or climb
requirements, coordination for alternate climb out instructions are made which ensures
obstacle clearance.
g. For an engine out emergency, pilot will identify safest ditching/termination point if a safe
landing can’t be made while on the approach, or when directed to abort landing/goaround by ATC due to safety of life or resources.
h. For UAS’s that are more autonomous and fly using GPS guidance from approach to
landing, a previously developed arrival and/or departure procedure with emergency
approach methods included, is required.
Touchdown – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Exhibits satisfactory knowledge of the elements related to an approach and landing to
include any additional emergency procedures.
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b. Executes all appropriate emergency and landing checklists.
c. Properly communicates with ATC to obtain proper landing clearance.
d. Properly communicates with visual observer, when applicable, to ensure cleared
approach path, landing surface, and departure path in the case of a go-around.
e. Ensures aircraft is properly configured for landing, to include landing lights on and gear
down.
f. Pilot is aware of minimum missed approach requirements and is able to properly execute
a missed approach. Where standards or requirements are absent, establish standards.
g. Standards for UAS emergency landing procedures be developed for each variant of
landing, size, and category that may be used as a standard that can be customized to each
platform where such standards are absent.
Ditching site selection – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot is able to execute ditching checklist.
b. Pilot is able to determine a suitable ditching location that will not involve undue risk to
personnel or property on the ground.
c. Pilot will communicate with ATC about intention to ditch and location in order to keep
traffic clear and expedite emergency vehicles and personnel to the scene.
d. Where there is an absence of standards or emergency ditching checklist for UAS,
procedures shall be developed for each variant of size and category that may be used as a
standard to which is customizable to each platform.
Flight termination – Emergency landings – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot is able to execute termination checklist.
b. Depending on the level of automation built in the termination procedures, pilot is familiar
and will monitor or execute all steps for the termination sequence.
c. Pilot is able to determine a suitable termination point, if not previously identified in the
mission plan, which upon terminating will not involve undue risk to personnel or
property on the ground.
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d. If Pilot is unable to reach a designated termination point, the pilot will direct the
unmanned aircraft to an unpopulated area and initiate flight termination.
e. Pilot will communicate with ATC about intention to terminate and location in order to
keep traffic clear and expedite emergency vehicles and personnel to the scene.
f. Where there is an absent of standards or emergency termination checklist for UAS,
procedures shall be developed for each variant of size and category that may be used as a
standard to which is customizable to each platform.
4. Uncontrolled flight (where real time human pilot input, either manual or through
automated systems, has no effect on the aircraft attitude or flight path.) – [In-Flight
Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations
a. Pilot shall identify systems and equipment failures and/or physiological factors that could
lead to or hinder recovery from uncontrolled flight.
b. Pilot shall be able to execute applicable checklist for control link or equipment failure.
c. Pilot shall identify environmental factors that may be contributing to the uncontrolled
flight.
d. Pilot will contact ATC to declare an emergency to allow coordination for aircraft
deconfliction.
e. Development of more standardized procedures across all UAS for aircraft where real time
human pilot input, either manual or through automated systems, has no effect on the
aircraft attitude or flight path.
5. Navigation (GPS or other navigation system) failure – [In-Flight Emergencies]
Initial Recommendations:
a. Pilot shall understand the related systems to detect abnormal or possible emergency
navigation situations.
b. Pilot shall correctly diagnose failures and takes timely action to trouble shoot navigation
failures.
c. Pilot shall take appropriate action per checklists to recover aircraft using all internal and
external references, to include engineers and communication specialists, and external
controls from other shelters when available.
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d. Pilot, when available, shall contact maintenance shelter and communication personnel to
help troubleshoot navigation failure.
e. Pilot shall execute all proper checklists and prepare for emergency landing if system can
land without internal navigation inputs.
f. Pilot will inform all applicable agencies, to include ATC, when aircraft cannot land
without internal navigation. Pilot will provide information on predictive aircraft flight
path to ATC so they can deconflict other traffic.
Development of more standardized procedures across all UAS for aircraft where navigation
system failure hinders the ability to get to landing airfield or land at all.
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APPENDIX C—OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MATRIX
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APPENDIX D—FLIGHT TEST CARDS WITH OBSERVED RESULTS
Flight Card Description

Flight Test #1

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID

All

Data Collector ID

Researcher/Assessor's ID

All

Date Tested

Assumption
1
2
3
4
OP #

Assumptions:
UGCS operating in simulation mode
Platform Specific POH is Available

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

2-1

Review CS maintenance
logs.

2-2

Resolve open discrepancies,
as required.

2-3

Inspect control station.

2-4

Conduct an inventory of all
appropriate publications to
include but not limited to:
- Pilot Operating Handbook
(POH)
- Checklists
- Regulations
- Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs)
- Aircraft weight and
balance if required
- Ensure all FAA publications
are current
- Ensure full FAA chart

Expected Results

The CS displays
maintenance logbook
information to the pilot.
The CS displays open
discrepancies for the pilot
to determine if
maintenance actions are
required of the UA and CS.
The pilot detects any
deficiencies with the CS
prior to preflight.
The CS provides the pilot a
reference for applicable
publications prior to
starting the preflight
inspection, including:
- Pilot Operating Handbook
(POH)
- Checklists
- Regulations
- Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs)
- Aircraft weight and
balance if required
- Ensure all FAA

Perform Pre-Entering GCS &
Operational Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator
ID
June 6,
2017
OP #
2

Presets
All

Test Case
N/A
(Pass/Fail)
Operational Procedures Validated
Presets

Final Result
Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended
Pass

Observer 1
Actual Results

Checked logbook.

Observer 1
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Observer 2
Actual Results

Observer 2
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Observer 3
Actual Results

Observer 3
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pass

Used an electronic
logbook to determine
faults.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Performed during the
Preventative
Maintenance Daily
inspection.
Pilot had Technical
Manual (POH), Checklist,
Airworthiness release,
weight & balance sheets,
weather forecast, and
electronic charts loaded.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Military operations
use standardized
publications with
same information

D-1

Observer 4
Actual Results

Observer 4
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pass

With limits of
Simulation

Pass

Pass
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coverage for the route

publications are current
- Ensure full FAA chart
coverage for the route

2-5

Apply power to all required
ground control equipment.

The pilot powers up all CSrelated equipment
necessary for flight.

Pass

2-6

Verify that the control
station and aircraft powered
up correctly in accordance
with the applicable POH.
Ensure sufficient CS power
is available for entire
duration of operations.

Pilot determines if the CS
powered up correctly.

Pass

Pilot determines if the CS
has enough power
throughout the flight,
including generator fuel if
powered by a generator or
uninterruptable backup if
powered from a nongenerator source.
Pilot verifies the CS
hardware and software is
set to the correct UA
configuration.
Pilot loads applicable map
data, elevation data, and
overlays.
Pilot creates, uploads, and
sets a mission plan to the
UA.
Pilot sets control link
equipment in CS and UA by
establishing link and
verifying control.

Not Observed

The pilot sets applicable
voice communication
frequencies and performs a
radio check.
Pilot references applicable
approach plates, en-route
charts, and supplemental
data within the control
station.

2-7

2-8

Ensure functionality of all
equipment as required.

2-9

Load and verify all maps and
navigation data that are
required for flight.
Create, upload, and set
mission plans.

2-10

2-11

2-12

2-13

Ensure that all command
and control link equipment,
both in the control station
and onboard the aircraft is
correctly configured for
flight.
Tune all voice
communication radios to
the appropriate frequencies.
Verify that all required
approach plates, en-route
charts, and any required
supplements are in the
control stations and
accessible.

Performed during the
Preventative
Maintenance Daily
inspection.
Performed during the
Preventative
Maintenance Daily
inspection.
Only shore power was
available.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Not Performed

Not Performed

NA (simulator)

Pass

Performed during power
up.

Pass

Not Performed

Not Performed

Pass

Pass

Loaded and checked
during presets.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Used Aviation Mission
Planning System (AMPS)
on pilot workstation.
Recalled link profile. Set.
Performed datalink
terminal calibration. Set
datalink terminal GPS
location.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Simulated setting radio
frequencies using the
radio head unit.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Available prior to flight.
Charts were loaded
during preflight.
Approach Charts were
not used.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
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Software (Pass);
Hardware (NE)

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test
#2

Validation Attempt ID
All
Researcher/Assessor's ID
All
Assumption #
Assumptions:
1
2
3
4

Test Case Description

Data Collector ID
Date Tested

UGCS operating in simulation mode
Platform-specific POH is available in CS
Presets have been completed
Simulated ground clearance to taxi
provided

Perform Preflight, Engine Start,
Pre-Taxi, Taxi, and
Communications Operational
Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
3
Preflight
4
Engine Start
5
Pre-Taxi
6
Taxi - General
7

All
N/A

Taxi - Communications

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended

Actual Results

Actual Results

CS displays the result of a
BIT test.

Pass

Displayed BIT
status.

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Verify successful
completion of any BIT.

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

3-1

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

3-2

Verify the correct function
of the throttle control(s) as
applicable.

Pass

Verified ignition
switch as cold.
Checked ECM.

Pass

3-2-1

Set throttle to max

Pass

Displayed BIT
status as pass.

Pass

Co-operative
task with crew
chief

Pass

3-2-2

Set throttle to min

Pass

Displayed BIT
status as pass.

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

3-3

Set/verify altimeter.

The pilot uses the CS to
manipulate the UA's
throttle position and
verify functionality prior
to engine start.
The pilot uses the CS to
manipulate the UA's
throttle position to
maximum and verify
correct UA response.
The pilot uses the CS to
manipulate the UA's
throttle position to
minimum and verify
correct UA response.
The pilot loads an
altimeter setting of
30.09" Hg. The pilot
should be able to
determine is the CS
commanded this
altimeter setting to the
UA.

Pass

Altimeter
loaded. Value
reported in GUI.

Pass

Adjust to
current
altimeter
setting;
"General
Data"

Multiple BITs
to check

Pass

D-3

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Auto

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass
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3-4

Perform IMU function
checks.

3-5

Perform payload function
checks, if applicable.

3-6

Perform a function check
on all redundant command
link systems. Ensure that all
systems function and are
able to do so at the levels
required for flight.
Pilot disables backup
control link.

3-6-1

The pilot performs an
IMU built-in test. The CS
displays the
corresponding position
change.
The pilot performs a
payload check to slew the
camera 360 degrees
around, 90 degrees down,
and nose position. The CS
is able to display these
payload functions to the
pilot.
Pilot verifies functionality
of all command datalinks
prior to flight.

Pass

Checked in
avionics status
panel. BIT
reported as
pass.
Nose camera
video
configured and
checked.
Mission payload
camera not
used.

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

No payload
operator
present

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Link loss setting
set. Set datalink
terminal
pointing
direction.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pilot disables backup
datalink and verifies the
downlink telemetry
datalink from primary link
within the CS. Pilot
determines a secondary
uplink loss condition.
Pilot disables primary
datalink and verifies the
downlink telemetry
datalink from secondary
link within the CS. Pilot
determines a primary
uplink loss condition.
Pilot disables both
primary and secondary
uplinks. Pilot determines
the UA initiates link loss
emergency mode.

Pass

Selected receive
only. Verified
link warnings
and primary
control.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Not performed.

Not
Observed.

Disabled
primary link Redundant
link takes over

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Selected the
SYS1 switch to
off, disabling
both datalinks.

Pass

Test by
placing both
links in Rx
Only; reestablished
links

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Simulated
setting the radio
frequencies in
the head unit,
which was not
functional in the
simulator.
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

Pass

Pass

3-6-2

Pilot disables primary
control link.

3-6-3

Pilot disables primary and
secondary uplink control
links.

3-7

Verify correct function of
two-way communication
radios by performing a
radio check with a
controlling agency, crew, or
visual observer as required.

Pilot performs a two-way
radio communications
check with ATC,
air/ground crew, and any
Visual Observers.

Pass

3-8

Verify flight controls and
flight control surfaces are
free and correct.

Pilot deflects all flight
control surfaces and
receives confirmation of

Pass

D-4

Not BIT check
but physically
moving UA with
RPIC validation

And antenna
configuration

Pass

Pass
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correct surface
deflection.

3-8-1

Set right roll.

Pilot determines if the
right aileron deflects up
and the left aileron
deflects down.

Pass

3-8-2

Set left roll.

Pilot determines if the left
aileron deflects up and
the right aileron deflects
down.

Pass

3-8-3

Set flaps down.

Pilot determines if the
flaps deflect down.

Pass

3-8-4

Set flaps up.

Pilot determines if the
flaps retract back up.

Pass

3-8-5

Set pitch down.

Pilot determines if the
elevator/ ruddervator
deflects down.

Pass

3-8-6

Set pitch up.

Pilot determines if the
elevator/ ruddervator
deflects up.

Pass

3-8-7

Set right yaw.

Pilot determines if the
rudder/ ruddervator
deflects right.

Pass

response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct

results

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

Pass

D-5
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3-8-8

Set left yaw.

Pilot determines if the
rudder/ ruddervator
deflects left.

Pass

3-8-9

Set nose wheel left.

Pilot determines if the
nose wheel deflects left.

Pass

3-8-10

Set nose wheel right.

Pilot determines if the
nose wheel deflects right.

Pass

3-9R

RECOMMENDED: Verify
any inoperative items
found on MEL during Preflight have been cleared
and signed off.
Verify navigation lights are
functioning properly

Pilot determines MEL
requirements and verifies
if any inoperative items
are on this list.

Pass

Pilot turns on and off the
navigation lights.

Pass

3-9R-2

Verify anti-collision lights
are functioning properly

Pilot turns on and off the
anti-collision lights.

Pass

3-9R-3

Verify landing lights are
functioning properly

Pilot turns on and off the
landing lights.

3-9R-4

Verify fuel level.

Pilot verifies the CS is

3-9R-1

response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Flight surfaces
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Nosewheel left
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Nosewheel right
checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Any BIT failure
equated to a
NOGO for flight
situation.

results

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Cooperative
task with crew
chief

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Fail

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

N/A

Navigation
lights checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Anti-collision
lights checked.
Correct
response
reported from
crew chief
(simulated).
Not performed.

Not
Observed.

Not equipped
with landing
light(s)

Fail

Pass

N/A

Pass

Entered the fuel

Pass

Fuel is based

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or

D-6

Pass

No MEL for
type series

Manually enter

Fail

Pass
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displaying the correct
amount of fuel onboard
the UA.

level in GUI
menu.
Displayed fuel
level in aircraft
status panel.

3-9R-5

Verify GPS functionality

Pilot verifies the CS is
displaying the correct GPS
health, status, and
position.

Pass

4-1

Coordinate with
crew/applicable personnel
to ensure that required
safety equipment is
present and that the area is
clear of hazards and nonessential personnel.
Establish communication
with appropriate ground
control agency and ground
crew to coordinate engine
start procedure, if
required.
Set radio frequency to
Redstone ATIS of
121.25MHz. Obtain current
altimeter.

Pilot determines if
required safety
equipment is present.
Pilot verifies the area
around the UA is clear of
hazards and non-essential
personnel.
Pilot communicates via
CS-installed radios.

Pass

4-2-2

upon a
calculated
consumption

Verified GPS
positioning vis
datalink
terminal
antenna
pointing.
Coordinated
with crew chief
via radio
communications
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Pilot sets the radio to
121.25 MHz and obtains
current altimeter setting.

Pass

Set radio frequency to
Redstone Ground of
124.8MHz and perform
radio check.

Pilot sets radio to
124.8MHz and performs a
radio check.

Pass

4-2-3

Set radio frequency to an
Internal Discrete of
126.20MHz and perform
radio check.

Pilot sets radio to
126.20MHz and performs
a radio check with ground
crew.

Pass

4-3

Ensure that the system is
properly configured for

Pilot sets UA systems for
engine start.

Pass

4-2

4-2-1

Verified in CS
interface

exceeded
expected
results

fuel quantity
provided by
crew chief.
Level displayed
is based on this
initial value and
then burn rate.

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Coordinated
with crew chief
via radio
communications
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Simulated
setting the radio
frequencies in
the head unit,
which was not
functional in the
simulator.
Simulated
setting the radio
frequencies in
the head unit,
which was not
functional in the
simulator.
Simulated
setting the radio
frequencies in
the head unit,
which was not
functional in the
simulator.
Checked the
engine status

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded

Pass

Pass
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4-3-1

engine start and begin
engine start procedures.
Set throttle for engine
start.

Pilot sets the throttle for
engine start.

Pass

4-3-2

Set ignition switch for
engine start.

Pilot ensures the UA's
ignition switch is set for
engine start.

Pass

4-3-3

Verify glowplug status (if
equipped)

Pilot determines if
glowplug (if equipped) is
ready for engine start.

Pass

4-3-4

Start engine

Pilot starts engine from
CS.

Pass

4-4

Monitor engine health
throughout the engine
start procedure.

Pilot monitors engine
instrumentation during
engine start.

Pass

4-4-1

Monitor oil pressure.

Pilot acknowledges the oil
pressure is within
prescribed limitations.

Pass

4-4-2

Monitor fuel pressure.

Pilot acknowledges the
fuel pressure is within
prescribed limitations.

Pass

4-4-3

Monitor coolant
temperature.

Pass

4-4-4

Monitor RPM.

Pilot acknowledges the
coolant temperature is
within prescribed
limitations.
Pilot acknowledges the
engine RPM is within
prescribed limitations.

Pass

panel as set to
cold.
Set to idle.

Pass

Set within CS
interface via
slider

Pass

Enabled engine
start switch
from cold to hot
from within CS.
Coordinated
with crew chief
to select UA
ignition switch
to hot
(simulated).
Checked in the
engine status
panel.

Pass

Crew chief
toggles the
ignition switch

Pass

Coordinated
with crew chief
to select UA
starter switch to
start
(simulated).
Checked engine
health status.
Ready to select
engine kill if
limitations were
exceeded or
engine fire
started.
Checked the oil
pressure was
within spec.

Pass

Checked the
fuel rail
pressure was
within spec.
Checked the
coolant
temperature
was within spec.
Checked the
engine RPM was
within spec.

Pass

N/A

Crew chief
starts when
commanded
by PIC

Pass

expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Auto

Pass

Pass

Crew Chief
does this on
actual aircraft
based on the
RPIC direction.

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

N/A

Crew Chief
does this based
on RPIC
direction

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

Pass

Pass

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass

The aircraft
powerplant is
air cooled

N/A

Pass

Pilot monitors
RPM

Pass

D-8
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4-4-5

Monitor manifold pressure.

Pilot acknowledges the
manifold pressure is
within prescribed
limitations.
Pilot sets the correct
engine RPM for warmup.

Pass

4-4-6

Set warmup RPM

4-4-7

Monitor EGT temperature

Pilot acknowledges the
EGT temperature is
within prescribed
limitations.

Pass

4-4-8

Monitor output current

Pilot acknowledges the
output current is within
prescribed limitations.

Pass

4-5

Verify proper operation of
the engine and all engine
instrumentation.

Pilot verifies the engine
instrumentation is within
required specifications.

Pass

4-5-1

Perform alternator check

Pilot determines if the
alternator is working
correctly.

Pass

4-5-2

Perform bus voltage check

Pilot determines if the
bus voltage is within the
specified range.

Pass

4-6

Perform abnormal engine
start procedures, if
required.

Pilot performs abnormal
engine starting
procedures from the CS.

Pass

4-6-1

Perform cold temperature
engine start procedures

The pilot performs a cold
engine starting procedure
from the CS.

As applicable

4-7

In the event of an
emergency during engine
start, perform an
emergency engine
shutdown.

Pilot shuts down the
engine.

Pass

5-1

Verify UA free of frost

Pilot determines if pitot

Pass

Pass

Checked the
manifold
pressure was
within spec.
Checked that
RPM remained
at idle for
warmup.
Checked the
EGT was within
spec.

Pass

Aircraft has a
fixed-pitch
propeller

N/A

Pass

Set an RPM of
4500 for
warmup

Pass

Pass

Pass

Checked total
system amps in
engine status
monitor.
Checked engine
operation.

Pass

Look for
popup
indications;
no indication
if nominal
Not equipped
to read output
current
Run "snaps"
and observe
indications

Pass

Checked
alternator A,
then both, then
alternator B,
then both.
Checked output
amps.
Checked bus
voltage.

Pass

There were no
abnormal
engine starting
procedures.
There were no
cold engine
starting
procedures.
Not required,
but showed two
methods to shut
down the
engine in the
CS.
Checked icing

Not
Applicable.

Not Observed

Not
Applicable.

Not Observed

Pass

Not Observed

Pass

Not observed

Pass

N/A

N/A

Pass

Directly
monitor bus
voltage
indication
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Pass

results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

N/A

Auto button
sequence

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not available in
system

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

N/A

Not
Performed

N/A

Met or

Pass

Pass

Ignition switch
on aircraft
(Crew Chief)
command stop
from CS

Pass

N/E
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and/or ice.

heat/ pitot anti-icing
system is functional.

Contact ATC and request
taxi clearance/instructions
(if applicable). If at a nontowered
airport,
communicate with other
traffic on common traffic
advisory frequency (CTAF)
and/or utilize visual
observers or other
available means to ensure
separation from traffic
during taxi.
Check all critical
instrumentation for correct
settings including but not
limited to altimeter,
navigation equipment,
radios, etc.
Check flight mode
commands

Pilot performs two-way
communication with ATC
to request taxi clearance.

Pass

Pilot monitors
instruments prior to taxi

Pass

Pilot verifies the flight
mode commands prior to
taxi.

5-3-2

Check altimeter setting

5-3-3

5-4

5-2

5-3

5-3-1

detector by
coordinating
with crew chief
to hand hold
the icing
detector to
reduce
vibrations,
causing the
detector to
indicate icing.
Performed
(simulated).

exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Checked FCAs in
auto. Checked
FADEC A/B
health.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Performed.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pilot verifies the current
altimeter setting is
loaded.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Check GPS equipment

Pilot verifies the health,
status, and position from
the GPS.

Pass

Checked ALTGPS, ALT-MSL,
ALT-Laser.
Compared
difference to
meeting
prescribed
specs.
Continuously
monitored.

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Auto

Pass

Ensure all flight displays are
correctly set and
configured for flight.

Pilot sets the correct GUI
displays for taxi

Pass

Pulled up
applicable
menu.

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Aircraft is not
taxied

D-10

N/A

Pass

Pass

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.

5-4-1

Set attitude indicator GUI

Pilot sets attitude
indicator GUI for taxi

Pass

Checked.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

5-4-2

Set airspeed indicator GUI

Pilot sets airspeed
indicator GUI for taxi

Pass

Checked.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

5-4-3

Set altitude indicator GUI

Pilot sets altitude
indicator GUI for taxi

Pass

Checked.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

5-4-4

Set UA location on location
display

Pilot sets and locates the
UA's position on the
location display.

Pass

Checked FCA1,
2, 3 and GPS
health.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

5-5

Brief any participating
crewmembers on the
following:
- Taxi route
- Known hazards along the
route
- Contingencies to address
any abnormal or
emergency situations

Pass

Performed.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

6-1

Verify that command and
control data links have the
required signal strength
and reliability required for
taxi.

Pass

Performed.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

6-2

If brakes are installed,
perform a check of brake
function to ensure the UAS
may be stopped at any
point during taxi. Utilize
ground crew to verify brake
function, if applicable.
If link loss during taxi,
contact ground control
element, if applicable.

Pilot communicates with
ground crew to perform a
pre-taxi briefing, to
include:
- Taxi route
- Known hazards along
the route
- Contingencies to
address any abnormal or
emergency situations
Pilot verifies command
and control data links
have the required signal
strength and reliability
required for taxi from
within the CS.
Pilot performs a brake
check by coming to a
complete stop within one
length of the UA.

Pass

Performed by
pulling joystick
rearward.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

The pilot detects the UA
has stopped during an
uplink loss failure.

Pass

Set taxi brake
duration for link
loss.

Pass

The pilot uses cameras
onboard the UA to
properly recognize airport
surface signage.
The pilot maintains

Pass

Performed.

Pass

Marshaller not

6-3

6-4

6-5

Utilize visual aids and
markers to assist with taxi
operations to the
maximum extent possible.
If possible, maintain visual

results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Auto

Pass

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Brakes on
this type
aircraft.

N/A

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Not

Aircraft is not

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or

Pass

No Taxi

N/A
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contact and/or two-way
radio communication with
a marshaller, if one is used.
Maintain visual contact
with a marshaller, if one is
used.

contact with a marshaller.

The pilot uses an onboard
camera to maintain visual
contact with a marshaller.

6-5-2

Maintain two-way radio
contact with a marshaller,
if one is used.

6-6

Conduct taxi operations at
the pace of the marshaller,
or vehicle observer.

6-7

6-5-1

6-8

6-9

7-1

7-2

used.

observed.

taxied

Pass

Marshaller not
used.

Not
observed.

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

The pilot uses two-way
radio contact from within
the CS to maintain
contact with a marshaller.
Pilot taxis at the same
speed as the marshaller.

Pass

Marshaller not
used.

Not
observed.

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pass

Marshaller not
used.

Not
observed.

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

When using full-motion
video, stop UA if taxiway
centerline is lost and
contact cannot be regained
in a reasonable amount of
time.
Set taxi speed such that the
UAS is able to be brought
to a stop within a safe
distance of obstacles and
other traffic.
Maintain communication
with ground control and/or
applicable ground crew
throughout taxi.
Maintain sterile cockpit
while taxiing.

Pilot stops the UA if the
runway centerline is lost.

Pass

Performed.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pilot maintains a taxi
speed to enable a fullstop to avoid obstacles.

Pass

Used speed
indicator in
HUD.

Pass

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

The pilot uses two-way
radio contact from within
the CS to maintain
contact with a marshaller.
Pilot maintains a sterile
cockpit within the CS.

Pass

Marshaller not
used.

Not
observed.

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Pass

Not required.

Not
applicable.

Aircraft is not
taxied

N/A

Use backup
communications during
primary communications
failure.

Pilot selects backup
communications methods
if the voice radio
communications method
fails

Pass

Used a
secondary radio
from CSC
selector.

Pass

Pilot is
capable of
using a phone
or passing
messages to
crew verbally

Pass
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exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #3

Validation Attempt ID
All
Researcher/Assessor's ID
All
Assumption Assumptions:
#

Test Case Description

Data Collector ID
Date Tested

1

UGCS operating in simulation mode

2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

4

Simulated ground clearance to taxi
provided
UA taxied to departure runway. Cleared to
position and hold on active runway
AIM is available in CS

5
6

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual
Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pilot performs two-way
radio communications
with ATC for takeoff
clearance.
Pilot records ATC takeoff
clearance.

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Pilot uses a backup
method of
communications with ATC
in the event of a two-way
radio communications
failure.
Pilot verifies the datalinks
are working correctly.

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Pass

Checked.
Turned
output power
to 100%.

Pass

Pass

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

8-1

Complete any remaining
pre-takeoff checks prior to
taking position on the
runway.
Obtain ATC clearance in
accordance with procedures
in AIM Section 4.

Pilot completes takeoff
check within CS prior to
taking the active runway.

9-2

Record clearances in
accordance with AIM 4-47a.

9-3

Use backup
communications during
primary communications
failure.

10-1

Perform flight checks of any
critical systems. Verify
proper setting and strength
of required command

All
N/A

Final Result
OP #

9-1

Perform Pre-Takeoff Checks,
Takeoff Communications,
Takeoff Run/ Launch, and
Initial Climb Out Operational
Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational
Procedures
Validated
8
Pre-Takeoff
Checks
9
Takeoff
Communications
10
Takeoff Run/
Launch
11
Initial Climb Out

Checked FCA
1, 2, 3, and
GPS health.

Preflight is completed
prior to placing the
aircraft on the
launcher

D-13

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Launcher not
Runway

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Datalink
failure is a
WCA (auto
detect)

Pass

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.

10-2

link(s).
Verify traffic is clear.

Pilot identifies the
presence of potential
traffic conflicts.

Pass

Used nose
camera and
ATC
clearance.
Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Pilot performs two-way
radio communications
from within the CS to
provide a read-back of
ATC clearance
instructions.
Pilot is able to taxi the UA
onto the runway
centerline and maintain
centerline until rotation.
Pilot maintains the proper
takeoff power setting
from within the CS while
simultaneously
monitoring engine health.
Pilot monitors and
acknowledges the
function of flight critical
systems from within the
CS including:
Navigation system
- Two-way
communications
- Command and control
link
- Any other flight-critical
systems/equipment

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Monitored
nose camera
video.

Pass

N/A

Pass

Monitored
RPM,
manifold
pressure, IAS.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Most alerts populate
as needed in
warning/caution/alert
window

Acknowledges system
cues and aborts if
required

10-3

Acknowledge receipt of
clearance using standard
phraseology and read-back
practices.

10-4

Maintain runway centerline;
maintain runway heading at
rotation.

10-5

Maintain takeoff power and
monitor critical power plant
operating parameters.

10-6

Ø Monitor flight-critical
systems, including by not
limited to:
- Navigation system,
- Two-way communications,
- Detect, sense and avoid
equipment, as applicable
- Command and control link,
and
- Any other flight-critical
systems/equipment.

10-7

Consider takeoff abort if
required if an emergency
situation develops.

Pilot determines takeoff
abort parameters during
the takeoff procedure.

Pass

Pass

11-1

Rotate at rotation speed (VR
or VROT).

The pilot determines VR
or VROT and rotate at that
airspeed.

Pass

Pass

11-2

Maintain appropriate V
speed during climb out.

Pilot maintains Vy or Vx
after rotation.

Pass

Pass

11-3

Maintain ATC-instructed
departure altitudes and
headings, as applicable.

Pilot maintains the ATCinstructed heading,
altitude, and airspeed.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

N/A

Climb @ 55 kts
(Automated)

Pass

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #4

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID

All
All

Data Collector ID
Date Tested

Assumption
#
1
2
4
5
6

Assumptions:
UGCS operating in simulation mode
Platform-specific POH is available in CS
Simulated ground clearance to taxi
provided
UA taxied to departure runway. Cleared to
position and hold on active runway
AIM is available in CS

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Actual
Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
N/A

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual
Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
N/A

Pilot performs two-way radio
communications with ATC for
takeoff clearance.
Pilot documents ATC takeoff
clearance.

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot uses a backup method of
communications with ATC in
the event of a two-way radio
communications failure.
Pilot verifies the datalinks are
working correctly.

Pass

Not
performed

Not
Applicable

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

WCA

Pass

Pilot identifies the presence of
potential traffic conflicts prior
to taking the active runway.
Pilot performs two-way radio
communications from within

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Launcher

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Expected Results

8-1

Complete any remaining
pre-takeoff checks prior to
taking position on the
runway.

Pilot completes takeoff check
within CS prior to taking the
active runway.

9-1

Obtain ATC clearance in
accordance with procedures
in AIM Section 4.
Record clearances in
accordance with AIM 4-47a.
Use backup
communications during
primary communications
failure.
Perform flight checks of any
critical systems. Verify
proper setting and strength
of required command
link(s).
Verify traffic is clear.

10-1

10-2

10-3

Acknowledge receipt of
clearance using standard

Aborted Takeoff

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

9-3

12

Final Result
OP #

9-2

Perform Pre-Takeoff Checks, Takeoff Communications, Takeoff
Run/ Launch, and Aborted Takeoff Operational Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
All
June 6, 2017 Test Case
N/A
(Pass/Fail)
OP Operational Procedures
#
Validated
8
Pre-Takeoff Checks
9
Takeoff Communications
10
Takeoff Run/ Launch

Completed this
task in earlier
flight test card;
runway
element not
applicable

For military
ops, clearances
are logged in
official forms.

D-16

Met or exceeded
expected results

Launcher vice
runway

Pass
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phraseology and read-back
practices.
Maintain runway centerline;
maintain runway heading at
rotation.

the CS to provide a read-back
of ATC clearance instructions.
Pilot taxis the UA onto the
runway centerline and
maintain centerline until
rotation.

10-5

Maintain takeoff power and
monitor critical power plant
operating parameters.

10-6

Monitor flight-critical
systems, including by not
limited to:
- Navigation system
- Two-way communications
- Command and control link
- Any other flight-critical
systems/equipment

10-7

Consider takeoff abort if
required if an emergency
situation develops.
Maintain an airspeed that
allows positive control of
the UAS.

10-4

12-1

12-2

Maintain heading clear of
obstacles.

12-3

Communicate the aborted
takeoff to ATC as soon as
practical.

Pass

Pass

Pilot monitors and
acknowledges the function of
takeoff power setting and
engine health.

Pass

Pass

Pilot monitors and
acknowledges the function of
flight critical systems from
within the CS including:
- Navigation system
- Two-way communications
- Command and control link
- Any other flight-critical
systems/equipment
Pilot determines takeoff abort
parameters during the takeoff
procedure.
Pilot is able to determine
airspeed and rate-of-climb;
and maintain an airspeed that
allows a positive rate of climb.
Pilot detects obstacles and
maintain headings that are
clear of obstacles.
Pilot performs two-way radio
communications to inform
ATC of an aborted takeoff
condition.

Pass

N/A

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Performed
(simulated).

The aircraft
does not rotate
due to utilizing
a launcher for
takeoff.
Pilot monitors
aircraft in
automated
takeoff
procedure

Commands
aircraft heading
to remain clear

Pass

D-17

Launcher

Auto until
Knobs

N/A

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #5

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
All
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
All
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2
Platform-specific POH is available in CS
6
AIM is available in CS

Perform Climb to Altitude, En-Route Operations, Cruise Power Settings, Weather Monitoring, Lost-Link
Control Procedures, and Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
All
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
N/A
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
13
Climb to Altitude - General
14a
En-route Operations - General
14b
En-route Operations Navigation
15
En-route Operations - Climb
16
En-route Operations - Course
Change
17
En-route Operations Descents
18
Cruise Power Settings
19
Weather Monitoring
31
Lost-Link Control Procedures General
32
Lost-Link Troubleshooting
Procedures - General

7
8

UA is airborne
A simulated ATC entity is available

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

13-1

Maintain contact with ATC
and perform frequency
changes as requested.
Contact Huntsville
Departure on 118.05MHz

Pilot changes ATC
frequencies during flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot changes the twoway radio to 118.05MHz.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

13-2

Ensure that the aircraft is
configured for climb.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

13-2-1

Climb to 5,000 feet.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Maintain heading assigned
by ATC unless cleared to
deviate or climb/maneuver
at pilot's discretion.
Level off at assigned
altitude.
Use proper communication
procedures when using
radar services (as

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

13-3

Pilot uses CS to set UA for
flight and command a
climb.
Pilot commands a climb
to 5,000 feet MSL.
Pilot turns and maintains
a heading of 360 degrees
magnetic.

Changes
Frequency;
notional here
Changes
Frequency;
notional here
Commands and
monitors climb

Pass

Pass

Pilot levels off at 5000
feet MSL.
The pilot uses two-way
communication with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

13-1-1

13-4
14a-1

Pass

Pass
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14a-1-1

applicable).
Contact Memphis Center on
120.8MHz.

14a-2

Obtain ATC clearance.

14a-2-1

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

14a-3

Respond to ATC clearance.

14a-3-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.
Comply with ATC clearance.

14a-4

14a-4-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

14a-5

Use standard aviation
phraseology when
communicating with ATC.

14a-6

Set communication
frequencies, navigation
systems, and transponder
codes to ensure compliance
with ATC clearances.
Conduct any required
communication frequency
changes.
Use available systems (if
equipped) to detect icing
conditions.
Determine if the pitot tube
has ice.
Determine if the UA has
structural ice.

14a-7

14a-8

14a-8-1
14a-8-2

The pilot changes the
two-way radio frequency
to 120.8 while in flight
and contact the Memphis
ARTCC.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.
Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using
standard aviation
terminology.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.
Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.
Pilot uses standard
aviation phraseology
when communicating
with ATC.
Pilot switches radio
navigation frequencies
and transponder code
from within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Changed
transponder
frequency

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot switches two-way
radio frequencies from
within the CS.
Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

No system to
detect ice

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing on the pitot tube.
Pilot uses the payload
video to inspect the UA
for structural icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Not Observed

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass
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14a-9

Monitor aircraft electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
performance.

14a-9-1

Determine if current bus
voltage is within limitations.

14b-1

Monitor aircraft's position
throughout the flight and
maintain course in
accordance with ATC
instructions/clearance.
Determine current location

14b-1-1

14b-1-1
14b-2

Turn and maintain 130
degrees.
Intercept and track a given
course, radial (if equipped),
or bearing, as appropriate.

14b-2-1

Determine the course
heading to Nashville, TN.

14b-2-2

Determine a ground track to
Nashville, TN.

14b-3

Determine loss of GPS or
navigation solution if it
occurs.

14b-4

Maintain the appropriate
altitude and headings.

14b-4-1

Turn to heading 350
degrees.
Climb and maintain 10,000

14b-4-2

Pilot monitors status and
health of electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
systems.
Pilot monitors bus voltage
and determine it is within
the POH-required limits.
Pilot determines the
location of the UA on a
location display.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pilot determines current
location on the location
display and/ or GPS
coordinate display.
Pilot turns from 360
degrees to 130 degrees.
Pilot plots a course and
command the UA
heading.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot plots a course
heading from the UA's
current position direct to
Atlanta, GA. While
factoring winds.
Pilot determines a ground
track necessary for a
direct course to Atlanta,
GA.
The pilot interprets the
GPS health and status
within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot turns the UA and
change altitude while in
flight.
Pilot turns the UA to 350
degrees magnetic.
Pilot climbs the UA to

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded

Pass

Pass

Pass
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Pilot scans
multiple
windows

Not equipped to
track radials

Pilot observes
indications to
determine GPS
health

Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Auto and #
display

GPS Pt to PT
only. Pilot
could
calculate
equivalent
radial
intercept with
VOR position
information.

WCA with
secondary
menus display
for more
detail
information

Used 5,000 ft

Pass

N/A

Pass

Pass
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14b-4-3

14b-4-4

14b-4-6

14b-6

14b-7

feet MSL.
Perform dead reckoning
navigation if required.
Return to Huntsville
International Airport via
heading and airspeed.
Use payload video to enter
the traffic pattern at
Huntsville International
Airport.
Maintain course by
reference to established
waypoints/steer points or
other navigational
references, as applicable.
If equipped, be able to
identify surface features to
chart symbols.

14b-8

Navigate by means of
precomputed headings,
groundspeeds, and elapsed
time (if required).

14b-9

Correct for wind to maintain
desired route and
performance.
Remain within planned
route described in the flight
plan.

14b-10

14b-10-1

Obtain ATC clearance.

14b-10-2

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

14b-10-3

Respond to ATC clearance.

14b-10-4

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb

10,000 MSL and level off.
Pilot uses payload video
to navigate back to a
landing airport.
Pilot uses the UA's
heading and ground
speed to return to HSV.
Pilot uses payload video
to navigate into the traffic
pattern.

Pass

results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Not
Observed.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot remains on an
established course and
changes course once
waypoints are achieved.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot performs map to
video correlation
between the payload
video and location display
to identify natural and
man-made terrain
features.
Pilot determines a
required heading +/- 10
degrees, groundspeed +/10 knots, and time +/- 3
minutes.
The Pilot acknowledges
and corrects for wind to
maintain desired course.
The Pilot commands the
UA to maintain the
desired course, speed,
and altitude outlined in
the flight plan.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.
Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

N/E

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass
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Manual
calculation
from provided
data

Pass
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14b-10-5

and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.
Comply with ATC clearance.

14b-10-6

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

15-1

Conduct en-route climbs
according to ATC clearance.
Climb and maintain 7,500
feet MSL.
Conduct climbs with respect
to UAS performance
limitations, including but
limited to:
- Absolute ceiling
- service ceiling
- altitude and temperature
- time, fuel, and distance to
climb
Determine time to climb to
service ceiling

15-1-1
15-2

15-2-1

15-2-2

Perform a climb to service
ceiling.

15-2-3

Perform a maximum
airspeed dash.

15-3

Notify ATC if the UA is
unable to climb at a
specified rate or gradient in
accordance with AIM 4-4-

standard aviation
terminology.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.
Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.
Pilot complies with ATC
altitude instructions.
Pilot climbs and maintains
7,500 feet MSL.
Pilot climbs to the UA's
performance limits
identified in the POH.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results
Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Parameters
considered in
climb.
Limitations are
built into the
system.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results
Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

The pilot has a
chart available
to outline climb
performance
and correlate it
with a rate of
climb

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass
Pass

Pass

Pass
Used
simulated
airspace

Pass

Pass
Used 5,000ft

Pass

Pilot determines the time
required to climb from
current altitude to the
service ceiling. The pilot
should plan within +/- 3
minutes.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pilot determines the UA's
service ceiling from POH
and command a climb.
Pilot monitors the
performance of the climb
and determine when
service ceiling is reached
from the CS.
Pilot determines the
maximum airspeed and
command the UA to
maximum speed. Pilot
monitors UA's
performance at maximum
speed from the CS.
If the pilot detects climb
performance less than
500 feet per minute, the
pilot notifies ATC to

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass
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10(d).
16-1

Obtain and/or acknowledge
clearance to change course
from ATC.

16-2

Command the UA to fly the
desired heading or course.

16-3

Verify the UA is flying the
commanded heading and/or
course using available flight
data.
Make corrections to
maintain heading and/or
course as required.

16-4

17-1

indicate unable to comply
with ATC instructions.
The pilot uses two-way
radio communication and
acknowledge ATC course
change instructions.
The pilot maneuvers the
UA by changing course
heading according to ATC
instructions within the CS.
The pilot determines the
commanded heading or
course from within the
CS.
The pilot detects
deviations from the
desired heading or course
and adjusts commands to
the UA to correct
deviations from within
the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Conduct descents in
accordance with ATC
clearance.
Descend and maintain 5,000
feet MSL.

Pilot commands a
descent of the UA when
required by ATC.
Pilot commands a
descent of the UA when
required by ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

17-2

Conduct descents with
regard to UAS limitations.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

17-3

Do not exceed UAS
performance limitations in
descents.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

18-1

Monitor UA fuel/battery
status while in flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

18-1-1

Determine fuel burn rate.

The pilot descends with a
maximum descent rate
less than the POH
limitation.
The pilot does not exceed
airspeed, pitch, or roll in
excess of the maximum
limitation identified in the
POH.
Pilot determines the
status of fuel/ battery
during flight.
The pilot determines the
rate of fuel consumption
from within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

17-1

D-23

The pilot may
command
desired courses
and headings.
They have the
capability of
flying specific
ground tracks
with a "ground
track" tool; can
feed in headings
to be followed.

Pilot descends
to given altitude
when
commanded
The system has
established
limits on
descent rate
The system has
established
limits on
descent rate

Fuel burn rate is
an embedded
variable that is
determined by

Used 3,000 ft

Initial input
and fuel burn
but no direct
level gauge

Pass

Pass
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charts and
environmental
parameters
18-1-1

Determine fuel consumed.

18-1-2

Determine fuel remaining.

18-2

Adjust power settings as
required to maintain
desired performance.

18-3

Perform fuel burn/battery
life calculations such that
the destination is reached
with the required
fuel/battery reserve
remaining.

18-3-1

Determine the fuel required
with a 30-minute reserve to
fly to Memphis International
Airport.

18-4

Re-evaluate performance
data as required to reach
the destination at the
required time with the
required fuel/battery
reserves.

18-4-1

Climb to 10,000 feet

18-5

Determine any new
performance capabilities or
limitations that may result
from alterations in the flight
plan or an in-flight

The pilot determines the
amount of fuel consumed
within 10 gallons and how
much remains within 10
gallons since engine start.
The pilot determines the
amount of fuel remaining
from within the CS since
engine start.
The pilot sets the power
setting for maximum
range or endurance.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot calculates fuel/
battery remaining
requirements within 10
gallons or 5 minutes to
complete a mission with
reserve capacity from the
CS while in flight.
Pilot calculates the fuel
requirements, taking into
account GS, time,
distance, fuel burn rate,
and reserve from within
the CS while in flight.
Pilot re-evaluates
performance/ endurance,
including fuel/ battery
reserves within 10 gallons
or 5 minutes after a
change in the mission
plan.
Pilot re-calculates the fuel
requirements, taking into
account GS, time,
distance, fuel burn rate,
and reserve within 10
gallons or 5 minutes.
Pilot is able to determine
if any performance
limitations changed as a
result of altering the flight
plan form the CS while in

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

D-24

Set indirectly
by selecting
airspeed, and
/or altitude
change
commands

Pass

Pass

Manual
calculation
from provided
data

Pass

Pass

POH Table

Pass

Pass
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19-1

19-2

19-3

emergency.
Monitor weather conditions
along the route of flight,
establishing
communications with inflight weather services as
required.
Determine if icing
conditions exist and utilize
anti/de-icing equipment as
appropriate.
When necessary, alter the
flight plan to avoid weather
that poses a hazard to the
safety of flight.

flight.
Pilot monitors current
and forecasted weather
conditions for current
location, route of flight,
and destination form the
CS while in flight.
Pilot determines if icing
conditions exist form the
CS while in flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pilot maneuvers the
mission plan to avoid
hazardous weather to the
destination from the CS
while in flight.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communications to
inform ATC of alterations
to planned flight of route
because of hazardous
weather conditions.
Pilot determines the
current lost-link/
contingency actions and
transponder actions prior
to a lost-link event
occurring.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Fail

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Does not
change
transponder
to 7400

Fail

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Radios on are
CS so Loss link
does not
affect. Loss of
downlink
would prevent
transponder
verification
directly but
could get
confirmation
from ATC.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

19-4

Notify ATC if a flight plan
must be altered to avoid
hazardous weather.

31-1

Ensure that lost-link fail
safes are set up as
appropriate for the flight
(including any automated
transponder triggering to
squawk 7400) and active
throughout all phases of
flight.

31-2

Communicate lost-link
behavior to ATC and verify
appropriate transponder
squawk code, if able.

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication if a
lost link conditions exists.
Pilot is able to verify
transponder code.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

31-3

At a minimum, relay the
following information to
ATC:
- Last known altitude
- Heading
- Destination

Pilot performs two-way
radio communications to
inform ATC of:
- Last known altitude
- Heading
- Destination

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass
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Pilot has to rely
on outside help
for this
information;
notional in this
instance

The system
does not
automatically
trigger a
transponder
code change
upon initiating
lost-link
protocols.
Note: Radio
communication
s occur through
the control
station

Pass

No Payload
cameras.

N/E

Pass
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- Location when the link was
lost (Latitude/Longitude),
and
- Expected lost-link behavior
32-1

32-2

32-3

Refer to published
troubleshooting procedures
when troubleshooting a lost
command link.
Continue or terminate the
flight based upon the
outcome of link
troubleshooting procedures.
Communicate the outcome
of troubleshooting to ATC.

Flight Card Description
Validation Attempt ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID

Flight Test #6
All
All

- Location when the link
was lost
(Latitude/Longitude), and
- Expected lost-link
behavior
Pilot references the POH
to troubleshoot lost-link
conditions from the CS
while in flight.
The pilot determines
either to continue or
terminate flight, based on
lost-link troubleshooting
results.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication
with ATC about the lostlink troubleshooting
outcome.
Test Case Description
Data Collector ID
Date Tested

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Assumptions:

OP #

1

UGCS operating in simulation mode

33

2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

34

7

UA is airborne

35

8

A simulated ATC entity is available

44
45

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

33-1

While operating a UAS,
monitor the command and
control link integrity. Should

The pilot detects a
degraded command link
and reacts by referring to

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Perform Lost-Link, In-Flight Emergency, and Emergency Landing Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
All
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
N/A

Assumption

OP #

Follows a
published
checklist to
troubleshoot

Operational Procedures
Validated
Operations During
Command and Control
Degradation and Loss General
Operations During Periods of
Decreased Sensory Cues
from Aircraft and
Environment
In-Flight Emergencies Propulsion Failure
Emergency Landing Ditching Site Selection
Emergency Landing - Flight
Termination

Final Result
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Observer 1
Actual Results

Met or exceeded
expected results

Observer 1
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass
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Observer 2
Actual Results

Observer 2
Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Observer 3
Actual Results

Met or
exceeded
expected

Observer 3
Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended
Pass

Observer 4
Actual Results

Observer 4
Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended
Pass
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33-2

34-1

34-2

34-3

degraded link performance
be encountered, execute
appropriate procedures to
address the situation.
During command and
control degradation or loss
of signal, execute
appropriate checklists,
troubleshooting,
communication protocols,
and contingencies for reestablishing the command
link.
Determine if full or partial
loss of sensory cues exist.

If applicable, use UAS
sensors to regain or
maintain orientation and
spatial awareness of the
UAS.
Manage multiple telemetry
datalinks independently, if
applicable.

34-4

Maintain situation
awareness of the UAS by
scanning displays and
instrumentation.

34-5

Monitor UA caution/alert
status.

34-6

If multiple emergences
exist, manage them using
aeronautical decision
making techniques.
If required, calculate
position, heading, and
airspeed to determine
proper heading and time to
designated location.
If equipped, be familiar with
ground data terminal

34-7

34-8

published procedures for
degraded link
performance.

results

The pilot utilizes the
appropriate checklists
and procedures to
troubleshoot/attempt to
restore the command
link.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

The pilot acknowledges
and inventories degraded
performance of required
displays and flight
information.
The pilot uses available
sensors to maintain
controlled flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

N/E

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

N/E

The pilot chooses the
data link with the
strongest signal while
demonstrating awareness
of the status of other
links.
The pilot continues their
scan of available
instrumentation and
maintains controlled,
stable flight.
The pilot acknowledges
any caution or alert
notifications as they
occur.
The pilot prioritizes the
most significant
emergency above less
significant anomalies.
The pilot determines their
position, heading, and
airspeed using alternative
means.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

The pilot uses the GDT
antenna to aid in

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Met or
exceeded

Pass

Pass

Can orient to
aircraft based

D-27

Pass

Auto and
displayed
information

Pass
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azimuth and dead reckoning
to maintain UA position.

determining their
position.

35-1

Identify and address engine
failure notifications with the
appropriate emergency
procedures, as applicable.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

35-2

Maintain aircraft control
and configure the aircraft to
achieve optimum glide, as
required.
While performing an
emergency landing, select
landing areas that pose
minimal risk to personnel
and property on the ground.

The pilot refers to the
appropriate published
procedures to address an
engine failure and takes
appropriate action.
The pilot ensures
optimum glide is flown.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

The pilot identifies a
lowest-risk landing area.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

35-3

upon link
signal
strength
Scenario:
Stuck throttle
servo

Pilot takes
note of rate of
descent and
airspeed
Usually
coordinates
with payload
operator to
identify a safe
area
Not a normal
consideration
for military
operations.
This could be
coordinated if
required.

expected
results
Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Stuck Throttle

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

auto Airspeed

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

35-4

During an emergency
landing, take high-volume
transects and approaches
into consideration and
maneuver to avoid them
whenever possible.

The pilot attempts to
avoid busy airspace and
airways.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

35-5

If a suitable landing site is
unavailable, determine the
best area to terminate the
flight to minimize risk to
personnel and property on
the ground.
Determine effects of
weather on landing/ditching
location.

The pilot chooses a flight
termination point in a
location that minimizes
risk.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

The pilot demonstrates
factoring weather into
consideration when
picking a landing/ditching
location.
The pilot addresses
additional emergencies
and prioritizes them by
criticality.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

35-6

35-7

Address all applicable
emergency procedures as
practical.

In the case of
the stuck
throttle, the
throttle was
stuck at a low
throttle
setting. The
pilot
prioritized the
effect of the
low throttle
setting over
that of the
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frozen servo.
35-8

Set transponder to 7700
if/when able to do so.

The pilot sets the
transponder accordingly.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

35-9

Communicate an engine
failure to ATC as soon as
practical.

The pilot communicates
the engine failure to ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

35-10

Notify ground crew, if
required.

The pilot notifies crew as
applicable.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

44-1

Execute ditching maneuvers
in accordance with
published procedures for
the given system.
Select ditching locations
based upon the ability to
minimize risk to personnel
and property on the ground.
When practical,
communicate ditching
locations and pilot
intentions to ATC.
Perform flight termination,
if required.

The pilot sets up to ditch
the aircraft in accordance
with established
procedures.
A remote or unpopulated
location is chosen for
ditching.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

The pilot communicates
their intent and ditching
location to ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Flight termination is
initiated if the pilot
deems ditching is
impractical.
Flight termination is
executed according to
published procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

The pilot monitors the
termination procedure
and verifies that it
completes correctly.
The pilot chooses a
remote location for flight
termination.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

The pilot relays their
intent to terminate the
flight and the termination
location to ATC.
The pilot engages a fuel

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded

Pass

44-2

44-3

45-1

45-2

45-3

45-4

45-5

45-6

Execute flight termination
according to established
flight termination
procedures for the given
system.
When executing flight
termination, monitor the
execution of the maneuver.
Select flight termination
locations bases upon the
ability to minimize risk to
personnel and property on
the ground.
Notify ATC of intent to
terminate and provide the
flight termination position.
Upon execution of flight

Engine
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Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or
exceeded
expected
results

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results
Met or

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.

Pass

Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.

Pass

Ditch and
Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
Ditch and

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

THIRD PARTY RESEARCH. PENDING FAA REVIEW.
termination, engage the fuel
cutoff, if applicable.

cutoff during termination,
if applicable.

expected results

ignition is cut
upon
termination;
parachute is
deployed.

D-30

exceeded
expected
results

Terminate are
the same for
this platform.
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #7

Test Case Description

Data Collector ID

Perform En-route Operations, In-Flight
Emergencies, and Emergency Landing
Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID

Validation Attempt ID

All

All

Researcher/Assessor's ID

All

Date Tested

June 6, 2017

N/A

Test Case (Pass/Fail)

Assumption
#

Assumptions:

OP #

Operational Procedures
Validated

1

UGCS operating in simulation mode

14a

2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

14b

7

UA is airborne

36

8

A simulated ATC entity is available

37

En-route Operations General
En-route Operations Navigation
In-Flight Emergencies Two-way Communications
Failure
In-Flight Emergencies Navigation Failure - GPS or
Other System
In-Flight Emergencies Uncontrolled Flight
Emergency Landing - Flight
Termination

39
45

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended

14a-1

Use proper communication
procedures when using
radar services (as
applicable).
Contact Memphis Center on
120.8MHz.

The pilot uses two-way
communication with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot changes the
two-way radio frequency
to 120.8 while in flight
and contact the Memphis
ARTCC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Obtain ATC clearance.

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-1-1

14a-2

Pass

Pass

Pass
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14a-2-1

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-3

Respond to ATC clearance.

Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-3-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using
standard aviation
terminology.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-4

Comply with ATC clearance.

Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-4-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-5

Use standard aviation
phraseology when
communicating with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-6

Set communication
frequencies, navigation
systems, and transponder
codes to ensure compliance
with ATC clearances.

Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.
Pilot uses standard
aviation phraseology
when communicating
with ATC.
Pilot switches radio
navigation frequencies
and transponder code
from within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-7

Conduct any required
communication frequency
changes.

Pilot switches two-way
radio frequencies from
within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-8

Use available systems (if
equipped) to detect icing
conditions.

Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-8-1

Determine if the pitot tube
has ice.

Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing on the pitot tube.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
No payload
operator; can
use payload to
detect airframe
icing

Pass

Pass
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14a-8-2

Determine if the UA has
structural ice.

Pilot uses the payload
video to inspect the UA
for structural icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-9

Monitor aircraft electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
performance.

Pilot monitors status and
health of electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
systems.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14a-9-1

Determine if current bus
voltage is within limitations.

Pilot monitors bus voltage
and determine it is within
the POH-required limits.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-1

Monitor aircraft's position
throughout the flight and
maintain course in
accordance with ATC
instructions/clearance.

Pilot determines the
location of the UA on a
location display.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-1-1

Determine current location

Pilot determines current
location on the location
display and/ or GPS
coordinate display.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-1-1

Turn and maintain 130
degrees.

Pilot turns from 360
degrees to 130 degrees.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-2

Intercept and track a given
course, radial (if equipped),
or bearing, as appropriate.

Pilot plots a course and
command the UA
heading.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-2-1

Determine the course
heading to Nashville, TN.

Pilot plots a course
heading from the UA's
current position direct to
Atlanta, GA. While
factoring winds.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass
Auto and #
display

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
GPS Pt to PT
only. Pilot
could
calculate
equivalent
radial
intercept with
VOR position
information.

N/A

Pass
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14b-2-2

Determine a ground track to
Nashville, TN.

Pilot determines a ground
track necessary for a
direct course to Atlanta,
GA.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-3

Determine loss of GPS or
navigation solution if it
occurs.

The pilot interprets the
GPS health and status
within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4

Maintain the appropriate
altitude and headings.

Pilot turns the UA and
change altitude while in
flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4-1

Turn to heading 350
degrees.

Pilot turns the UA to 350
degrees magnetic.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4-2

Climb and maintain 10,000
feet MSL.

Pilot climbs the UA to
10,000 MSL and level off.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4-3

Perform dead reckoning
navigation if required.

Pilot uses payload video
to navigate back to a
landing airport.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4-4

Return to Huntsville
International Airport via
heading and airspeed.

Pilot uses the UA's
heading and ground
speed to return to HSV.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-4-6

Use payload video to enter
the traffic pattern at
Huntsville International
Airport.

Pilot uses payload video
to navigate into the traffic
pattern.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-6

Maintain course by
reference to established
waypoints/steer points or
other navigational
references, as applicable.

Pilot remains on an
established course and
changes course once
waypoints are achieved.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass
WCA with
secondary
menus display
for more
detail
information

Pass

Pass

Pass
Used 5,000 ft

Pass
No payload
operator
present

Pass

Pass
No payload
operator
present

Pass

Pass
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14b-7

If equipped, be able to
identify surface features to
chart symbols.

Pilot performs map to
video correlation
between the payload
video and location display
to identify natural and
man-made terrain
features.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14b-8

Navigate by means of
precomputed headings,
groundspeeds, and elapsed
time (if required).

Pilot determines a
required heading +/- 10
degrees, groundspeed +/10 knots, and time +/- 3
minutes.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

14b-9

Correct for wind to maintain
desired route and
performance.

The Pilot acknowledges
and corrects for wind to
maintain desired course.

Pass

14b-10

Remain within planned
route described in the flight
plan.

14b-10-1

Obtain ATC clearance.

The Pilot commands the
UA to maintain the
desired course, speed,
and altitude outlined in
the flight plan.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.

14b-10-2

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

14b-10-3

No payload
operator
present

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Respond to ATC clearance.

Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-10-4

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using
standard aviation
terminology.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-10-5

Comply with ATC clearance.

Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

14b-10-6

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

N/E
Manual
calculation
from provided
data

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
Pass
Used
simulated
airspace

Pass
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36-1

Set transponder to 7600.

The pilot sets the
transponder code to 7600
during a communication
failure.
Alternative means to
communicate with ATC
are identified during a
two-way communication
failure.
The pilot correctly
prioritizes routes using
AVEF.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Sets
transponder
code

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

36-2

When available, utilize
alternative means of
communication to
communicate with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot can use
phone

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

36-3

Prioritize routing as
required for IFR
communications failures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Fail

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot correctly
prioritizes altitudes for
IFR communication
failures.
Navigation failures are
addressed as they are
identified by the pilot.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not equipped
to fly
instrument
routes; No
RNAV
Possible; Not
observed

36-4

Prioritize altitudes as
required for IFR
communications failures.

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

37-1

Address navigation system
failures as soon as practical.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Possible; Not
observed

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

37-2

Address a navigation failure
in accordance with
established procedures for
the given system.

The pilot addresses
navigation system failures
in accordance with
published procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

37-3

Perform dead reckoning
navigation if required.

The pilot uses dead
reckoning to perform
navigation.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

37-4

Notify ATC of intentions.

The pilot notifies ATC of
their intentions when
addressing a navigation
failure.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

37-5

Refer to off-site landing
(ditching) or termination
procedures, as required, if
flight cannot be continued
with a failed navigation
system.

The pilot chooses to ditch
or terminate if navigation
systems cannot be
restored.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass
Phone,
Personnel

Pass

Pass

Pass
WCA

Pass

Pass
Use payload to
assist if
required;
Notional in this
case

Using Payload
if available. If
not, last
position.

Pass

Pass

N/A
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39-1

Address equipment failures
that can lead to or hinder
the recovery from
uncontrolled flight.

The pilot troubleshoots
equipment failures
related to flight control
systems.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

39-2

Address equipment failures
in accordance with
established procedures.

The pilot addresses
equipment failures per
published procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

39-3

Interpret and react to
system cues that warn of
the possibility of entering
into a state of uncontrolled
flight.
Avoid configurations and
flight regimes in which the
UAS is susceptible to a loss
of control.

The pilot acknowledges
and reacts to
warnings/alerts that are
indicators of uncontrolled
flight.
The pilot acknowledges
and avoids flight
configurations where the
aircraft is inherently
unstable.
The pilot recovers from
unusual attitudes.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Not performed

Not observed.

Pass

Software inhibits
the capability of
intentionally
entering a stall
or spin.
Met or exceeded
expected results.

Not Observed

Auto system

Pass

No Stall due
to auto
protect so no
spin either

39-4

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

39-5

Recognize and recover from
unusual attitudes, when
UAS capabilities allow such
control.

39-6

Execute appropriate
stall/spin recovery
strategies for multiple types
of stalls/spins, when UA
capabilities allow such
control.

The pilot recovers from a
stall/spin.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

39-7

Notify ATC of a loss of
control as soon as practical.

The pilot notifies ATC of a
loss of aircraft control.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

39-8

Know and execute any
published procedures to
address any loss of UAS
control.

The pilot addresses loss
of control with published
procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

45-1

Perform flight termination,
if required.

The pilot terminates the
flight if controlled flight
cannot be regained.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Robust
envelope
protection
system
prevents the
pilot from
stalling and
getting into a
stall/spin
scenario.

N/A

Pass

N/A
Pass

Pass
Pilot terminates
in the event of a
loss of control;
deploys a
parachute.
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45-2

Execute flight termination
according to established
flight termination
procedures for the given
system.
When executing flight
termination, monitor the
execution of the maneuver.

Flight termination is in
accordance with
established procedures
for the system.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Followed
established
procedures

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot monitors flight
termination and confirms
termination with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Follows
telemetry;
reports last
known position
prior to loss of
link at
touchdown
after initiating
flight
termination.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

45-4

Select flight termination
locations bases upon the
ability to minimize risk to
personnel and property on
the ground.

The pilot chooses a
remote location for flight
termination.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

45-5

Notify ATC of intent to
terminate and provide the
flight termination position.

The pilot notifies ATC of
the intent to terminate
and provides the location
of the termination point.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

45-6

Upon execution of flight
termination, engage the fuel
cutoff, if applicable.

The fuel cutoff is engaged
when the flight is
terminated.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

45-3

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass
Engine is killed
upon initiating
flight
termination.
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #8

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
All
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
All
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2
Platform-specific POH is available in CS
7

UA is airborne

8

A simulated ATC entity is available

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

18-1

Monitor UA fuel/battery
status while in flight.

18-1-1

Determine fuel burn rate.

18-1-1

Determine fuel consumed.

18-1-2

Determine fuel remaining.

18-2

Adjust power settings as
required to maintain
desired performance.

The pilot determines the
status of fuel/ battery
during flight.
The pilot determines the
rate of fuel consumption
from within the CS.
The pilot determines the
amount of fuel consumed
from within the CS since
engine start.
The pilot determines the
amount of fuel remaining
from within the CS since
engine start.
The pilot adjusts power
settings for maximum
range or endurance.

18-3

Perform fuel burn/battery
life calculations such that
the destination is reached
with the required
fuel/battery reserve
remaining.
Determine the fuel required
with a 30-minute reserve to
fly to Memphis International
Airport.

The pilot calculates fuel/
battery remaining
requirements to
complete a mission with
reserve capacity from the
CS while in flight.
Pilot is able to correctly
calculate the fuel
requirements, taking into
account GS, time,

18-3-1

Perform Cruise Power Settings, In-Flight
Emergencies, and Emergency Landing
Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
18
Cruise Power Settings
40
In-Flight Emergencies Emergency Descent
41
Emergency Landing Communication
42
Emergency Landing - Approach
43
Emergency Landing Touchdown

All
N/A

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not Observed/
Not Applicable
/ Suspended
Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results
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Indirectly set
through
airspeed
settings.

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Multiple Map
and fuel
measurements
for pilot to

Pass
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18-4

18-4

Re-evaluate performance
data as required to reach
the destination at the
required time with the
required fuel/battery
reserves.
Climb to 10,000 feet

distance, fuel burn rate,
and reserve from within
the CS while in flight.
The pilot re-evaluates
performance/endurance,
including fuel/ battery
reserves after a change in
the mission plan.

calculate from

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot re-calculates the
fuel requirements, taking
into account ground
speed, time, distance,
fuel burn rate, and
reserve from within the
CS while in flight.
The pilot determines if
any performance
limitations have changed
as a result of altering the
flight plan form the CS
while in flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Used 5,000 ft

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Generator
Failure chosen
here: Shut of
non-essential
systems
creates new
limitations.
See previous
example for
prioritization
of
emergencies.
Envelope
protection
limits
airspeeds.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Gen Failure;
Batt only,
reduced loads

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

auto

Pass

Shut off nonessential
systems for
GEN fail.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

same as
normal

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

18-5

Determine any new
performance capabilities or
limitations that may result
from alterations in the flight
plan or an in-flight
emergency.

40-1

Execute proper division of
attention in an emergency
descent scenario.

The pilot prioritizes
emergencies.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

40-2

When performing an
emergency decent, ensure
that any performance
limitations are not
exceeded.
Perform emergency
descents as applicable to
the aircraft's configuration
(flaps, landing gear, and
engine power setting) as
applicable.
Notify ATC as soon as
practical when executing an
emergency decent.
Execute all descent
procedures as time allows
while maintaining aircraft
control.
If applicable, brief and
perform hand-off
procedures to the landing

The aircraft does not
exceed VNE during the
descent.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

The pilot configures the
aircraft for emergency
descent per established
procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

The pilot notifies ATC of
emergency descent when
practical.
The pilot maintains
positive control during
the emergency descent
maneuver.
A control station handoff
is performed to meet the
needs of the emergency.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

40-3

40-4

40-5

40-6

D-40

Cane be done;
not
performed in
this instance

Pass

Pass
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40-7

41-1

41-2

41-3

41-4

41-5

42-1

42-2

42-3

42-4

42-5

pilot.
Determine if landing or
flight termination is
suitable.
Communicate emergency
landing flight plans/or
routes with ATC as soon as
practical.
Notify ATC as soon as
practical when deviating
from a clearance.
Maintain a sterile cockpit
during emergency
maneuvers.
When the situation
warrants, provide ATC with
information regarding the
nature of the emergency
and intentions.
During the transition
portions and prior to
landing, maintain
communication with ATC
and any required ground
crew.
Perform emergency
approaches in accordance
with procedures for the
given system.
Monitor airspeed, altitude,
and other flight
performance parameters
while on approach.

Choose an emergency
landing location that
minimizes risk to persons or
property on the ground.
Determine effects of
weather on emergency
landing conditions.

Ensure obstacle clearance to

The pilot makes a
decision to land or
terminate the flight.
The pilot communicates
their emergency route to
ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot notifies ATC of a
deviation from a known
clearance.
The pilot maintains a
sterile cockpit.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot communicates
their intention and the
nature of their
emergency to ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot maintains open
communications with ATC
and other required
personnel.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Emergency approaches
are conducted in
accordance with
established procedures.
The pilot identifies
deviations in airspeed,
altitude, and other
performance parameters
and corrects for them
while on approach.
The pilot chooses a
remote location for the
emergency landing.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot lands into the
wind.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot avoids obstacles

Pass

Met or exceeded expected

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded

Pass

D-41

Pilot
coordinates to
get weather
when possible
(emergency
landing
conducted at
takeoff site).

Pass

Gen Failure

Auto and pilot

Map and if

Pass

Pass

Pass
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the best extent possible
when executing an
emergency landing.
Adhere to any published
emergency approach and
landing procedures that
may exist for the system.
Complete any additional
procedures that may be
required after touching
down.

throughout the
procedure.

43-2

Maintain communications
with ATC.

43-3

Upon touchdown,
communicate with a visual
observer (if required) or
other necessary ground
support personnel to ensure
that the approach path
remains clear.

43-4

43-5

42-6

43-1

results

expected results.

available video

The pilot follows
established emergency
landing procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Agreed to UAS
approach

Pass

The pilot completes any
other documented
procedures that are
required to follow an
emergency landing.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Gen Failure
TALS abort
override (pilot
kills engine if
UAS does not
do it properly)

Pass

The pilot maintains
communication with ATC
throughout the
emergency.
The pilot coordinates with
crew to ensure that the
approach path is clear.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Not Observed

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Determine missed approach
requirements.

The pilot executes a
missed approach if
missed approach criteria
are met.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Complete emergency
landings in accordance with
any published emergency
procedures for the given
system.

Emergency landings are
executed in accordance
with published
procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded expected
results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

D-42

Normal
operations in
sterile
airspace,
Coordination
with a VO to
clear airspace
is possible.
Missed
approaches
are an
absolute last
resort in a
GEN fail
scenario.
However, it is
possible to
perform a
"wave off" if
required.

Pass

Crew Chief

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test #9

Test Case Description

Data Collector ID

Perform En-Route Operations, Descent
from Cruise, Approach, Landing, and
Ground Support Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID

Validation Attempt ID

All

All

Researcher/Assessor's ID

All

Date Tested

June 6, 2017

N/A

Test Case (Pass/Fail)

Assumption
#

Assumptions:

OP #

Operational Procedures
Validated

1

UGCS operating in simulation mode

17

2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

20

6

AIM if available in CS

21

En-route Operations Descents
Descent From Cruise General
Approach - General

8

UA is airborne

22

Landing - Communications

8

A simulated ATC entity is available

23
24

Approach and Landing
(Human in the Loop)
Go Around

25

Ground Support

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer
3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

17-1

Conduct descents in
accordance with ATC
clearance.

The pilot complies with
ATC clearance to
descend.

17-2

Conduct descents with
regard to UAS limitations.

UAS airspeed and
structural limitations are
not exceeded.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

17-3

Do not exceed UAS
performance limitations in
descents.

UAS airspeed and
structural limitations are
not exceeded.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

D-43

Met or exceeded
expected results.
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20-1

Descend to pattern altitude
or an approach fix/initial
approach waypoint in a
manner that does not
impede or decrease the
safety of other air traffic.

The pilot maintains
separation from other
traffic while descending
to pattern altitude.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

20-2

If unable to perform a
published instrument
approach, coordinate
approach procedures with
ATC prior to arrival at the
initial approach fix.

The pilot coordinates
their approach with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

20-3

Comply with ATC clearance
to descend, if applicable.

Pass

20-4

Ensure that the UA is
configured for descent.

The pilot complies with
ATC clearance to
descend.
The UA is configured for
descent (flaps, landing
gear, etc.).

21-1

Monitor the airspeed,
altitude, heading, and
system health parameters
while on approach.

21-2

21-3

Aircraft not
equipped to
maintain
separation
without a VO

Fail

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot monitors
airspeed, altitude,
heading, and system
health while on approach
and executes a missed
approach if the UA falls
within missed approach
parameters.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Perform approaches per the
published approach plates
unless a standardized
approach exists for specific
unmanned system being
flown.

The pilot performs the
approach per established
procedures, whatever
they may be.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Ensure that the final
approach path is clear of
aircraft and obstacles.

The final approach path is
clear throughout
approach and the pilot
reacts correctly to a
traffic conflict.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Limited ability to
perform manned
aircraft
approaches, but
may use
standardized
approaches that
are unique to the
platform.
PIC cannot clear
traffic without a
VO (notional)
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With ATC
separation or
VO. No internal
DAA system.

Pilot would
coordinate (No
DAA system)

Pass

Pass
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21-4

If a visual observer (VO) is
the sole means of clearing
the airspace for an
approach, ensure that twoway communication with
the observer is maintained
throughout the approach.

If a VO is used to clear the
airspace, the pilot
maintains communication
with them throughout the
approach.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

22-1

Establish communication
with local ATC when arriving
at the destination or
entering controlled
airspace, as applicable.

The pilot makes initial
contact with ATC prior to
entering controlled
airspace.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

22-2

Maintain communication
with ATC when operating in
controlled airspace.
Acknowledge and read back
clearances per AIM 4-4-7.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

22-3

Use standard phraseology
to obtain ATC clearance for
landing.

The pilot maintains
communication with ATC
and properly
acknowledges clearances,
reading them back when
required.
Then pilot uses standard
ATC phraseology when
requesting clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

23-1

Choose landing procedure
appropriate to the type of
approach and prevailing
weather conditions.

The pilot chooses an
approach that is
appropriate to the
prevailing weather
conditions at the
destination airport.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

23-2

Contact ATC and request
clearance to land;
acknowledge landing
clearance when received.

The pilot requests and
acknowledges landing
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

23-3

Ensure that the UA is
configured for landing prior
to touchdown.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

24-1

Communicate the goaround to ATC as soon as
practical.

The UA is configured for
landing as described in
published
procedure/POH.
The pilot communicates
the go-around(s) to ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass
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Radio or phone

Requires
ground
personnel to
change runways

Pass

Pass

Pass

Auto flaps only.
Invisible to RPIC

Pass

Pass
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24-2

Abort landing prior to
commitment point.

The pilot makes the
decision to abort prior to
a predetermined
commitment point.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

24-3

Maintain positive rate of
climb.

The pilot maintains
positive climb to a
predetermined altitude
during the abort
procedure.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

24-4

Maintain runway centerline.

The pilot maintains
runway centerline during
the initial climb.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

24-5

Climb to a predetermined
altitude that ensures
obstacle clearance.

The pilot climbs the UA to
an altitude that assures
obstacle clearance.

Pass

24-6

Follow applicable missed
approach procedures.

Published missed
approach procedures are
followed (as applicable).

24-7

Coordinate with ATC as
required to re-attempt the
approach.

25-1

If required for landing,
coordinate with any ground
support personnel and brief
them on landing
procedures.

Verify positive
climb

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Auto until
Knobs mode
selected

Pass

Pass

Climb to
specified point

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Preprogrammed

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Climb to
specified point

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

As applicable

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

The pilot coordinates with
ATC to re-attempt an
approach.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot coordinates with
ground personnel if
required.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results.

Pass

Pass

Part of standard
procedure
(notional)
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Pass

Pass

Pre-coordinated
but possible
UAS specific
version.

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test
#10
All
All

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2
6
7
8

Platform-specific POH is available in CS
AIM if available in CS
UA is airborne
A simulated ATC entity is available

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

20-1

Descend to pattern altitude
or an approach fix/initial
approach waypoint in a
manner that does not
impede or decrease the
safety of other air traffic.

20-2

If unable to perform a
published instrument
approach, coordinate
approach procedures with
ATC prior to arrival at the
initial approach fix.

20-3

Comply with ATC clearance
to descend, if applicable.

The pilot descends to
pattern altitude or an
approach fix/initial
approach waypoint in a
manner that does not
impede or decrease the
safety of other air traffic.
(Pilot is unable to
perform a published
instrument approach)
Pilot coordinates a new
approach procedure with
ATC prior to arrival at the
initial approach fix.
The pilot complies with
an ATC clearance to
descent, if applicable.

20-4

Ensure that the UA is
configured for descent.

21-1

Monitor the airspeed,
altitude, heading, and
system health parameters
while on approach.

21-2

Perform approaches per the

Perform Normal Operational Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
20
Descent From Cruise General
21
Approach - General
24
Go Around
25
Ground Support
26
Approach and Landing
(Automated)

All
N/A

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Not Observed

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pass

Not capable

Fail

Pilot performs a
platform specific
approach

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

UAS published
approaches
are typical
operations

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

The pilot properly
configures the UA for
descent.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

The pilot monitors the
airspeed, altitude,
heading, and system
health parameters while
on approach.
The pilot executes the

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Not capable

Fail

Met or

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Use payload of
VO. Payload is
not ideal, but is
capable of
detecting aircraft
with IR.

Pilot performs a

D-47

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Payload (if
available)/ VO

Both Pilot and
auto

Pass

Pass

Pass
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published approach plates
unless a standardized
approach exists for specific
unmanned system being
flown.

21-3

Ensure that the final
approach path is clear of
aircraft and obstacles.

21-4

If a visual observer (VO) is
the sole means of clearing
the airspace for an
approach, ensure that twoway communication with
the observer is maintained
throughout the approach.

24-1

Communicate the goaround to ATC as soon as
practical.

24-2

Abort landing prior to
commitment point.

24-3

instrument per the
published approach
plates unless a
standardized approach
exits for specific
unmanned system being
flown.
The pilot determines that
the final approach path is
clear of aircraft and
obstacles.
If a visual observer (VO) is
the sole means of clearing
the airspace for an
approach, the pilot
ensures two-way
communication with the
observer throughout the
approach.
The pilot notifies ATC as
soon as practical when a
go-around is executed.

platform specific
approach

exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

If VO is used

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Communication
was notional in
this case

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

The pilot aborts the
landing prior to
commitment point.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Maintain positive rate of
climb.

The pilot maintains a
positive rate of climb.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

24-4

Maintain runway centerline.

The pilot maintains
runway centerline.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

24-5

Climb to a predetermined
altitude that ensures
obstacle clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

24-6

Follow applicable missed
approach procedures.

The pilot climbs to a
predetermined altitude
that ensures obstacle
clearance.
The pilot follows
applicable missed
approach procedures.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

24-7

Coordinate with ATC as
required to re-attempt the
approach.

The pilot obtains ATC
clearance to re-attempt
the approach.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass
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Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Payload (If
available)/ VO

Pass

Pass

Military
typically uses
airspace and
procedure.
When they
have used
CoA VO is
used.

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pilot and auto

Pass

Pass

Auto

Pass

Pass

Auto and
RPIC.
Preconfigured
by RPIC for
route and
altitude

Pass
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25-1

If required for landing,
coordinate with any ground
support personnel and brief
them on landing
procedures.

26-1

Monitor the aircraft on
approach and ensure that it
conforms to known
performance limitations on
approach and landing.

26-2

If required and the UAS is so
equipped, make manual
control inputs to assist in
guiding the UAS while on
approach.
If applicable, assume
manual control of the UAS
in the event of an
emergency.

26-3

If required for landing,
the pilot coordinates with
any ground support
personnel and briefs
them on landing
procedures.
The pilot monitors the
aircraft on approach and
ensures that it conforms
to all performance
limitations during
approach and landing.
If required and the UAS is
so equipped, the pilot
manually controls the
UAS during approach.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

If applicable, the pilot
assumes manual control
of the UAS during
emergency situations.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

D-49

Auto

N/A
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test
#11
All
All

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2
7

Platform-specific POH is available in CS
UA is airborne

8

A simulated ATC entity is available

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

27-1

Maintain communication
with the applicable ATC
element upon landing.

27-2

Follow ATC instructions for
taxi.

28-1

Taxi on cleared route.

The pilot establishes and
maintains 2-way
communication with the
applicable ATC element
upon landing.
The pilot establishes and
maintains 2-way
communication with the
applicable ATC element
during taxi operations.
The pilot uses the CS and
camera if available to taxi
on the cleared route.

28-2

Maintain a taxi speed at the
marshaller's pace (if
required), or as appropriate
to maintain separation from
other traffic.
Remain a safe distance from
other aircraft.

28-3

28-4

Avoid hazards on taxiway
surface.

28-5

Taxi according to applicable
signage and warning lights.

The pilot follows the
marshaller's commands
or as appropriate to
maintain separation from
other traffic.
The pilot maintains a safe
taxi speed in order to
enable a full-stop to avoid
other aircraft or
obstacles.
The pilot uses the CS and
camera, if available, to
avoid hazards on the
taxiway surface.
The pilot uses the CS,
camera, or VO (if
available) to avoid

Perform Post Landing Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational
Procedures Validated
27
Post-Landing Communications
28
Post-Landing - Taxi
29
Post-Landing - Ground
Support

All
N/A

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail / Not
Observed/ Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Met or exceeded
expected results
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Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
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29-1

Verify UA is parked in
designated location.

29-2

Shut down the engine.

29-3

If required, confirm engine
shutdown with ground
crew.

29-4

Perform a post-flight
inspection of GCS and
associated systems.

29-5

Coordinate with ground
crews (if required) to
perform a post-flight
inspection of the UA.

hazards on the taxiway
surface.
The pilot uses the CS,
camera, marshaller, or VO
(if available) to verify that
the UA is parked in it
designated location.
The pilot successfully
shuts down the engine.

The pilot confirms the
successful engine
shutdown with the
ground crew, if required.
The pilot follows the
appropriate checklist(s) to
perform the post-flight
inspection of CS and
associated systems.
The pilot communicates
with the appropriate
ground crews (if required)
to perform a post-flight
inspection of the UA.

results.
Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Aircraft does
not taxi

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

No Taxi

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass

Coordinated
with Crew
Chief

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Coordinated
with Crew
Chief

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test
#12

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
All
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
All
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

7
8

UA is airborne
A simulated ATC entity is available

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

14a-1

Use proper communication
procedures when using
radar services (as
applicable).

The pilot uses two-way
communication with ATC.

14a-1-1

Contact Memphis Center on
120.8MHz.

14a-2

Obtain ATC clearance.

14a-2-1

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

14a-3

Respond to ATC clearance.

14a-3-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Perform En-Route, Cruise Power
Settings, Weather Monitoring, and
Control Station Handoff Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
14a
En-route Operations General
14b
En-route Operations Navigation
18
Cruise Power Settings
19
Weather Monitoring
30
Control Station Handoff General

All
N/A

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

The pilot changes the
two-way radio frequency
to 120.8 while in flight
and contact the Memphis
ARTCC.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using
standard aviation
terminology.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results
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14a-4

Comply with ATC clearance.

Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14a-4-1

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14a-5

Use standard aviation
phraseology when
communicating with ATC.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14a-6

Set communication
frequencies, navigation
systems, and transponder
codes to ensure compliance
with ATC clearances.
Conduct any required
communication frequency
changes.

Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.
Pilot uses standard
aviation phraseology
when communicating
with ATC.
Pilot switches radio
navigation frequencies
and transponder code
from within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot switches two-way
radio frequencies from
within the CS.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

No payload
operator

Pass

Pilot would
notice
airspeed
problems if
pitot tube
blocked by ice
Pilot would
notice
airspeed
problems if
pitot tube
blocked by ice
Possible with
the use of
payload. No
payload
operator used.

Not Observed

14a-7

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded

Pass

Pass

14a-8

Use available systems (if
equipped) to detect icing
conditions.

Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14a-8-1

Determine if the pitot tube
has ice.

Pilot uses the CS to detect
icing on the pitot tube.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14a-8-2

Determine if the UA has
structural ice.

Pilot uses the payload
video to inspect the UA
for structural icing.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14a-9

Monitor aircraft electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
performance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14a-9-1

Determine if current bus
voltage is within limitations.

Pilot monitors status and
health of electrical,
propulsion, and datalink
systems.
Pilot monitors bus voltage
and determine it is within
the POH-required limits.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14b-1

Monitor aircraft's position
throughout the flight and

Pilot determines the
location of the UA on a

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass
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Pass

Pass

Auto and #
display

Pass

Pass
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14b-1-1

maintain course in
accordance with ATC
instructions/clearance.
Determine current location

location display.

expected
results.

14b-1-1

Turn and maintain 130
degrees.

Pilot determines current
location on the location
display and/ or GPS
coordinate display.
Pilot turns from 360
degrees to 130 degrees.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

14b-2

Intercept and track a given
course, radial (if equipped),
or bearing, as appropriate.

Pilot plots a course and
command the UA
heading.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14b-2-1

Determine the course
heading to Nashville, TN.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Different
location used;
same outcome
achieved

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

14b-2-2

Determine a ground track to
Nashville, TN.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Different
location used;
same outcome
achieved

Pass

Pass

Determine loss of GPS or
navigation solution if it
occurs.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

14b-3

Pilot plots a course
heading from the UA's
current position direct to
Atlanta, GA. While
factoring winds.
Pilot determines a ground
track necessary for a
direct course to Atlanta,
GA.
The pilot interprets the
GPS health and status
within the CS.

14b-4

Maintain the appropriate
altitude and headings.

Pilot turns the UA and
change altitude while in
flight.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

14b-4-1

Turn to heading 350
degrees.

Pilot turns the UA to 350
degrees magnetic.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

14b-4-2

Climb and maintain 10,000
feet MSL.

Pilot climbs the UA to
10,000 MSL and level off.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

14b-4-3

Perform dead reckoning
navigation if required.

Pilot uses payload video
to navigate back to a
landing airport.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

No payload
operator

D-54

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

GPS Pt to PT
only. Pilot
could calculate
equivalent
radial intercept
with VOR
position
information.

WCA with
secondary
menus display
for more detail
information

Used 5,000 ft

N/A

Pass

Pass

Pass
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14b-4-4

Return to Huntsville
International Airport via
heading and airspeed.

Pilot uses the UA's
heading and ground
speed to return to HSV.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

14b-4-6

Use payload video to enter
the traffic pattern at
Huntsville International
Airport.
Maintain course by
reference to established
waypoints/steer points or
other navigational
references, as applicable.
If equipped, be able to
identify surface features to
chart symbols.

Pilot uses payload video
to navigate into the traffic
pattern.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot remains on an
established course and
changes course once
waypoints are achieved.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot performs map to
video correlation
between the payload
video and location display
to identify natural and
man-made terrain
features.
Pilot determines a
required heading +/- 10
degrees, groundspeed +/10 knots, and time +/- 3
minutes.
The Pilot acknowledges
and corrects for wind to
maintain desired course.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

The Pilot commands the
UA to maintain the
desired course, speed,
and altitude outlined in
the flight plan.
Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
obtain an ATC clearance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pilot performs two-way
radio communication to
request clearance into R2104B restricted airspace.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.
Pilot reads back the ATC
clearance approval using

14b-6

14b-7

14b-8

Navigate by means of
precomputed headings,
groundspeeds, and elapsed
time (if required).

14b-9

Correct for wind to maintain
desired route and
performance.

14b-10

Remain within planned
route described in the flight
plan.

14b-10-1

Obtain ATC clearance.

14b-10-2

Request clearance for
transitioning into R-2104B

14b-10-3

Respond to ATC clearance.

14b-10-4

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/E

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded

Pass

Pass

No payload
operator

Not Observed

Pass

No payload
operator

This is an
automated
process in
point
navigation

D-55

Manual
calculation
from provided
data

Pass
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and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.
Comply with ATC clearance.

standard aviation
terminology.
Pilot maneuvers the UA
to comply with ATC
clearance.

14b-10-6

Cleared into R-2104B
airspace. Maintain climb
and maintain 5,000 feet
MSL.

18-1

Monitor UAS fuel/battery
status while in flight.

18-2

14b-10-5

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pilot turns the UA into
R2104B, remain within
that airspace, climb to
5,000 feet MSL and level
off.
The pilot monitors UAS
fuel/battery status while
in flight

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Adjust power settings as
required to maintain
desired performance.

The pilot adjusts power
settings as required to
maintain desired
performance.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

18-3

Perform fuel burn/battery
consumption calculations
such that the destination is
reached with the required
fuel reserve/battery power
remaining.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

18-4

Re-evaluate performance
data as required to reach
the destination at the
required time with the
required fuel/battery
reserves.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

18-5

Determine any new
performance capabilities or
limitations that may result
from alterations in the flight
plan or an in-flight
emergency.

Pass

19-1

Monitor weather conditions
along the route of flight,
establishing
communications with in-

The pilot demonstrates
the knowledge to
perform fuel burn/battery
consumption calculations
such that the destination
is reached with the
required fuel/battery life.
reserve/battery power
remaining.
The pilot demonstrates
the knowledge to reevaluate performance
data as required to reach
the destination at the
required time with the
required fuel/battery
reserves.
The pilot determines any
new performance
capabilities or limitations
that may result from
alterations in the flight
plan or an in-flight
emergency.
The pilot uses any
available means to
demonstrate the ability to
monitor weather

Pass

expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Used
simulated
airspace

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

D-56

Pass

Pass

Set indirectly
by selecting
airspeed, and
/or altitude
change
commands

Pass
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flight weather services as
required.

19-2

Determine if icing
conditions exist and utilize
anti/de-icing equipment as
appropriate.

19-3

When necessary, alter the
flight plan to avoid weather
that poses a hazard to the
safety of flight.

19-4

Notify ATC if a flight plan
must be altered to avoid
hazardous weather.

30-1

Receiving Pilot - Perform
preflight on receiving GCS
and verify correct function
of essential systems.

30-2

Establish two-way
communication with the
receiving control station
prior to initiating a control
station handoff.
Receiving CS: Coordinate
with transferring CS to
establish C2 link with UA,
if/as applicable per the
pilot’s operating handbook
(POH).

30-3

30-4

Receiving CS: Coordinate
with transferring CS to
establish C2 link with UA,
if/as applicable per POH.

conditions along the
route of flight,
establishing
communications with inflight weather services as
required.
The pilot uses any
available means to
demonstrate the ability to
determine if icing
conditions exist and
utilize anti/de-icing
equipment as
appropriate.
The pilot demonstrates
proper situation
awareness and (when
necessary), alter the flight
plan to avoid weather
that poses a hazard to the
safety of flight.
The pilot uses any
available means to notify
ATC if a flight plan must
be altered to avoid
hazardous weather.
The pilot performs
preflight on receiving GCS
and verifies correct
function of essential
systems.
The pilot establishes twoway communication with
the receiving control
station prior to initiating a
control station handoff.
The receiving CS
coordinates with the
transferring CS to
establish C2 link with UA,
if/as applicable per the
pilot's operating
handbook (POH).
The Receiving CS
coordinates with
Transferring CS to
establish C2 link with UA,
if/as applicable per POH.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Not intended
for flight into
known icing;
No payload
operator

Not Observed

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

D-57

Documented
in a preset
procedure

No Payload
cameras.

N/E
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30-5

Transferring CS: Provide
handover briefing to
Receiving CS:
- Verify autopilot mode
- Verify matched commands
(if applicable)
- Verify data terminal
settings (if applicable)
- Verify altimeter setting
- Verify current clearance
- Verify any other flightcritical systems

30-6

Transferring CS: Positive
transfer of UA control to
Receiving CS.

30-7

Receiving CS: Verify UA
control.

30-8

Keep the transferring on link
as backup, if/as applicable.

30-9

For transfer of UA control
from one CS to another Perform a control station
handoff briefing for the
receiving pilot, to include at
a minimum:
- UAS overall health
- Fuel/battery state
- Altitude
- Altimeter setting
- Airspeed
- Heading
- ATC clearances
- Any abnormal occurrences
- Contingency/emergency
plan(s)
- Safety critical information
that the receiving pilot will
need to ensure safe flight
- confirmation of command
link integrity (strength/
reliability)

The Transferring CS pilot
provides handover
briefing to Receiving CS
pilot:
- Verify autopilot mode
- Verify matched
commands (if applicable)
- Verify data terminal
settings (if applicable)
- Verify altimeter setting
- Verify current clearance
- Verify any other flightcritical systems
The Transferring CS pilot
verifies positive transfer
of UA control to Receiving
CS.
The Receiving CS pilot is
able to verify UA control.

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pilot ensures that the
transferring CS remains
on link as backup. If/as
applicable.
For CS internal handoff –
The pilot performs a
control station handoff
briefing for the receiving
pilot, to include at a
minimum:
- UAS overall health
- Fuel/battery state
- Altitude
- Altimeter setting
- Airspeed
- Heading
- ATC clearances
- Any abnormal
occurrences
- Contingency/emergency
plan(s)
- Safety critical
information that the
receiving pilot will need
to ensure safe flight
- confirmation of
command link integrity
(strength/ reliability)

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Not capable on
simulator.

Not observed

Pass

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

D-58

Pass

These are
automatically
downloaded to
CS from UA
when receiving
RPIC connects

These are
automatically
downloaded to
CS from UA
when receiving
RPIC connects

Pass

Pass
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30-10

For an internal crew
changeover within a CS –
Perform a crew changeover
briefing for the receiving
pilot, to include at a
minimum:
- UAS overall health
- Fuel/battery state
- Altitude
- Altimeter setting
- Airspeed
- Heading
- ATC clearances
- Any abnormal occurrences
- Contingency/emergency
plan(s)
- Safety critical information
that the receiving pilot will
need to ensure safe flight
- confirmation of command
link integrity (strength/
reliability)

For an internal crew
changeover - The pilot is
able to perform a crew
changeover briefing to
the receiving pilot, to
include at a minimum:
- UAS overall health
- Fuel/battery state
- Altitude
- Altimeter setting
- Airspeed
- Heading
- ATC clearances
- Any abnormal
occurrences
- Contingency/emergency
plan(s)
- Safety critical
information that the
receiving pilot will need
to ensure safe flight
- confirmation of
command link integrity
(strength/ reliability)

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

Pass

D-59

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass
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Flight Card Description

Flight Test
#13
All
All

Test Case Description

Validation Attempt ID
Data Collector ID
Researcher/Assessor's ID
Date Tested
Assumption Assumptions:
#
1
UGCS operating in simulation mode
2

Platform-specific POH is available in CS

7
8

UA is airborne
A simulated ATC entity is available

OP #

Operational Procedure/
Process Step

Expected Results

38-1

Abide by applicable right-ofway rules.

The pilot abides by
applicable right-of-way
rules.

38-2

When applicable, use
available collision avoidance
instruments and understand
their associated procedures.

38-3

If an automated detect and
avoid system is used, it must
give way to other air traffic
in a manner that is
consistent with 14 CFR
91.113.

38-4

Monitor DAA system to
maintain safe distance from
other aircraft.

38-5

Execute evasive maneuvers
when required.

The pilot demonstrates
knowledge of applicable
collision avoidance
instruments and
demonstrate knowledge
of the applicable collision
avoidance procedures.
The pilot monitors the
automated detect and
avoid system (if used) and
ensure that the
automated detect and
avoid system commands
an avoidance maneuver
consistent with 14 CFR
91.113.
The pilot monitors the
DAA system (if used) and
ensure that the DAA
system maintains safe
distance from other
aircraft.
The pilot uses the CS to
execute evasive
maneuvers when

Perform In-Flight Emergencies and
Abnormal Operating Procedures
Collective
UAS Operator ID
June 6, 2017
Test Case (Pass/Fail)
OP #
Operational Procedures
Validated
38
In-Flight Emergencies Detect and Avoid
46
Abnormal Operating
Procedures - General

All
N/A

Final Result

Observer 1

Observer 1

Observer 2

Observer 2

Observer 3

Observer 3

Observer 4

Observer 4

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

Actual Results

Pass / Fail /
Not
Observed/
Not
Applicable /
Suspended
Pass

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

N/A

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

N/A

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

Met or exceeded
expected results

D-60

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected

Pass

N/A
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38-6

When applicable, the pilot
must monitor the execution
of automated collision
avoidance maneuvers.

38-7

Override autonomous DAA
system, if required.

38-8

Notify ATC of intentions
when able.

46-1

Perform any abnormal
operations procedures as
they are published for the
given system.

46-2

Report any failures of
instrumentation, reversion
to backup or standby
systems, or any other
failure/abnormal operation
that may impact safety of
flight to ATC.

required.
When applicable, the
pilot uses the CS to
monitor the execution of
automated collision
avoidance maneuvers.
If required, the pilot
demonstrates the
capability to use the CS to
override autonomous
DAA system.
The pilot notifies ATC of
intentions when able

The pilot is performs any
abnormal operations
procedures as they are
published for the given
system.
The pilot reports any
failures of
instrumentation,
reversion to backup or
standby systems, or any
other failure/abnormal
operation that may
impact safety of flight to
ATC.

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

N/A

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

No DAA
equipment
installed

N/A

N/A

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

Pass

Pass

Not capable with
simulator.

Not observed.

Pass

Met or exceeded
expected results

Pass

No
documented
abnormal
procedures

N/A

Pass

D-61

results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.
Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

N/A

Pass

N/A

Met or
exceeded
expected
results.

Pass

Pass
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APPENDIX E—VALIDATION RESULTS
The validation process during research task PC-3 demonstrated procedures from the operational
requirements identified in research phases PC-1 and PC-2. Not all operational requirements or
procedures were validated using the UGCS because they were independent of control stations.
These requirements or procedures were compared to reasonableness during PC-1 consisting of
manned and unmanned aircraft requirements and procedures. PC-1 analyzed these requirements
and recommended procedures from multiple sources, including federal aviation regulations,
Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM) and Pilots Operating Handbooks (POH). Additionally, by
comparing a common set of UAS tasks to various representative UAS platforms' procedures
commonality was determined. These requirements and procedures were also compared to
manned tasks as given by the FAA Commercial Practical Test Standards (PTS) and the Airman
Certification Standards (ACS) for a typical single-engine airplane (C-172). Relevant tasks from
the Instrument ACS were considered for comparison as appropriate.
The recommended minimum operational requirements and procedures focused on high-level
requirements for UAS pilots such as roles and responsibilities, duty requirements, rest
requirements, and minimum requirements served by the role of PIC. Minimum operational
requirements and procedures related to flight operations were also contained within this section,
organized by phase of flight. Since they were foundational in nature, they formed the basis for
addressing all operational scenarios, from normal flight operations, to emergency, and abnormal
scenarios. The intent with these requirements and procedures was to provide minimum
recommended procedures to the FAA. Recommended requirements and procedures for
additional crewmembers, such as crew chiefs, visual observers (VOs), and other essential crew
were not included in this document.
Table 3. Non-Validated Procedures.

Pilot
Procedure

Operational
Procedure

1
2
3
4
1

Procedure Name
Requirements and Procedures Related to UAS Pilots
Pilot Duty Requirements
Pilot Rest Requirements
Minimum Flight Crew
Before Entering GCS

E-1

Validation Result
Using UGCS
Not Validated
Not Validated
Not Validated
Not Validated
Not Validated
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Table 4. Validated Procedures.

Pilot
Procedure

Operational
Procedure
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14a
14b
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Procedure Name
Presets
Pre-Flight
Engine Start
Pre-Taxi
Taxi - General
Taxi - Communications
Pre-Takeoff Checks
Takeoff Communications
Takeoff Run/ Launch
Initial Climb Out
Aborted Takeoff
Climb to Altitude - General
En-route Operations - General
En-route Operations - Navigation
En-route Operations - Climb
En-route Operations - Course Change
En-route Operations - Descents
Cruise Power Settings
Weather Monitoring
Descent From Cruise - General
Approach - General
Landing - Communications
Approach and Landing - (Human in the Loop)
Go Arounds
Ground Support
Approach and Landing (Automated)
Post-Landing - Communications
Post-Landing - Taxi
Post-Landing - Ground Support
Control Station Handoff - General
Lost-Link Control Procedures - General
Lost-Link Troubleshooting Procedures - General

Validation Result
Using UGCS
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass

33

Operations During Command and Control Degradation
and Loss - General

Pass

34
35

Operations During Periods of Decreased Sensory
Cues from Aircraft and Environment
In-Flight Emergencies - Propulsion Failure

Pass
Pass

E-2
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36

In-Flight Emergencies - Two-way Communications
Failure

Pass

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

In-Flight Emergencies - Navigation Failure - GPS or
Other System
In-Flight Emergencies - Detect and Avoid
In-Flight Emergencies -Uncontrolled Flight
In-Flight Emergencies - Emergency Descent
Emergency Landing - Communication
Emergency Landing - Approach
Emergency Landing - Touchdown
Emergency Landing - Ditching Site Selection
Emergency Landing - Flight Termination
Abnormal Operating Procedures - General

Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass

E-3

